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Abstract
The Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS™ ) is a system designed to
continually monitor the status of special nuclear materials (SNM) at the Oak Ridge based
Y-12 facility. CAVIS consists of an integrated package of low-cost sensors used to
continuously monitor weight and radiation attributes of the stored items. The CAVIS
system detects "changes-in-state" of the special nuclear material and generates an
appropriate alarm. Unfortunately, the CAVIS system is susceptible to false alarms that
do not coincide with the removal of special nuclear material. These false alarms may be
due to the random stochastic nature of the measurements, due to failing components, or
due to external sources in the vicinity of the facility. The response to a false alarm may
be an inventory check, which entails the physical verification of the attributes of the
SNM. Thus, it is desirable to limit this costly response.
This thesis presents the development of a monitoring system for CAVIS to
eliminate the costly responses caused by false alarms. The system merges advanced
statistical algorithms, such as the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), to extract
features related to changes in the CAVIS sensors with an expert system that forms a
hypothesis on the root cause of any anomaly. In addition, kernel-averaging techniques
have been developed as a regional anomaly-monitoring module. This thesis presents the
development of the expert system and the kernel-averaging techniques featured in the
fault detection and isolation system. The implementation of these techniques will enable
the monitoring of the CAVIS system and develop alternative hypothesis of the root cause
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of spurious CA VIS alarms. These alternative hypotheses can be investigated prior to any
inventory check, thus reducing cost and lessening radiation exposures.
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Introduction

This chapter contains an introduction to the CAVIS monitoring system, a Fault Detection
and Isolation (FDI) system for the CAVIS system at the Y-12 National Security complex.
The introduction includes a brief description of CAVIS, the faults CAVIS is subject too,
and the proposed FDI system to detect and isolate CAVIS faults. The project has two
major contributions: 1) the extraction of information rich features from CAVIS data and
2) the mapping of those features to faults hypothesis through an expert system. This
thesis focuses on the second contribution. Information concerning the CAVIS
monitoring system feature extraction can be found in "The Sequential Probability Ratio
Test (SPRT) in Feature Extraction and Expert Systems in Nuclear Material Management"
[Harrison 04].

1.1

Objectives of the Present Study

The objective of the present study is to develop a Fault Detection and Identification (FDI)
system to monitor the Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS ™ ). The
Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge Tennessee currently houses the nations
supply of weapons grade uranium. CAVIS is a security system in place at the Y-12
National Security Complex that monitors this special nuclear material (SNM) to ensure
its safe and secure storage. CAVIS is subject to several types of failures making it
necessary to have a FDI system to monitor the CAVIS system as a whole.
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CA VIS is a system designed to continually monitor the status of SNM. CA VIS is an
integrated package of low-cost sensors that monitor the weight and radiation attributes of
SNM. The system functions by monitoring the SNM for "changes-in-state" and
generates an appropriate alarm in the event of a change.
CAVIS generated alarms may result in an inventory check of the SNM. An inventory
check consists of measurements of the physical characteristics of the SNM to ensure none
of the material has been removed. Inventory checks can be costly, time consuming and
may expose workers to radiation. Thus, it is desirable to perform as few inventory
checks as possible. To limit the number of inventory checks it is necessary to ensure that
CAVIS will only alarm when tampering with the SNM has occurred. However, CA VIS
is prone to generate alarms that do not coincide with the removal of SNM. Thus, a
system that provides some validity to CA VIS generated alarms is desirable. The
proposed CAVIS monitoring system will provide root cause analysis by monitoring the
CAVIS system to ensure that generated alarms are not a result of some type of CAVIS
failure. Henceforth, CAVIS alarms that coincide with the removal of SNM will be
referred to as true alarms. All other CAVIS generated alarms, or alarms that do not
coincide with the removal of SNM, will be referred to as false alarms.
This thesis presents the development of a monitoring system for CAVIS, which
eliminates the costly responses caused by false alarms. The system merges advanced
statistical algorithms, such as the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), to extract
features related to changes in the CAVIS sensors with an expert system that forms a
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hypothesis on the root cause of any anomaly. In addition, kernel-averaging techniques
have been developed as a regional anomaly-monitoring module.

1.2

Problem Statement

The CAVIS system is suspect to false alarms, which may not coincide with the removal
of special nuclear material. Several factors can result in false radiation sensors alarms.
First, the statistical nature of radioactive decay and counting may cause the count rate to
fall outside of the commonly used 95% confidence intervals. In such an instance, the
state of the SNM has not changed and the CAVIS system incorrectly alarms. Secondly,
the CAVIS system is comprised of numerous components that may fail over time. Thus,
the CAVIS system may generate alarms due to component failures, which are not
correlated with changes in the SNM. Thirdly, the storage area is a functioning warehouse
that may have radioactive material being moved. These external radiation sources may
be detected by the CAVIS system causing an alarm in the region of the warehouse where
the external radiation source is located. Fourthly, the radiation sensors used in the
CAVIS system display a spike behavior when they are impacted. Forklifts and other
heavy equipment moving in the warehouse may cause impacts that are transmitted to the
CAVIS storage vaults inducing spikes in the count rates. Finally, the CAVIS system has
displayed a dependence on environmental stimuli such as heat and humidity. Thus, the
environmental conditions of the storage area may cause the CAVIS system to generate
false alarms. These numerous conditions can all result in CA VIS false alarms that may
result in unnecessary and costly inventory checks.
3

1.3

Overview of the Methodology

The CAVIS monitoring system is a proposed system that will monitor the CAVIS
system. In effect, the CAVIS monitoring system is a system that monitors a monitoring
system. The system extracts features related to changes in CAVIS using the sequential
probability ratio test and several other modules. These extract features are then analyzed
by an expert system that forms a hypothesis on the root cause of any anomaly. These
alternative hypotheses can be investigated prior to an inventory check to avert
unwarranted inventory checks. A Regional Anomaly Monitoring Module (RAMM) was
also developed to detect external stimuli that may induce alarms in CAVIS. The RAMM
utilizes kernel-averaging techniques to detect and isolate root causes of abnormality that
affect regions of the CAVIS system.
The SPRT is a statistical test developed by A. Wald in 1945 that is capable of
monitoring statistical properties of a Gaussian distribution [Wald 1945]. The SPRT
determines if an input data stream was generated by the expected, normal Gaussian
distribution characterized by an expected mean and variance, or if there is a greater
probability that the data stream comes from some faulted distribution characterized by a
shifted mean and or altered variance. If the input comes from the faulted distribution, the
SPRT will generate an appropriate alarm. This technique is capable of optimally
monitoring two attributes of the radiation distribution: mean and variance, in contrast to
previous techniques used in CAVIS [Bell], which only monitored the mean. By
monitoring two attributes of the radiation distribution, the SPRT based system will be
capable of identifying additional operational faults.
4

An expert system is an intelligent computer program that uses knowledge and
inference procedures to solve problems that may require significant human expertise
[Feigenbaum 1982). An expert system is comprised of a rule base, a knowledge base,
and an inference engine [Waterman 1986]. Knowledge or facts cause rules to "fire"
which in tum cause additional facts to be hypothesized. The inference engine controls
program execution. When presented information about the state of a system, the expert
system is capable of emulating the diagnostic actions of an expert if the system has been
programmed with the correct knowledge. Expert systems have been used for fault
detection and isolation in several industries including nuclear power [Bhatnagar 1990,
Khartabil 1991, Miller 1994].
Kernel smoothing is a non-parametric technique used to estimate the probability
density function of a data set [Wand 1995). In this application the data are the radiation
detector count rates observed at different locations in the storage facility. Kernels are
used to smooth the discrete measurements resulting in an approximation of the
underlying radiation field. The resulting distribution can be thought of as a weighted
average of the data with the weights defined by the kernel function. Kernel smoothing is
implemented to detect and identify regional radiation disturbances. Kernel smoothing is
used to map the behavior of the sensors in close proximity to one another to form a
neighborhood score. Certain known anomalies may affect a region of the storage facility
and would induce an increase in the neighborhood scores for that region. The maximum
of the neighborhood scores will occur close to the regional anomaly, enabling the
location of the anomaly to be determined and its cause to be investigated.
5

1.4

Organization of the Thesis

The first chapter of this thesis presents the objectives of the study, the problem statement,
and an overview of the methodology describing the proposed FDI system. Chapter 2
contains a literature survey of an application of expert systems in fault detection and
isolation in nuclear systems and an application of kernel smoothing in fault detection and
isolation. Chapter 2 also contains a description of expert systems including the
definition, theory, and a discussion of their deficiencies and a discussion of the method of
kernel smoothing. Chapter 3 contains a description of the CAVIS system. This chapter
describes the Y-12 National Security complex, the Highly Enriched Uranium Material
Facility, the various components of CA VIS, and the known possible faults CA VIS can
experience including a discussion of several environmental experiments performed on
CA VIS. Chapter 4 discusses the methodology of the study, including the integration of
the feature extraction module with the expert system and RAMM to form the FDI system.
Chapter 5 presents the results of the CA VIS monitoring system including a discussion of
the performance of the FDI system and the RAMM on fabricated data and data collected
by the CAVIS system. Conclusions on the study, contributions of the study, and
recommendations for the future work on the system are given in chapter 6.
The CAVIS system at the Y-12 National Security complex is a security system
that monitors the status of SNM by detecting "changes in state" of the SNM. The system
is susceptible to false alarms, the response to which can be costly and time consuming.
The proposed CA VIS monitoring system is capable of distinguishing between true alarms
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and the false alarms. The following chapters of this thesis describe the CA VIS
monitoring system.
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2

Literature Survey of Expert Systems and Kernel Smoothing

This chapter contains a literature survey of expert systems and kernel smoothing that
includes a discussion of the theory and method of expert systems and kernel smoothing.
Applications of expert systems and kernel smoothing in fault detection and isolation
systems are also discussed.

2.1

Expert Systems

Expert systems are one of the most successful and widespread divisions of artificial
intelligence or the study of computer programs that exhibit intelligent behavior. An
expert system is an intelligent computer program that uses knowledge and inference
procedures to solve problems that may require significant human expertise [Feigenbaum
1982]. In general it is necessary to optimize expert systems to solve specific problems, as
attempts to build general problem solving expert systems have not had much success
[Giarratano 1994, Waterman 1986]. If optimized with the correct system knowledge, an
expert system is capable of emulating the actions of an expert system operator when
presented with information concerning the state of that system.
An expert system is comprised of a rule base, a knowledge base, and an inference
engine [Tsoukalas 1997]. The knowledge base contains facts or information about the
state of the system. The rule base contains the knowledge domain of the expert, or a
collection of rules concerning the system that an expert would use to diagnosis the
system. A popular method of representing the knowledge domain of an expert in the rule
8

base is in the form of IF /THEN rules. Knowledge or facts contained in the knowledge
base cause rules in the rule base to "fire" which in tum causes additional facts to be
hypothesized which are further stored in the knowledge base. The continual "firing" of
rules will allow the expert system to build an understanding of the systems problem until
it is able to correctly diagnose the problem. The inference engine controls program
execution by determining which rules are satisfied by the facts in the knowledge base,
prioritizes the satisfied rules and executes the rules with the highest priority. This
enables the inference engine to diagnose the problem affecting the system. Several
introductory texts on expert systems are available. The presentation given here is similar
to Giarratano [Giarratano 1 986] and Waterman [Waterman 1 986].
Expert systems can also contain Explanation and Knowledge Acquisition modules
[Giarratano 1986]. The Explanation module explains the reasoning the Expert system
used to arrive at its decision. The Knowledge Acquisition module enables a user to add
additional rules to the rule base of the expert system without having to explicitly code the
rules. This is useful as additional information concerning the expert system problem may
become available, or the knowledge engineering may have not covered all possible
scenarios. A Graphical User Interface allows the Expert system to communicate with the
user [Giarratano 1 986]. Figure 2. 1 illustrates the various components and the process of
data flow in a typical Expert system.

9

Figure 2.1. Structure of Rule-Based Expert System

2.1.1

Knowledge Engineering and Representation

In order to emulate the actions of an expert, an expert system must be programmed with
significant knowledge of the problem it is to solve, and the course of actions an expert
would take when presented with the problem. The gathering and programming of this
knowledge is known as knowledge engineering. The knowledge engineer extracts
strategies and rules of thumb for problem solving from the human expert and uses this
knowledge to build the expert system [Waterman 1 986] . For the expert system to be
successful, it is necessary for the knowledge domain (the domain of information extract
from experts) to span the entire problem domain (specific to the current problem area).
An expert system containing knowledge of medicine would be ineffective at solving
problem in engineering, and vice versa. Thus, the proper knowledge must be
programmed into the knowledge domain of the expert system. In contrast, it is necessary
to only program knowledge into the knowledge domain that is necessary to solve the
specific problem. As previously mentioned, early attempts to produce systems capable of
10

solving large classes of problems, or general problem solvers, were unsuccessful
[Giarratano 1 994, Waterman 1 986). As the number of classes of problems a system
could solve increased, the poorer the system preformed on each individual problem
[Waterman 1 986). This is because the number of rules involved in the knowledge
domain became very large and it became increasing difficult for the system to distinguish
between the rules and solve the problem. Thus, it is necessary for an expert system to be
problem specific. The later development of Fuzzy Logic by Zadeh [Zadeh 1 965]
extended the applicability of expert system rule-base by allowing greater flexibility in the
formation of the rules [Tsoukalas 1 997]; however it is still necessary for an expert system
to be problem specific.
Expert system development spawned from several disciplines of artificial
intelligence. One such area is known as cognitive science and focuses on the method that
human's process information or how humans think. This is important to expert systems
because they attempt to emulate the actions of a human expert. Newell and Simon were
able to demonstrate that human cognition can be expressed by IF/THEN rules [Newell
1 972]. A simple example of human knowledge being expressed in IF/THEN rules is IF
the car will not start THEN check the gas. Of course there are thousands of reasons why
a car may not start but without any other operatory knowledge of the car the first reaction
to a car not starting is to ensure that the vehicle has adequate fuel. Additional
combinations of IF/THEN rules can be used to diagnose the more complicated failures
that can occur in an automobile. Depending on the complexity of the problem the
number of IF/THEN rules featured in an expert system can be hundreds or thousands. As
11

previously mentioned, the portion of the expert system that contains the knowledge
concerning the problem is known as the knowledge base. The knowledge base of an
expert system contains both factual and heuristic knowledge, which can be expressed in
the form of IF/THEN rules. Factual knowledge is the widely excepted and understood
knowledge concerning the problem domain and contains the underlying principals of the
problem domain [Engelmore 1993). Heuristic knowledge is the knowledge of the
instinct or gut feeling an expert in the field of the problem domain [Engelmore 1 993).
This includes the judgments an expert in the problem domain would use to make a
decision when presented with various situations in the problem domain. Heuristic
knowledge contains the experiences an expert in the field has had while working in the
field.
Expert systems responsible for diagnosing large complex systems may feature
hundreds or thousands of rules. In these large systems it is possible for several rules in
the rule base to be satisfied by the conditions in the knowledge base. Thus, it is
necessary for expert system to be able to determine which rule should be executed by the
current state of the system and in some cases, choose between multiple rules that could be
executed. As previously mentioned, the inference engine determines which rules are
satisfied by the knowledge base and determines the order of execution of the rules by
prioritizing the rules in order to form an inference or make a diagnosis about the state of a
system. Returning to the automobile example, suppose the car will not start and the
engine will not turn over. An expert system attempting to diagnosis this problem may
have a rule base featuring two rules that state I ) IF the car will not start THEN check the
12

gas, and 2) IF the car will not start AND the engine does not tum over THEN check the
battery. The antecedent for both rules is satisfied however, if the engine does not tum
over the failure is probably not an empty gas tank. In this instance, the Expert systems
inference engine would prioritize the satisfied rules and suggest checking the cars battery
first.
The inference engine is able to determine which rules in the rule base to execute
using the problem-solving paradigm to organize the problem and determine the order the
problem should be solved [Giarratano 1994]. This often involves chaining the IF/THEN
rules to form an order or line of reasoning. Problems can be forward or backwards
chained depending on the desired direction of the problem solving [Giarratano 1994].
Forward chaining begins with a set of conditions and moves towards some conclusion
using the IF/THEN rules contained in the knowledge base. Backwards chaining begins
with the desired conclusion and reasons backwards to the conditions necessary for that
conclusion to occur. By programming the rule base knowledge in the structure of
multiple IF/THEN rules and following a line of reason to the desired goal, expert systems
are able to infer the action an expert would take when presented with the necessary
information concerning the state of the system.

2.1.2

Expert System Uncertainty

When experts solve problems, they have an idea of how confident they are in their
solution. The uncertainty that experts have in their solution can be due to inadequate
information concerning the problem and uncertainty in the accuracy of the rules and
13

principals they used in determining their solution. Calculating an uncertainty for the
conclusion of an expert system can be a difficult task. This is in part because it is
difficult to assign an uncertainty to the IF/THEN rules contained in the knowledge base.
One method of assigning uncertainty to an expert system is to use fuzzy logic and make
the expert system a fuzzy system [Engelmore 1993]. Fuzzy logic is a problem solving
method that uses fuzzy numbers that can be expressed in linguistic terms to address the
imprecision of the inputs and output of the system variables [Tsoukalas 1997]. In a fuzzy
system, each IF/THEN rule has a degree of fulfillment, or the degree to which the rule is
satisfied. An uncertainty in the expert system conclusion can be calculated using the
degree of fulfillment of each rule used by the expert system to arrive at the conclusion.
Fuzzy logic can also be useful in expert systems with extremely large knowledge bases.
In crisp or non-fuzzy systems, when the knowledge base becomes increasingly large, the
inference engine can have an increasing difficult time determining which knowledge to
use to arrive at the appropriate conclusion. Fuzzy logic can be used to remedy this issue
[Tsoukalas 1997].

2.1.3

Expert System Deficiencies

Expert systems have been proven successful at diagnosing specific problems but some
deficiencies in their ability still exist. These deficiencies are mainly attributed to the
knowledge base of the expert system, or strictly their inability to infer from the
knowledge base, and to actually understand the knowledge contained in the knowledge
base. Expert systems are incapable of a complete understanding of the knowledge base
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and this can often cause their diagnosis to suffer [Luger 2002]. For example, MYCIN
[Shortliffe 1 976] one of the first expert systems was a medical application used to select
the antimicrobial therapy for patient and contains no knowledge of physiology. The
expert system only contains the knowledge necessary to select the antimicrobial therapy
for a patient. MYCIN selects a treatment by analyzing patient records, and lab results
and then asks the user a series of question to narrow in on the correct treatment. A myth
concerning the system states that MYCIN actually asked if the patient was pregnant even
after being told the patient was a male [Luger 2002]. Regardless of whether or not the
myth is true, the example illustrates the inability of the expert system to have a profound
understanding of the knowledge contained in its knowledge base. This lack of profound
understanding results in the expert system having an inability to provide a profound
explanation of its arrived decision. The explanation module is really just the expert
system asserting which antecedents were satisfied in the knowledge base. Thus, the lack
of a profound understanding of its knowledge base leads to several deficiencies in expert
systems.
In addition to a lack of profound understanding of its knowledge base, expert
systems are incapable of inferring outside of their knowledge base. Thus, expert systems
"lack robustness and flexibility" [Luger 2002]. When presented with a problem they
cannot solve, expert systems are incapable of going and searching for more knowledge on
the subject or reasoning the problem out from deeper principles than define the problem.
This inability of an expert system to learn or search out new knowledge is also a
deficiency [Luger 2002]. In general, once the expert system is programmed and
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complete, the knowledge base will not extend itself. Some expert systems are
programmed with knowledge acquisition modules; however, this is not the system
learning on its own, but rather additional knowledge being programming into the expert
system. Finally, and perhaps the most serious deficiency for this particular application is
the difficulty in verifying the decision, or providing a confidence in the decision [Luger
2002]. The expert system is only as accurate as its knowledge base, and it is difficult to
quantify the accuracy of the knowledge base. Where many techniques may have a 99%
confidence in their result, it is difficult to give a confidence in the result of an expert
system.
Despite these deficiencies, expert systems have enjoyed great success when
applied to a specific problem. Expert systems have numerous applications in geology,
medicine, engineering, and military science, among many others. With the adaptation of
representing human knowledge as IF/THEN rules, expert systems have evolved from
unsuccessful systems that attempted to be general problem solvers, to extremely
successful problem specific systems. The following section describes the application of
an expert system.

2.2

Expert Systems Applications

AI scientists have attempted to build computer programs capable of exhibiting intelligent
behavior since the 1 950s. These early attempts focused on building general problem
solver that were capable of solving large classes of problems. These attempts were
generally unsuccessful, however some significant result did come from this work such as
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Newell and Simons demonstration that human cognition could be represented by
IF/THEN type production rules. This work paved the way for the rise of knowledge
based systems that were problem specific rather than general problem solvers. Early
expert system such as DENDRAL [Linsay 1980], MYCIN [Shortliffe 1 976] , and
PROSPECTOR [Duba 1979) are all examples of problem specific expert systems that
were successful in particular fields. In 1965, work began on DENDRAL, a system that
identifies the molecular structure of a compound. The system uses knowledge of
chemical expertise on mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic response data to identify
the unknown compound from a database of molecular structures of all compounds
[Linsay 1 980].
MYCIN is an expert system used in medicine to select the antimicrobial therapy for
patient with viral infections ofbacteremia, meningitis, and cystitis [Shortliffe 1 976).
MYCIN functions by first diagnosing the infection using laboratory results, patient
history, and the patients symptoms and then selects the appropriate treatment by
mimicking treatments previously administered by experience physicians. MYCIN was
the first expert system to separate the knowledge base and the inference engine. This
enabled the core of MYCIN, known as the shell, to be reused in another expert system
with a different knowledge base.
PROSPECTOR is an expert system used in geology to determine the likelihood of
mineral and ore deposits in a region based on samples from the region [Duba 1979].
PROSPECTOR functioned by analyzing characteristics of the region such as the geologic
setting, structural settings, and the type of rocks and minerals discovered from samples
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from the region. Using this information PROSPECTOR infers the likelihood of
discovering deposits of certain ores by comparing and contrasting the site with previously
developed models. PROSPECTOR is a large system containing over 1 000 rules. These
early problem specific knowledge based systems demonstrated that expert systems could
be successfully used to solve real world practical problems and paved the way for the
application of expert systems in other areas.
Today expert systems have application in multiple disciplines including chemistry,
medicine, and geology as well as agriculture (PLANT/ds), computer systems (XCON),
law (EXPERTAX), engineering (REACTOR), and military science (EPES). Expert
systems have also been used for fault detection and isolation in several industries
including nuclear power. The following review discusses an application of an expert
system to a nuclear application.

2.2.1

Operator Advisors

Expert systems have been develop to aid nuclear power plant operators by continually
monitoring plant parameters and when an abnormality is detected, diagnoses the plant
using a hierarchical classification scheme that are known as operator advisors (OAs).
The OAs have been developed for use on simulators of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
and a simulator of the K reactor at the Savannah River Site as simulators enable testing of
hypothetical accident scenarios that can be difficult to test and rarely seen in normal
operating conditions [Miller, etc. 1 994].
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The OAs discussed here feature three modules; data management, monitoring,
and diagnosis, with a fourth module, procedure management, still under development.
The data management module performs several tasks including reading the data from a
serial port, storing the data in a database that must be easily accessible for later use, and
providing data to the other module in the OA when it is requested. The data management
module data is organized in relational databases, which enables convenient storage and
retrieval of data and trends in the data by the other modules. The monitoring module
inspects the status of the plant by detecting changes in values of plant data under normal
operating condition. Current plant data values are compared to baseline values that were
established when the OA was initialized. If some value or values deviate from the
baseline value by some threshold amount the monitoring module determines that some
abnormal condition exists. If an abnormal condition exists the diagnostic module is
initialized. The diagnostic module purpose is to isolate the specific component failure or
plant automated action that resulted in the abnormal condition. For every component
failure that can occur there exist an expected pattern of plant parameter changes that are
characteristic of the component failure. Diagnosis of component failures requires
matching the observed abnormal conditions with a known pattern of plant values that are
characteristic of some specific component failure.
Nuclear power plants contain thousands of components that are subject to failure,
thus it is necessary to reduce the search space to a manageable size in order to isolate the
failed component. Organizing the plant into a hierarchy of systems and component
reduces the search space. Diagnosis is performed by identifying the system, subsystem,
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component, and subcomponent that have failed until the specific component failure is
isolated. Top systems are evaluated first. If a failure is found, the lower level systems
that correspond to the top system are evaluated. If a failure is not found, the lower level
systems are not evaluated. This process continues until the faulted component is isolated.
Systems unrelated to the failure are not evaluated thus reducing the search space. The
OA determines if a system is faulted using; 1) the status of systems which support the
system, 2) the status of inputs to the system, 3) the presence of signals which initiate
some automatic action by the system, and 4) the system output. This hierarchy diagnosis
method is known as system based decomposition utilizing a search strategy of
classification known as establish-refine. Hierarchical classification has several
advantages, namely that highly compiled knowledge is easily encoded in structure
programming constructs, and the search space can be easily reduced.
It is important to note that this method of organization of the knowledge base does
not insure the correct diagnose of all abnormalities related to the system by the expert
system. This is because it is difficult to conceive all possible interactions between
systems for every possible scenario. For this reason the OA features a knowledge
acquisition module. Additional knowledge is added to the OA by following a set of step
where the user 1) chooses a scenario of interest to add, 2) identifies all plant systems
associated with the scenario, 3) develops the proper hierarchical decomposition for the
systems related to the scenario, 4) incorporates this scenario specific knowledge
including the hierarchical decomposition into the expert system and 5) tests the expert
systems response on the scenario.
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The expert system was applied to a multiple mode Residual Heat Remover (RHR)
in a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) to diagnose and manage operations and procedures.
The RHR system is an eight-mode system that is used to remove heat from the core under
normal shutdown conditions, maintain desired pool temperature, and to maintain desired
reactor water level under abnormal conditions by condensing reactor steam. The original
design of the OA was unable to distinguish between transients caused by operator actions
such as a change in power level, and faults in the actual system. To account for this
deficiency, the system was modified so that transients were qualified as system
abnormalities or changes caused by normal operator actions such that the RHR system is
in a steady state, a transient state (changing from one mode to another), or an abnormal
state. When the OAs monitoring module detects a change in the operating conditions of
the RHR the OA uses a routine to check if the abnormality is caused by operator action or
if the system is indeed in an abnormal state. If the routine determines the system is in an
abnormal state the diagnostic module is initiated, else the OA initiates another module to
assist the operator in whatever action is being executed.
Due to the multi-modal aspect of the RHR, it can be difficult to use classification
based decomposition to diagnose the system. This is because it is necessary to construct
a different diagnostic hierarchy for each mode, or build one diagnostic hierarchy with a
knowledge base for each mode. This can be remedied by using a functional base
decomposition to decompose the system hierarchy. Functional decomposition operates
by denoting top hypotheses that specify failures and faults in the system. The hierarchy
is based on system malfunction and the function of the subsistent of the systems
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containing the abnormalities related to the malfunction. The top of the hierarchy states
the function of the system being diagnosed, in this case the RHR. The lower level states
the major functions that are necessary to perform the function of the higher levels until
the hierarchy ends with the function of independent components. This system is
diagnosed to determine if it is performing its function for the indicated mode. This is
achieved by diagnosing the input and output conditions of the system. If some fault is
detected, the expert system systematically moves down the malfunction hierarchy testing
the status of each component it encounters until the failed component is isolated. The
functional decomposition approaches is advantageous as the functionality of the
components of nuclear power plants is well defined which provides consistent
malfunction hypotheses. Also, the multiple modes of the RHR system can be diagnosed
using this method of hierarchical decomposition.
The expert system was applied to a heavy water reactor to detect and diagnoses
root causes of deviations from normality in the reactors process water loop including
leaks. The applied system uses a diagnostic knowledge base that features a hybrid of the
system-based decomposition and the functional based decomposition. This organization
of the knowledge base was used because a set of specific malfunctions was chosen and
experts in diagnosing these malfunctions were available [Miller 1994]. The heavy water
reactor that the expert system was applied to was a 2700 MW thermal reactor used to
produce plutonium, tritium, and medical isotopes. Heat from the core is transferred to the
process water loop that moderates and cools the core. Heat exchangers are then used to
transfer the heat from the process water loop to the cooling water system that rejects the
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heat into the environment. The process water loop's main function is to dissipate heat
generated in the reactor by pumping heavy water (D20) from the reactor to heat
exchangers where it is cooled. The system consists of a pump suction valve, a pump, a
heat exchanger, and an outlet valve.
The knowledge base for the expert system was acquired through written
documents, and interviews with experts. This information was organized into a
malfunction hypothesis hierarchy where the top nodes represent more general
malfunction hypothesis and the lower nodes called tip nodes represent more specific
malfunction hypothesis that correspond to a specific malfunction. The organization
featured a hybrid of system and functional based decomposition where the choice
between the decomposition is knowledge driven. The reason for choosing the hybrid
representation was the goal of an expert system is to not only perform the task of an
expert, but also mimic the manor in which the expert performs the task. The hybrid
knowledge base was best able to obtain this goal.
Here the decomposition of a process water system malfunction is discussed to
demonstrate the use of functional and system base decomposition. The top node of this
hierarchy is naturally a process water malfunction. The process water system can be
decomposed into two major functions of process water containment and process water
transport through the reactor and heat exchangers. Thus, lower node malfunctions are
process water leak and process water flow malfunction. The children nodes of the
process water flow malfunction use a system based decomposition to isolate the loop
where the flow malfunction occurred. A functional based decomposition is then used to
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classify the malfunction as a flow loss or valve malfunction in the faulted loop. This
final classification leads to the isolation of the root cause of failure in the process water
system. By using both types of decomposition the root cause of failure is identified in a
manor similar to that an expert would use.
This expert system has undergone several structural tests to ensure its
functionality and accuracy in diagnosis. Testing of the knowledge base indicated that
system could correctly detect and diagnose the complete set of process water
malfunctions.
The common factor in the article "Experience with the hierarchical method for
diagnosis of faults in nuclear power plant systems" and the research present in this thesis
is that both use an expert system for fault detection and isolation for a large complex
system featuring a large number of components. Of course a nuclear power plant is
immensely more complex than the CAVIS system, however, the systems are similar in
that both feature multiple components that are subject to failure and these failures yield
affects in other components in the system. Similar to the nuclear power plant the
structure of the CA VIS system lends itself to decomposition into a hierarchy that an
expert system can use to detect and isolate malfunctions and failures. Thus, a
hierarchical method can be used by an expert system to detect and diagnosis faults and
malfunctions in the CAVIS system similar to the method the expert system is used to
diagnosis the nuclear power plant.
The structure of the OA described in the article is similar to the expert system
designed to monitor the CAVIS system. The OA from the article features four modules:
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a data management module, a monitoring module, a diagnosis module, and a procedure
module. The expert system designed to monitor the CAVIS system currently features
three modules that perform similar tasks. The CAVIS monitoring expert system features
a feature extraction module that acts as a custodian and interpreter for the data collected
by the CAVIS system. This module is similar to the data management module in that it
processes data from the CAVIS system and provides information pertinent to the other
modules of the expert system. A difference between the CAVIS monitoring expert
systems feature extraction module and the OA data management module is that the
feature extraction module does not currently read or log data from the CAVIS system.
However, to implement the CAVIS monitoring expert system this type of functionality
would need to be added to the CAVIS monitoring expert system. The CAVIS monitoring
system also features a module that monitors the features extracted by the feature
extraction module to determine if some abnormality exists in the CAVIS system.
Comparing the value of the extracted feature to some threshold value performs this
monitoring. If some extracted feature value exceeds the threshold value for the feature
the CAVIS system is considered in an abnormal state and the knowledge base module of
the expert system is initialized. This module is extremely similar to the monitoring
module of the OA. They practically serve identical roles in identical fashions. Finally,
the CAVIS monitoring expert system features a module that attempts to isolate the source
of abnormality in the CAVIS system detected by its monitoring module. This isolation is
performed using a classification base system decomposition hierarchical scheme. This
module is similar to the OAs diagnostic module except the OAs diagnostic module
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features a functional based decomposition scheme as well as a system based
decomposition scheme. The CAVIS monitoring expert system is similar to the
application of OAs to diagnose nuclear power plant systems in that they both use a
similar system architecture and method to detect and isolate faults in the systems they are
designed to monitor.
The main difficulties faced by the OA diagnosing the nuclear power plant were
transient state of the power plant where operator actions induce changes in state of the
plant variables rather than a malfunction or faulted component. Operator actions such as
power reduction induce changes in state of system variables that the expert system has
difficulty diagnosing. Introducing a classification of the state of the nuclear power plant
and organizing the knowledge base in a functional decomposition overcame this
difficulty. This type of difficulty should not be faced in the implementation of the
CAVIS monitoring expert system, as no transient states exist in the CAVIS system.
The method presented in this article is pertinent to this research in that it
demonstrates a successful application of expert systems in fault detection and isolation
nuclear system application. The architectures of both systems are very similar with both
systems featuring basically the same modules. Also, both systems lend themselves well
to a hierarchical decomposition that enable system base and for the OA function based
decomposition of malfunctions and faulted components. The main difficulties faces by
the OA are transient states that induce changes in state of the system variables. These
difficulties were overcome by qualifying the mode of the system and organizing the
knowledge base in a functional decomposition. The CAVIS monitoring system will not

26

face these difficulties, as there are no transient states or operations utilized in the CAVIS
system.

2.3

Kernel Smoothing

This section contains a description of kernel smoothing and describes the method that it is
implemented. Kernel smoothing is a non-parametric technique used to estimate the
probability density function of a data set using a kernel density estimator. It can be
thought of as a weighted average of the data with the weights defined by the kernel
function, which measures a similarity between stored examples and new observations.
Suppose data exists from a random sample such that X 1 , • • • ,Xn taken from a continuous,
univariate density f. The kernel-smoothing estimator

j

is simply the weighted average

of each observation in the data set defined by equation 2.1
Eq. 2 . 1
where Kh ( x, x; ) represents the kernel function that defines the weighted average with a
kernel width h, n is the size of the data set, x is the contributing observation, and x; is the
data point around which the kernel is placed. The kernel estimate value at the point x is
the average of each of the n kernels ordinate at the point x. The kernels spread a
probability density of size _!_ from each data point to its neighboring data points.
Summing the contributions from each data point results in the kernel estimate of the
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probability density of the data set. Thus, the kernel-smoothing estimator f is a
representation of the underlying behavior of the data set [Wand 1995] .
A kernel function is a multivariate function for XE Rd and has the following
properties [Cherkassky, 1998]:
1. Kh(x,x;) takes on a maximum value where x=x;.
2. IKh(x,x;)I decreases with abslx-x;I.
3. Kh(x,x;) is a general function of 2d variables
4. Kh(x,x;) is a non-negative function
5. Kh(x,x;) is a radially symmetric function
Any function that meets these criteria can be used as a kernel function, thus there exist
many types of kernel functions such as the top hat kernel function, the Epanechnikov
kernel function, the triangular kernel function, and the commonly used Gaussian kernel
function defined in equation 2.2.
Eq. 2.2
In equation 2.2, x; is the data point around which the kernel is placed, x is the
contributing observation and h is a smoothing parameter or kernel width. The kernel
width (h) dictates the spread of the Gaussian function and can be used as a regularization
parameter. As the kernel width is increased, the system becomes more biased while its
variance decreases, and vice versa. This means that as the kernel width is increased,
more weight is given to the surrounding observations and the result is forced towards the
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mean of the observations, thus the larger the kernel width the smoother the result. The
optimal kernel width is problem specific and in many instances must be estimated.
Figure 2.2 displays several Gaussian kernel functions with varying kernel widths.

2.4

Kernel Smoothing Applications

The following section contains a description of an application that uses kernel smoothing
for fault detection.

2.4.1

Kernel Smoothing for Fault Symptom Generation

Several methods of fault diagnosis for systems have been developed and generally can be
classified as model-based fault detection and model-free fault detection methods. The
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utilization of model-based approaches to real life process may be somewhat restricted in
that an accurate process model of the system, that may not be available, is required to
produce realistic and reliable results. Model based fault detection approaches are also
limited because they can generally only be applied to linear processes. If an accurate and
reliable model is available, model based techniques are superior, however if a model is
not available a non-model based technique may be more appropriate. Suggested by their
name, model-free approaches do not require a model for fault symptom generation.
These methods function by comparing the measured and desired values of the controlling
variables in a system to determine the operating mode for the system.
In the article "A note on nonparametric kernel smoothing for model-free fault
symptom generation" [Fenu 1 999], a kernel smoothing method is discussed for model
free fault symptom generation for nonlinear systems. As previously discussed, kernel
based smoothing is a statistical method used to smooth noisy or scattered data to
determine the underlying probability density function of the data. Here a method of
applying kernel smoothing for fault detection is proposed that employs the kernel
bandwidth as a fault symptom. The basic method is when some fault occurs in the
system, some correlated change will occur in the smoothness characteristics of the time
behavior of the variable being smoothed. The change in the smoothness characteristics
will be reflected in the features of the kernel smoother, namely the optimal kernel
bandwidth. A change in the optimal kernel bandwidth may signify a fault in the system.
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Thus, the optimal kernel bandwidth can be interpreted as a fault symptom, which can be
monitored for fault detection.
Consider some single input single output nonlinear discrete time closed-loop plant
system such that
xr=1 = f(x, , r, , t),
y, = h(x, , t)
where x1 E 9t n represents the state vector, y1 E 9t denotes the output measurement vector,
and r, E 9t is the set-point input. Also consider the sampling of some unknown
continuous random variable y(t) from the system over some finite time interval [t-T,t] .
The density of the variable can be determined using the kernel-smoothing estimator

J.

As previously discussed, the kernel bandwidth h plays a role in the kernel smoothing
result and can be used in fault symptom generation. Several criteria can be used to
determine the optimal kernel bandwidth one such being a minimization of an average
cost function such that
f' E[y(t )-](t )] 2 dt
h, = arg min
h, J,-r
0

where E[ x] 2 is the square of the expectation. Assuming that the kernel estimator

J is

twice continuously differentiable and that the error in the estimate is a white random
process with constant variance a2-, then it is possible to obtain the optimal kernel
bandwidth such that
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f

where c k = K 2 (x)dx is the integral over the square of kernel function K(x),

f

d; = x 2 K(x )dx is the second moment of the kernel function K(x), }" (x) denot.es the
second derivative of the scalar function

/0 , and n is the number of samples of y(t) over

the time interval [t-T,t].
The technique developed in the article is able to use the kernel bandwidth as a
fault symptom because the kernel smoothing provides a smooth estimate of the density of
the unknown variable y(t). The optimal kernel smoothing bandwidth h1° is a
regularization parameter and dictates the smoothness of the kernel smooth estimator f .
Any change in the system will be reflected in a change in the optimal kernel bandwidth
h1° . Thus, the time behavior of the optimal kernel bandwidth can be used as a fault
symptom making the kernel smoother a change detector that can be used to correlate a
fault symptom with the current set point vector and any other available variables. It is
important to note that the equation for the optimal kernel bandwidth h1° is difficult to
apply in practice because its calculation involves complex unknowns that must be
estimated from the data. A good approximation of the optimal kernel bandwidth can be
determined using the leave one out cross validation method. Leave one out cross
validation partitions the data set into many training and testing sets in which one
observation is left out and computes an average squared error over the various sets.
Using this method it is possible to define the cross validation function that validates the
ability to predict y(t) such that
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r
1
CV(h1 ) = - I, [y(t) - ](1)] 2
T + 1 i=r _ r

The estimation of the optimal kernel bandwidth is then given by the minimizing the
average cost function of the cross validation function such that
h, = arg min CV(h1 )
0

h,

This equation is an approximate estimation of the optimal kernel bandwidth and
simulations have shown that approximation errors are negligible if the time interval T is
not to small.
The developed method was applied to a well-known FDI industrial actuator
benchmark Blanke et al. The benchmark at Aalborg University in Denmark is based on
an electro-mechanical test facility. The benchmarks actuator is a brushless synchronous
DC motor connected by an arm and an epicyclic gear train to a rod. A similar motor is
mounted in parallel to the rod that allows the desire external load torque to be simulated.
Four sequences of data from a real-time monitoring of the process were analyzed by the
kernel smoother with the size of the moving batch set at 150 milli-seconds. The four
sequences were no load disturbance, a position measurement fault, a load step
disturbance, and a current fault. During the no load disturbance sequence the actuator is
operating without an external load torque being applied by the motor. The position
measurement fault sequence simulates a malfunction of the position measurement of the
motors power drive. The current fault simulates a malfunction that results in the power
drive being able to only deliver positive current. The load step disturbance simulates an
external torque load applied to the actuator. The developed method was able to
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successfully diagnose the faulted sequences in the process as the position and current
faults resulted in significant changes in the kernel bandwidth, while the kernel bandwidth
remained unaffected by the load disturbance. Thus, the optimal kernel bandwidth was
successfully used as a fault symptom in this nonlinear system and the kernel smooth
estimator could be used as a fault generator by monitoring the smoothness characteristics
of the time behavior of the measured variables.
The common factor in the article on nonparametric kernel smoothing for model
free fault symptom generation and the research present in this thesis is that both use
kernel-smoothing techniques to monitor a system for a faulted state. The method
presented in the article monitors the parameters of the kernel smoothing for changes that
signify some fault state of the system. Here the optimal kernel bandwidth is calculated
for each setpoint and monitored for changes in order to generate faults. This research
implements kernel smoothing to detect and identify regional radiation disturbances
caused by regional anomalies in the CA VIS system. Here the actual kernel smoother
estimator

J is monitored for an abrupt change, as the probability function of the CAVIS

sensor being monitored by the kernel smoother should center about a mean value of zero
given no abnormalities in the CAVIS system.
The method presented in this article is pertinent to this research in that it demonstrates
a successful application of kernel smoothing in a fault detection application. While the
two applications do not monitor a common fault symptom both are based on similar
reasoning that fault detection is possible by monitoring the smoothness characteristics of
the systems they are assessing. A problem encountered in the method presented in the
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article is the calculation of the optimal kernel bandwidth. This is because the calculation
of the optimal kernel bandwidth involves complex unknowns that must be estimated from
the data. This problem was remedied by estimating the optimal kernel bandwidth using a
leave one out cross validation method. A similar problem exists in this research in that it
is difficult to choose an optimal kernel bandwidth for the kernel smoothing. This is
because the kernel bandwidth is dependent on the physical distance between the sensors
in the CA VIS system. The physical distance can be difficult to estimate, as the CAVIS
storage area is a functional area where the equipment is frequently being moved. Thus,
the optimal kernel bandwidth will have to be determined empirically when implemented
at the Y-12 site.
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3

Y-12 National Security Complex and CAVIS Background

This chapter contains a description of the Y-12 National Security Complex, and the
equipment and proposed facility for the storage and monitoring of the SNM. This
includes a discussion of the Highly Enriched Uranium Material Facility (HEUMF) and
the Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS™ ).

3.1

Y-12 National Security Complex

The Y-12 National Security complex, shown in figure 3.1, is an 811-acre facility in Oak
Ridge Tennessee built in 1943. Part of the Manhattan Project, the original mission of the
Y-12 facility was to process uranium for the first atomic bomb [Yesterday at the Y-12
National Security Complex] . Since the end of World War II, the mission of Y-12 has
changed to including the manufacturing and remanufacturing of unique nuclear weapon
components, the dismantling, storage and evaluation of returned weapons, and the storage
and management of enriched uranium material known as special nuclear material (SNM)
[Defense Programs at Y-12] .
As nuclear weapons are retired from the national stockpile or returned for
dismantlement under strategic arms reduction treaties, the size of the nations stockpile of
weapons grade uranium will increase. The safe, secure, & reliable storage of this
material is essential to national security. The Y-12 National Security complex currently
houses the nations supply of weapons grade uranium and construction is currently
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Figure 3.1. Y-12 National Security Complex [Society for the Historical Preservation of
the Manhattan Project 2004]

underway on the Highly Enriched Uranium Material Facility (HEUMF) that will function
as a modem storage facility for the SNM.

3.2

Highly Enriched Uranium Material Facility (HEUMF)

The Highly Enriched Uranium Material Facility (HEUMF) will act as the nations
repository for highly enriched uranium (SNM) [Parson 2002]. Currently, there are five
separate facilities at the Y-12 National Security complex where SNM is stored. Upon
completion, the HEUMF will act as the single repository of the SNM [Parson 2002].
Construction began on the facility in 200 I and should be completed in 2005. A modem
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monitoring system termed CAVIS will monitor the storage of the SNM in the HEUMF.
Figure 3.2 is a picture of the proposed HEUMF.

3.3

Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS)

One of the missions of the Y-12 National Security complex is the storage of SNM. The
Department of Energy (DOE) requires that the status of the SNM inventories be
confirmed periodically [Younkin 1999]. The purposed of the inventory status is to ensure
that the SNM is secure. One method is to continuously verify that the weight and
radiation attributes of the SNM have not changed. Currently, inventory verifications are
performed manually, resulting in an expensive process that exposes workers to radiation.

Figure 3.2. Highly Enriched Uranium Material Facility [Parsons 2001]
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CAVIS was developed to provide a method to remotely perform the inventory
confirmation [Pickett 1 999]. CAVIS is an integrated package of low-cost sensors used to
continuously monitor the weight, radiation, and temperature attributes of SNM [Pickett
2003 A]. The CAVIS system detects "changes-in-state" of these attributes for the special
nuclear material and generates an appropriate alarm. CAVIS continually receives the
radiation, weight, and temperature signals and forms a hierarchical network of
components including Power and Communication Distribution Units (PCDU) and Sensor
Concentrations. Figure 3 .3 illustrates the structure of the CAVIS system.
Several sensor types are available for monitoring the SNM attributes. This
research projects focuses solely on the radiation sensors. The available radiation sensors
for use in CAVIS are RADSiP™ , RADTELL™ , or other ORSENS™ radiation sensors.
The radiation sensors selected for use in the CAVIS system are RADSiPTM Photodiode
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Figure 3.3. CAVIS System Diagram
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Gamma Ray Sensors. These sensors are small, inexpensive, and are well suited to
monitor stored nuclear materials for long periods of time. Suggested by their name, the
sensors monitor the gamma ray emission of a radioactive source. The sensor continually
monitors the gamma ray emission radiation level of the SNM. Due to the long half-life
of the nuclear material, the radiation level remains approximately constant, so any
deviation suggests an abnormal status [Harrison 04].
The radiation signal, detected by the RADSiP detectors, propagates through a
series of junctions. The signal is first sent to a sensor concentrator, manufactured by
ORSENS, for processing. Here the signal collected by the detector is summed to
calculate a radiation count rate. The signal is then sent to a Power and Communication
Distribution Unit. This component provides power to the Sensor Concentrator and
RADSiP sensors and relays the radiation count rate to a central computer system. The
monitoring computer system can be a desktop personal computer running either a
National Instruments LabView® (Windows® 95) application or the GraFIC™ software
package on a Windows® NT system [Pickett 2003 A]. The computer system
requirement is an Intel Pentiuml 33 MHz based computer or higher. The computer
system logs the count and performs the calculation necessary to determine if a change in
state of the special nuclear material has occurred.
Currently, a change in state of a radiation signal is defined as a certain deviation
in the count rate, measured in the standard deviation of the signal, from the norm.
Radiation counting is a Poisson process, thus the standard deviation of the radiation
signal is the square root of the signal's mean. If an observation occurs outside of a three40

sigma confidence interval placed on the mean then the CAVIS system will alarm. The
CAVIS monitoring system's feature extraction module will monitor for a change in state
using the SPRT, an optimal method, rather than the three-sigma confidence interval.
The CAVIS system contains numerous components in the system hierarchy
whose failure will result in a disturbance of the propagation of the radiation signal.
CAVIS features an error and anomaly reporting module that attempts to quantify the
status of the radiation signal based on the communication between a microprocessor
module contained in the sensor concentration and the central computer system. If proper
communication exists between the microprocessor module and the central computer, the
status of the radiation signal for all RADSiP sensors common to the microprocessor is
classified as "GOOD." If the microprocessor and the central computer are not properly
communicating, the status of the radiation signal for all RADSiP sensors common to the
microprocessor is classified as "BAD." This sensor signal status is incorporated as one
of the features used by the CAVIS monitoring systems expert system to isolate root
causes in the CAVIS system.
Due to the integration of the sensor concentrator network, a single computer may
monitor thousands of SNM storage vaults. Figure 3 .4 is a picture of the CAVIS system
used in this research project.
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Figure 3.4. CAVIS System

3.3.1

RADSiP Radiation Sensors

The RADSiP™ photodiode gamma ray sensor is used to monitor the radiation attribute of
the SNM in the CAVIS system. The sensor is small (1 .5 cm wide by 8. 75 cm long),
inexpensive, and well suited for continual long-term monitoring of the SNM. Suggested
by their name, the sensors monitor the gamma ray emission of a radioactive source. The
sensor requires a single + 12 V power supply for electronics power and the sensor is
capable of monitoring the 20 keV to 1 00 keV gamma-ray energy band. The components
of the sensors are a Silicon-PIN photodiode, a low-noise preamplifier, and a pulse
shaping amplifier [Pickett 2003 C]. Gamma ray interaction within the photodiode
produce pulses at approximately 500 counts per second per R per hour. The produced
voltage pulse is shaped by filters in the pulse-shaping amplifier to provide an impulse
response with a width of 20 microseconds. The detected signal level can be selected
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using a pulse height discriminator. The discriminator lower level is set at the energy peak
of americium-241 (60 keV), the proper lower-level adjustment for precise gamma ray
monitoring of 235U. The discriminator upper level is adjusted to the highest energy of the
Compton interaction pulses generated in silicon. Thus, the hardware is adjusted to
monitor the 60-100 keV range.

235

U decays to 23 1 Th by an alpha decay and the daughter

emits several characteristics gamma rays while decaying to the ground state. The most
prevalent characteristic gamma ray is the 1 85 .7 1 5 keV gamma ray, which has a relative
intensity of 57.2 [Schmorak 2004]. This gamma ray fluoresces neighboring uranium
atoms due to the photoelectric effect, resulting in several K shell X-rays energy peaks in
the 60-1 00 keV energy range, the range monitored by the RADSiP sensor. The complete
specification sheet for the RADSiP radiation sensors can be seen in appendix A. Figure
3.5 is a picture of a RADSiP photodiode gamma ray sensor.

Figure 3.5. RADSiP photodiode gamma ray sensor
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3.3.2

ORSENS Sensor Concentrators

The sensor concentrator acts as the first relay junction in the CAVIS system. Here the .
radiation signal from the RADSiP sensors is summed to calculate a radiation count rate
and then further relayed on through the CA VIS system to the central computer system.
The sensor concentrators used in the CAVIS system are ORSENS sensor concentrator
which were developed with Lon Works® Technology. ORSENS sensor concentrators are
a configurable multi channel sensor interface and signal-processing unit designed for use
with the ORSENS sensors featured in the CAVIS system [Pickett 2003 B]. The unit has
a voltage range for the operating power supply of 1 6 to 28 V DC. The sensor
concentrator also has several features that ensure proper function and security such as an
enclosure tamper switch, enclosure temperature sensor, and a peer-to-peer
communications that allows the sensor concentrator to report error and anomalies
immediately. The error and anomaly reporting is a particularly useful feature
incorporated in the working memory of the proposed expert system.
The sensor concentrator has a six-slot motherboard that can accommodate four
sensor interface modules and two microprocessor modules. The four sensor interface
modules collect the signal from the RADSiP sensors and the two- microprocessor
modules process the signal to calculate a count rate for each sensor. The ORSEN sensors
all have a mating interface module that allows the connection of ten channels of each
type of sensors to each sensor interface module. Thus, a maximum of forty ORSENS
sensors can be connected to a single sensor concentrator. The sensor concentrator also
contains a communications processor to coordinate the relay of the sensor data from the
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two-microprocessor modules throughout the CAVIS system. The communications
processor is an Echelon 3 1 20 Neuron® based module with its embedded LonTalk®
communications protocol. Figure 3.6 is a picture of the ORSENS sensor concentrator
with a sensor interface module and a microprocessor module positioned beside the sensor
concentrator.

3.3.3

Power and Communication Distribution Unit

The Power and Communication Distribution Unit (PCDU) acts as the second relay
junction in the CAVIS system. The PCDU relays the processed radiation signal from the
sensor concentrators to the central communication computer. The PCDU unit also
provides power to the RADSiP radiation sensors, and the sensor concentrators. The
PCDU unit has mating interfaces available for up to four sensor concentrators. Thus, the

Figure 3.6. ORSENS Sensor Concentrator
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PCDU unit is capable of providing power and relaying the radiation signal to the central
computer for up to 1 60 ORSENS sensors. The PCDU units can also be daisy chained
together if additional sensors are necessary. Figure 3. 7 is a picture of the Power and
Communication Unit used in the CAVIS system.

3.4

CAVIS Deficiencies

The CAVIS system is susceptible to alarms, which may not coincide with the removal of
special nuclear material. Several factors can result in false radiation sensors alarms.
First, the statistical nature of radioactive decay and counting may cause the count rate to
fall outside of the commonly used 95% confidence intervals. In such an instance, the
state of the SNM has not changed and the CAVIS system incorrectly alarms. Secondly,

CA VIS

Figure 3.7. Power and Communication Distribution Unit
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the CA VIS system is comprised of numerous components that may fail over time. Thus,
the CA VIS system may generate alarms due to component failures, which are not
correlated with changes in the SNM. Thirdly, the storage area is a functioning warehouse
that may have radioactive material being moved. These external radiation sources may
be detected by the CA VIS system causing an alarm in the region of the warehouse where
the external radiation source is located. Fourthly, the radiation sensors used in the
CA VIS system display a spike behavior when they are impacted. Forklifts and other
heavy equipment moving in the warehouse may cause impacts that are transmitted to the
CAVIS storage vaults inducing spikes in the count rates. In addition to inducing spikes, a
collision between heavy machinery and the CAVIS storage vault may cause the RADSiP
radiation sensors to move.
The radiation signals are affected by source (SNM) distance, collimation of the
source, and the SNM container thickness and material. If the collision results in any
movement of the RADSiP or the SNM the sensor count rate may decrease and induce
CA VIS alarms. Finally, the CA VIS system has displayed a dependence on
environmental stimuli such as heat and humidity. Thus, the environmental conditions of
the storage area may cause the CAVIS system to generate false alarms. These numerous
conditions can all result in CAVIS false alarms, which may result in unnecessary and
costly inventory checks.
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3.5

CAVIS Component Failure

Several experiments were performed on the CAVIS system to explore the effect various
CAVIS component failures have on the CAVIS system. The CAVIS system was tested
for these effects by simulating a CAVIS component failure following a normal operating
condition counting experiment. Thus, it was possible to correlate any observed behavior
in the reported count rate to the induced failure. Due to a limited amount of CAVIS
equipment, it was not feasible to destroy or fail any of the equipment. Thus, the only
method to simulate a CAVIS component failure was to remove or unplug the component
to be failed. As previously discussed and illustrated by figure 3.3 the CAVIS system is a
hierarchical system in which a component failure may produce a response in the
components that are common to the failed component. For example, if a sensor interface
modules in the sensor concentrator were to fail, the RADSiP sensors common to the
interface module would exhibit a change in state of their radiation signal. This section
describes the behavior of the RADSiP radiation signal when each component of the
CAVIS system fails. Also, this section describes RADSiP radiation signal behavior
observed in CAVIS data sets collected at the Y-12 National Security Complex. It is not
possible to know how or why the component failed in the Y-12 data sets, only that the
RADSiP radiation signal displayed a certain behavior corresponding to some failed
component.
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3.5.1

RADSiP Sensor Failure

The RADSiP radiation sensors are connected individually to the Sensor Concentrator by
a two-prong wire. This connection provides power to the RADSiP sensor and relays the
radiation signal from the sensor to the sensor concentrator junction. If the RADSiP fails
or the wire is damaged, the radiation signal goes to and remains at zero. The CAVIS
systems error and anomaly-reporting module monitors the status of the radiation signal
from each RADSiP. Individual RADSiP sensor failures do not affect the communication
between the microprocessor module common to the sensor and the central computer
system. Thus, the CAVIS systems error and anomaly reporting module is unable to
detect the failure and will continue to report a radiation signal status of "GOOD" for the
failed or unplugged sensor.

3.5.2

Sensor Concentrator Failure

The sensor concentrator acts as the first relay junction in the CA VIS system where the
radiation signal from the RADSiP sensors is summed to calculate a radiation count rate
and then further relayed on through the CA VIS system. The Sensor Concentrator is
connected by a two-prong wire to each of the RADSiP radiation sensors, which provided
power to the RADSiP and relays the radiation signal from the RADSiP to the Sensor
Concentrator. The Sensor concentrator is connected to the PCDU by a large gauge wire
whereby the PCDU provides power to the Sensor Concentrator and receives the radiation
signals. If the sensor concentrator fails or the large gauge wire is damaged, the radiation
signal for each RADSiP sensor common to that concentrator will go to and remain at
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zero. Also, the CAVIS system self-diagnosis feature is capable of detecting this failure
and will report a radiation signal status of "BAD" for each RADSiP sensor corresponding
to the failure.
The sensor concentrator has a six-slot motherboard that accommodates four sensor
interface modules and two microprocessor modules that are all capable of failure. The
sensor interface modules collect the radiation signal from the RADSiP sensors and relay
the processed signal to the PCDU junction in the CAVIS system. Five RADSiP radiation
sensors are common to each sensor interface module. When a sensor interface module
fails, the radiation signal for each RADSiP sensor common to the module goes to and
remains at zero. Sensor interface module failures are not detected by the CAVIS system
self diagnosis features and the radiation signal status will remain at "GOOD" throughout
this type of failure. The two- microprocessor modules process the signal to calculate a
count rate for each RADSiP sensor. Ten RADSiP radiation sensors are common to each
microprocessor module. When a microprocessor module fails the radiation signal for
each RADSiP sensor common to the module goes to and remains at zero. When a
microprocessor module fails, the CAVIS system self-diagnosis feature will detect the
failure and report a radiation signal status of "BAD" for each RADSiP sensor common to
the failed sensor interface module.

3.5.3

PCDU Failure

The PCDU provides power to the RADSiP radiation sensors, and the sensor
concentrators and also acts as the second relay junction in the CAVIS system. The
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PCDU unit has mating interfaces for up to four sensor concentrators, thus one PCDU
provides power to four-sensor concentrators power and relays the radiation signal to the
central computer for 80 RADSiPs. If the PCDU experiences a power loss the radiation
signal for all RADSiP sensors common to the PCDU goes to and remains at zero. Also,
the radiation signal status is "BAD" for all RADSiP sensors common to the PCDU. The
PCDU is connected to the central communication computer by a large gauge wire. In the
event this wire become damaged or unplugged the radiation signal for the RADSiP
sensors common to the PCDU goes to and remains at zero. Also, the radiation signal
status is "BAD" for all RADSiP sensors common to the PCDU. The PCDU units can
also be daisy chained together if additional sensors are necessary. Due to equipment
limitations the effect of a PCDU failure at a point in the chain on the other PCDU in the
chain is not known.

3.5.4 Y-12 Data Set Component Failure

The radiation signal from several CA VIS data sets collected over a period of several
months at the Y- 1 2 National Security Complex were analyzed for behavior representative
of CAVIS component failure. The data were collected at one-hour intervals with no
alterations made to the system; thus any abnormal changes to the count rate indicate a
system degradation or component failure. As previously discussed, it is not possible to
know how or why the component failed in the Y- 1 2 data sets, only that the RADSiP
radiation signal displayed a certain behavior that may be indicative of a failed
component. Of the forty analyzed data sets, twenty-two display some behavior that
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appears to be related to component failure. The behavior that these component failure
data sets display is RADSiP sensors that are "stuck" and common to some component. A
"stuck" sensor is a radiation sensor that returns some non-zero count rate repeatedly
without variation. All twenty-two of the component failure data sets contain a Sensor
Concentrator wide "stick" or a portion of the data set where all twenty of the RADSiP
common to a sensor concentrator are stuck. Here the assumption can be made that some
failure in the Sensor Concentrator resulted in the stuck sensors. Figure 3.8 illustrates a
Sensor Concentrator stick.
Further analysis of the component failure data sets reveals that prior to the sensor
concentrator sticks, individual sensors will have brief instances of being stuck and then
return to normal operation. These sticks may last for five or six data observations (five or
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Figure 3.8. Sensor Concentrator Stick
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9000

1 0000

six hours) before the sensor returns to normal operation. This behavior may be a
precursor to a sensor concentrator failure that will occur later in the data set. All of the
twenty-two data sets containing a sensor concentrator failure exhibited this random stuck
detector behavior prior to the sensor concentrator failure. However, due to the manner in
which the data sets were collected it is impossible to be certain this behavior is a
precursor.
The component failure data set also contain instances in which a sensor interface
module fails. In these instances, the radiation signals for five of the twenty RADSiP
sensors will display some common abnormal behavior. This abnormal behavior is a zero
count rate for each sensor common to the module. All five of these sensors correspond to
the same sensor interface module due to their consecutive labeling (Sensor Labels: 1 -5, 61 0, 1 1 - 1 5 , 1 6-20). The root cause of these abnormal behaviors is unknown, only that the
behavior is common to the sensor interface module. Figure 3.9 illustrates a sensor
interface module failure for one module in a Sensor Concentrator.

3.6

CAVIS Environmental Effects

The CA VIS system is designed to monitor the material year round; therefore, it is
necessary to ensure that changes in the environmental conditions of the storage area,
which may be induced by the changing seasons, will have no effect on the radiation
sensors and their radiation signal. The current CAVIS facilities have no humidity control
and limited temperature control. The HEUMF will have both temperature and humidity
control however; RADSiP environmental response is advantageous information to
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contain in the expert systems knowledge base. Thus, several experiments were
performed to determine the RADSiP sensor response to temperature and humidity
variation. The Sensor Concentrator and PCDU were not tested for environmental effects
due to equipment limitations. The manufacturers of the RADSiP radiation sensors have
provided specifications for the sensors. The allowable operating range temperature for
the sensor is -20 to 1 25 degrees Fahrenheit. The humidity operating range is between 0 1 00% humidity. This operating range should cover the environment in which the
radiation sensors are housed. These experiments were performed to ensure that the
radiation sensors do not exhibit any flawed performance in or near this operating range.
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3.6.1

CAVIS Environmental Testing Methodology

The effect of environmental changes on the response of the RADSiP radiation sensors
was tested using a simple environmental chamber. The environmental chamber was
constructed using an aquarium with a heater or a humidifier inside it. By performing
counting experiments inside of the chamber with either the heater or humidifier operating
it was possible to observe the effect these environmental stimuli have on the responses of
the radiation sensors. Only the sensor was stressed by the environmental changes, the
effects on the power supplies, and remote signal processing electronics was not tested.
The device used to heat the chamber was a compact fan-forced heater with two
power setting of 750/1 500 watts. The heater was capable of heating the environment
inside of the aquarium to approximately 1 50 degrees Fahrenheit. The heater featured a
thermostat that enables the temperature in the chamber to be held somewhat constant. A
device to lower the temperature of the chamber was not incorporated in the experiment,
however the ambient temperature of the room in which the experiments were performed
was approximately 65 degrees Fahrenheit. Thus, the radiation sensors were subjected to
a temperature range of approximately 65 - 1 50 degrees Fahrenheit.
To test the response of the radiation detectors to various amounts of humidity, a
similar technique was incorporated. The detectors were placed inside the environmental
chamber along with a humidifier. The humidifier was a 2.5-gallon model capable of
humidifying an 1 100 ft:2 area. The humidifier was able to completely saturate the
environmental chamber. Turning the humidifier on inside of the chamber and monitoring
the response of the detectors tested the detectors response to humidity. A hygrometer
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was not available to monitor the exact humidity of the chamber. This was not an issue as
this experiment was only looking for changes in response inside the sensors operating
range. The allowable operating range given in the manufactures specification sheet is O 100% humidity, thus it was not possible to stress the sensor outside of its operating range.
The counting experiment performed inside of the environmental chamber featured
the RADSiP radiation sensors monitoring the activity of a I O micro Curie Barium 133
source. A Barium 133 source is utilized because a portion of its gamma emission energy
(79.6 139 keV 2.62% of decay, 80.997 1 keV 34.06% of decay) is contained within the
energy ranged monitored by the RADSiP sensor (60- 100 keV). During the counting
experiment the temperature or humidity inside of the environmental chamber was
changed and any observed effect in the radiation signal was correlated to the
environmental change. To determine if the environmental stimuli induced a change in
state of the radiation signal, the signal was analyzed using the sequential probability ratio
test (SPRT) [Wald 1945 ]. The SPRT is a test that is capable of monitoring statistical
properties of a Gaussian distribution. The SPRT is capable of detecting a change in the
mean or variance of the radiation signal caused by the environmental stimuli. Additional
information concerning the SPRT can be found in chapter 4.3 .
The result of the SPRT test used to analyze the data from the environmental
experiments is a plot that illustrates when an alarm occurs. The plot is broken into
subplots of the reported count rate and of the four hypothesis of the SPR T test: mean
shift up (hypothesis I ), mean shift down (hypothesis 2), variance shift up (hypothesis 3),
variance shift down (hypothesis 4). The SPRT plot features circles that indicate alarms
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that the test detects. The number of alarms generated during the SPRT test is dependent
upon the number of data points in the set and the mean of the data set. The nature of a
stochastic statistical distribution results in some data streams that will cause a false SPRT
alarm. In addition, testing has indicated that the SPRT is slightly more likely to alarm
with higher data mean values. To account for these properties, post processing has been
incorporated. However when this experiment was performed, post processing was not in
place and the results of SPRT must be interpreted accordingly. Testing of the SPRT with
fabricated data has indicated that an alarm rate of 1 alarm per 1 0,000 data points can be
expected. If a data set contains more than 1 alarm per 1 0,000 data points it is an
indication that a change in the statistical properties of the data set may exist.
A Labview data acquisition system is used to record the radiation count rate and
the temperature of the environmental chamber adjacent to the sensors. It should be noted
that inside the radiation sensors, where the electronics exist, might be at a slightly
different temperature than the temperature measured by the thermocouples. Inside the
environmental chamber are the radioactive sources that are attached to the radiation
detectors and the thermocouples. The heater is located on the top of the chamber and
blows heated air into the chamber. When the humidifier is used, it is located inside the
chamber. Figure 3. 1 0 illustrates the basic setup for the environmental testing
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Figure 3.10. Environmental Chamber Setup

3.6.2

Temperature Experiment Results

A counting experiment was performed inside an environmental chamber. During the
experiment the temperature of the chamber was either increased or decreased to test the
effect that temperature variation had on the RADSiP radiation sensors. The results of the
temperature variation are rather difficult to characterize. In general, the radiation sensors
show no response to nominal temperature variations. However, in some instances the
sensors response is sporadic and troublesome. The experiments indicate that the sporadic
behavior occurs when the sensors are exposed to temperatures greater than 110 degrees
Fahrenheit. This sporadic behavior is a "ramp up", or a steady increase in reported
activity, as the temperature of the environment increases, followed by a "ramp down"
behavior as the environment cools. This temperature effect should not be problematic as
58

it is unlikely the sensors will be exposed to such high temperatures in their everyday use.
However, the temperature effect should be noted and may be included in the rule base
knowledge of the FDI system.
The following example demonstrates how a large temperature variation may
result in a change in state of the RADSiP radiation signal. Data were sampled every 5
seconds during the experiment. The temperature of the environmental chamber is held
fairly constant at 90 - 1 00 degrees Fahrenheit except for two two-hour intervals in which
the temperature was increased to approximately 1 50 degrees. This temperature variation
may seem extreme, but during most of the experiment the average temperature was
approximately 95 degrees, well within the operating range of the sensors. Figure 3 . 1 1 is
a plot of the temperature of the environmental chamber during the experiment, the
response of the radiation sensors to the temperature variations and the SPRT analysis of
the signal.
Figure 3 . 1 1 indicates that several SPRT mean shift up and variance shift up
alarms occurred during the experiment. The SPRT alarms occur during the portion of the
experiment when the sensor was exposed to high and greatly varying temperatures. In
contrast, when the temperature is held relatively constant near 95 degrees Fahrenheit, the
radiation signal does not contain any SPRT alarms except for a spurious mean shift down
alarms. This and other results indicate that greatly varying temperatures above 1 1 0
degrees Fahrenheit may induce a change in the response of the sensors. The result does
demonstrate some temperature dependence, however it may not be very applicable as the
temperature of the CAVIS storage area should never be this high or vary this rapidly.
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3.6.3 Humidity Experiments Results
A counting experiment was performed inside an environmental chamber. During the
experiment the humidity of the chamber was increased to test the RADSiP response to
various amounts of humidity. Data were sampled every five seconds during the
experiment.

In

general, the RADSiP sensors do no display any dependence on the

humidity of the environment in which they are housed. In the following example, the
RADSiP radiation sensors were exposed to various amounts of humidity to test their
responses to this environmental stimulus. The chamber initially had the same humidity
as the surrounding room, which will be assumed to be none. At the two-hour point of the
experiment, humidity was added to the chamber using a humidifier. The humidifier was
left running for 15 hours. The environmental chamber was completely saturated at the
end of the experiment. Figure 3.12 displays the results of the SPRT on the sensor signal
exposed to these conditions.
The SPRT indicates that the radiation signal did not experience a change in state
while being exposed to the various levels of humidity although a few spurious alarms
occurred. Thus, this RADSiP sensor displays no dependence on the humidity level it is
exposed to. This result is characteristic of the RADSiP response to all of the performed
humidity environmental experiments.

3.6.4 CAVIS Environmental Conclusions
The environmental experiments indicated that the RADSiP radiation sensors
manufacturers suggested operating ranges are fairly accurate, however when the sensors
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Figure 3.12. RADSiP Response to Humidity Variation, SPRT Result

are exposed to temperatures at the extremes of their operating ranges their responses can
be difficult to characterize. Variations in the humidity level of the RADSiP's
environment had a null effect on the sensors response. Testing of the RADSiP sensors
response to temperature variations found the radiation signal remains unaffected up to
1 10 degrees Fahrenheit. In some instances, when the RADSiP sensors were exposed to
greatly varying temperatures greater than 1 1 0 degrees Fahrenheit the radiation signals
would experience ·mean and variance increases. This upper temperature limit is slightly
less than the manufacturers specified temperature limit. However due to the rudimentary
nature of these environmental experiments, it is difficult to make any suggestions for
changes in the temperature operating range. Thus, the environmental experimentation
indicates that the RADSiP radiation signal is unaffected by humidity variations, and the
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radiation signal should remain unaffected by temperature variations less than 110 degrees
Fahrenheit.
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4

Fault Detection and Isolation, and Regional Anomaly Monitoring
Module Methodology

This chapter contains the Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) system methodology and
the Regional Anomaly Monitoring Module (RAMM) methodology that together are used
to monitor the CA VIS system. The FDI system was developed to improve the CA VIS
system reliability and eliminate unnecessary inventory checks. The system merges
advanced statistical algorithms, such as the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) [Wald
1 945], to extract features related to changes in the CAVIS sensors with an expert system
that forms a hypothesis of the root cause of any anomaly. The SPRT is a statistical
method used to detect changes in the characteristics of a data stream. The SPRT is used
to extract features, which are used by an expert system. An expert system is a rule-based
system designed to perform functions similar to those of an expert. The RAMM features
kernel-averaging techniques to detect the presence of and track the location of external
radiation sources in the vicinity of the CAVIS system and other anomalies that affect
regions of the CA VIS system. The contents of this chapter include a discussion of the
system's software environment, an overview of the FDI system architecture, a discussion
of the SPRT and feature extraction system, a discussion of the expert system, and a
discussion of the RAMM.
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4.1

Software and Computing Environment

The CA VIS monitoring system was implemented in MATLAB (Matrix Laboratory) with
Microsoft EXCEL acting as the system database. MATLAB is a software package for
numerical computation and graphical applications in scientific and engineering
applications. MATLAB can run on many platforms including Windows, Macintosh,
Linux, DEC, VAX, and Sun. MATLAB was chosen for implementation due to ease of
use, availability of the software, and the ability to communicate with Microsoft EXCEL,
the program implemented as the database for the FDI system. Microsoft EXCEL is a
popular spreadsheet software that is a component of Microsoft Office. Excel will also
run on many platforms such as Windows, Macintosh, etc.
MATLAB is a programmable language that can be implemented at a command
prompt or in command files known as m-files. The language features standard
programmable constructs such as IF, FOR, WHILE, etc., logical operators such as AND,
OR, XOR, etc, string manipulation, file input/output, and graphical user interface
abilities. MATLAB is a vectorized language that performs poorly with DO and FOR
loops. However, MATLAB can be converted to C code, or compiled as stand alone
applications to remedy the poor performance. Dynamic data exchange allows MATLAB
to communicate with other Windows applications such as Microsoft Excel.
Microsoft Excel is a popular spreadsheet program used in many applications.
Excel is capable of simple arithmetic operation, graphical applications, and data analysis.
In this research Excel is used as a database. The program was chosen due to simplicity
and ease of communication with MATLAB.
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4.2

Overview of the FDI System Architecture

A monitoring and diagnosis system combining feature extraction, by a SPRT and other
statistical measures, with an expert system was developed and optimized to monitor the
CAVIS system in order to eliminate costly alarm responses and unnecessary inventory
checks. Figure 4. 1 is a flow chart that illustrates the overall processes of CAVIS data
collection, the flow of this data into the CAVIS monitoring system for feature extraction,
fault detection and fault isolation, and the final output to a graphical user interface.
CAVIS collects sensor measurements that are analyzed by the SPRT to extract
several features from the radiation count rates for each sensor and writes them to a
feature set. Additional features are derived from the time history of the count rates and
added to the feature set. The expert system analyzes the extracted features and maps
them to possible root causes of failure identified for the CAVIS system. Information
concerning the root cause is sent to a graphical user interface.
Figure 4.2 is a flow chart specific to the FDI system that completely illustrates the
path of data in the CAVIS monitoring system. The time and count rate of the radiation
signals for each vault are collected by CAVIS and stored in the Excel Database "Counts".

CAVIS
Sensor
Measurements

t----++-+-r------

SPRT Based
Fault Detection

Expert System
Fault lso]ation

Feature
Extraction

Figure 4.1. System Flow Chart
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Figure 4.2. CAVIS Monitoring System Data Flow Chart

The sequential probability test analyzes these data, produces alarms if variances or means
have changed past a 3-sigma confidence interval, and records the alarms in the Excel
Databases "FeatueExt" and "Ind50". The feature extraction module extracts alarms rates
and other necessary features from the two databases and records them in the Excel
Database "ExpSys" that acts as the working memory for the expert system. The expert
system processes the working memory in an attempt to determine the source of the fault.
First the expert system detection module compares the values of the extracted features in
Excel Database "ExpSys" to a set of tolerances to determine if a fault in any of the
radiation signals has occurred. If the extracted features do not exceed the tolerances then
no faults have occurred and the system will reinitialize. If the extracted features exceed a
set tolerance, then a fault has occurred and the type of fault and the identification number
of the culprit sensor will be stored in Excel Database "Faults". Also, the detected fault
will initialize the expert system fault isolation module that attempts to determine the
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source of the fault by analyzing what features were affected by the fault, and which faults
had previously occurred. The isolated fault will be stored in an Excel Database
"Identification", and information concerning the fault will be sent to a graphical user
interface. The Y-1 2 procedure for the remedy of detected root causes of failure in the
CAVIS system is not known, thus the CAVIS monitoring system does not feature an
advisory module to assist Y-1 2 operators in the repair of the CAVIS system.

4.3

Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)

This section describes the SPRT that is used to analyzes the CAVIS radiation signals.
The application of the SPRT in the CAVIS monitoring system is the work of T Jay
Harrison and additional information concerning the application can be found in his thesis
[Harrison 04] . The description of the SPRT is included in this work for completeness.
The SPRT is a statistical test developed by A. Wald in 1 945 that is capable of
monitoring statistical properties of a Gaussian distribution. The SPRT determines if an
input data stream was generated by the expected, normal Gaussian distribution
characterized by an expected mean and variance, or if there is a greater probability that
the data stream comes from some alternate distribution characterized by a shifted mean
and/or altered variance. If the input comes from the alternate distribution, the SPRT will
generate an appropriate alarm. This technique is capable of monitoring two attributes of
the radiation distribution: mean and variance, in contrast to previous techniques [Bell],
which only monitored the mean. By monitoring two attributes of the radiation
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distribution, the SPRT-based system is capable of identifying additional operational
faults.
The SPRT evaluates the radiation signal for four alternative hypotheses; increase
(H 1 ) or decrease (H2) in signal mean by an amount M and an increase (H3 ) in variance of

+
amount v or a decrease (H4) in signal variance by amount v-. If the signal has a greater

likelihood of having been a member of an alternative hypothesis than having been a
member of the null hypothesis, the SPRT for that particular hypothesis alarms. For every
data observation, the SPRT calculates a likelihood that the data stream belongs to the
original distribution or one of the four alternative hypotheses. That likelihood is given by
equation 4. 1
Eq. 4. 1
where P(Y nlHx ) is the probability of an observed sequence Yn given that Hx is true. The
radioactive decay process is Poisson and then approximated by a Gaussian, thus the
likelihood of each of the alternative hypotheses is given by equation 4.2-4.5.
Eq. 4.2

Eq. 4.3

Eq. 4.4
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Eq.4.5

The SPRT equations, given by equation 4.6-4.9, are defined by taking the natural log of
the likelihood equations.
Eq. 4.6
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The parameters for these alternative hypotheses (H 1 -H4 ), M, v+ , and V, are defined by
the mean µ and variance d- of the radiation signal, which are equal due to the meanvariance equality inherent in Poisson processes such as radioactive decay. The amount
by which the mean shifts up or down, M, is set for three standard deviations. This
mirrors a +/- 3cr band for the desired 99+% confidence interval. That is, if for a sequence
of data points the SPRT alarms with a mean up or mean down indication, the alarm has a
99+% probability of not being a false alarm. The factors by which the variance increases
y+ or decreases v-, are set to reflect the shifted means. Because the mean µ equals the
variance d-, the variance for the increased mean hypothesis is µ + M = µ + 3cr. Thus, the
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ratio of the new variance to the old variance is (µ + M)/µ = 1 + 3/cr for a variance
increase and 1 - 3/cr for a variance decrease.
The results of the SPRT equations are compared to two parameters, ln(A) and
ln(B), to determine if the radiation distribution has changed. A and B are defined by
A = -p1- a

B=

1p
a

Eq. 4.10

where the parameters a and P are the set false (Type I) and missed (Type II) alarm rates,
respectively. The sensitivity of the SPRT depends on these false- and missed-alarm
probabilities. This research sets a and p at 0.1% and 10%, respectively. The low value
for a reflects the need to minimize the number of false alarms-roughly 1 false alarm per
1000 data observations, or 99.9% accuracy in sounding alarms. The value for P is set
arbitrarily at 10% based on the assumption that if an actual alarm condition occurs but
does not trigger an alarm, it will trigger an alarm at a future time step.
If the result of any SRPT equation is greater than ln(B), the SPRT alarms for that
hypothesis then resets to 0 and starts a new collection sequence. If the result of any
SPRT equation is less than ln(A), the SPRT resets to 0 and starts a new collection
sequence. For more information of the feature extraction module see Harrison.

4.4

Feature Extraction Module

This section describes the Feature Extraction Module that is used to extracted features
from the CAVIS radiation signals. This module in the CAVIS monitoring system is the
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work of T Jay Harrison and additional information concerning the application can be
found in his thesis [Harrison 04]. The discussion of the Feature Extraction Module is
presented here for completeness.
The feature extraction system (FES) acts as a pre-processor for the collected data.
The FES acts as custodian and interpreter for the count rate database and extracts
information useful to the expert system. It does so using the SPRT to calculate, track,
and communicate trends within the collected count rates. The FES sums the number of
all alternative hypothesis alarms over the last I 00 and I 000 data points and tracks the
interval since the last alarm for each hypothesis. The FES also extracts the variance of
the last five and fifty data observations and performs a test on the sign of the residuals.
This is commonly known as Run Test 2: nine consecutive points same side of average
[Western Electric 1 958, Nelson 1 984]. Two other features used by the expert system
include the current count rate and a built-in system status signal from the CAVIS
hardware. The FES supplies the current count rate directly to the expert system database
without processing, but the FES does not extract the system status signal, which is
supplied directly from CAVIS. The expert system uses these extracted features to isolate
and diagnose system faults.

4.5

Expert System

An expert system is an intelligent computer program that uses knowledge and inference
procedures to solve problems that may require significant human expertise [Feigenbaum
1 982]. When applied to the CAVIS system, an expert system may reduce the number of
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unnecessary inventory checks by determining alternative explanations for the alarm,
besides the removal of SNM. This will allow workers to investigate the alternate
explanation first, which will save time, money, and possibly radiation exposure. For
example, the radiation sensors used in the CAVIS system may display some dependence
on temperature. This dependence may cause "spikes" or "ramp up" behavior in their
reading of the reactivity of the source. Without an expert system the response to this
behavior may be an inventory check. However, an expert system might recognize the
problem as an increase in temperature. The expert system would then make an alternate
suggestion to check the temperature of the storage room rather than performing an
inventory check. Recall that the expert system can only make this suggestion if it has a
rule base that incorporates knowledge concerning the functionality of the radiation
sensors. Thus, for an expert system to work properly it requires a complete
understanding of every component of the system it monitors and contain the heuristic
knowledge of an expert. The following sections describe the implementation of the fault
detection and isolation expert system in the CAVIS monitoring system.

4.5.1

Expert System Fault Detection

The expert system compares the extracted features values with a set of tolerances to
detect any faults that have occurred. The tolerances are set to ensure a 99% or greater
confidence interval in the faulted state of the feature when possible. The tolerances for
the SPRT alarms are set according to the results of a parametric study, the result of which
can be seen in Harrison. The tolerances for the remaining features are set using simple
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probabilistic calculations. Table 4. 1 contains a complete listing of the tolerances for the
extracted features.
If any value of the extracted features exceeds its tolerance, then a fault is
generated for that sensor. For example, if the radiation si gnal for a particular sensor
experiences five SPRT mean shift up alarms in l 000 data observations, then feature l is
faulted for the particular sensor. A faulted feature for a sensor implies there is a 99% or
greater confidence that the sensors radiation signal has experienced a "change in state" or
CAVIS has experienced some failure.
The tolerances for the SPR T alarms have bases from different conceptual and
experimental sources. The maximum number of SPRT alarms in the last l 00 or 1 000
data points is set through experiments and theory. By counting faults over a fixed
Table 4.1. Fault Detection Tolerances for Extracted Features.
Feature
F l : Mean Shift Up SPRT ( 1 000 obs.)
F2: Mean Shift Down SPRT ( 1 000 obs.)
F3 : Variance Shift Up SPRT ( 1 000 obs.)
F4: Variance Shift Down SPRT ( 1 000 obs.)
F5 : Successive Mean Shift Up
F6: Successive Mean Shift Down
F7: Successive Variance Shift Up
F8: Successive Variance Shift Down
F9: Run Test 2
F l 0: Variance of last 50 points
F 1 1 : Variance of last 5 points
F 1 2: Mean Shift Up SPRT ( 1 00 obs.)
F 1 3 : Mean Shift Down SPRT ( 1 00 obs.)
F 1 4: Variance Shift Up SPRT ( 1 00 obs.)
F l 5: Variance Shift Down SPRT ( 1 00 obs.)
F 1 6: Current Count Rate
F l 7: Communication Status of CA VIS
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Fault Tolerance: Feat. faulted if . . .
5 SPRT MSU alarms in 1 000 obs.
5 SPRT MSD alarms in 1 000 obs.
5 SPRT VSU alarms in 1 000 obs.
5 SPRT VSD alarms in 1 000 obs.
MSU SPRT alarms for 2 cons. data obs.
M SD SPRT alarms for 2 cons. data obs.
VSU SPRT alarms for 2 cons. data obs.
VSD SPRT alarms for 2 cons. data obs.
Nine cons. data obs. on same side of mean
Variance of last 50 data obs. equals zero
Variance of last 5 data obs. equals zero
3 SPRT MSU alarms in I 00 obs.
3 SPRT MSD alarms in 1 00 obs.
3 SPRT VSU alarms in 1 00 obs.
3 SPRT VSD alarms in I 00 obs.
Current count rate equals zero
Communication status of CA VIS is "bad"

number of data points, this effectively measures the alarm rate. Experimentally, an
unfaulted distribution will produce a total number of faults as tabulated in a parametric
study [Harrison 04]. The expected total alarm rate for means ranging from 25 to 1 45 is
around 2

*

1 04, while the alarm rates for hypotheses l and 2 are around 0.75

*

1 04 and

hypotheses 3 and 4 are around 0.25 * 1 04 . However, if the fault tolerances were set at
levels that low, one random data point outside the 3cr bands would be sufficient to cause
an SPRT alarm. The two-consecutive-alarms metric is intended to account for the
decreased sensitivity brought about by increasing the tolerated fault rate. This therefore
serves as a surrogate alarm threshold for finding drifting or wildly varying systems.
The remaining features tolerances were set according to probabilistic calculations.
Since the SNM count rates range between 25- 1 45, the radiation signal can be
approximated with a Gaussian distribution. Thus, the likelihood of any particular count
occurrmg 1s
-( x-µ )

2

1 l -,P(x I µ ,cr ) = -- - e 20 .fi;i cr

Eq. 4. 1 1

where P is the probability of the count, µ is the mean of the count rate, cr is the standard
deviation of the count rate (cr = µ 1 12 and x is the count rate for which probability is to be
),

determined. The tolerances for feature 1 0 (variance of last 50 observations), feature 1 1
(variance of last 5 observations), and feature 1 6 (current count rate) are set using equation
4. 1 1 to ensure a 99% confidence.
When a fault is generated, the time of the fault, the culprit sensor, and the type of
fault are recorded in a database. This database is used as a log to keep a record of all
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fault ·occurrences and as a supplement to the working memory of the expert system.
Also, a detected fault initializes the fault isolation portion of the expert system.

4.5.2

Expert System Fault Isolation

When a fault is detected in an extracted feature, the expert system attempts to isolate the
root cause of the fault using its programmed rule base knowledge. The rule base
knowledge is a collection of IF/THEN rules containing information mapping the feature
space to the fault space. The rule base contains a hierarchal collection of root causes and
alarmed features that may be "characteristic" of certain faults. The hierarchal rule base
allows physical component failures to be isolated by comparing the number of failed
sensors to the total number of sensors that correspond to a certain component. An
example rule is "if all the RADSiP sensors that correspond to a certain component fail,
the fault exists in the component rather than in each of the sensors." Figure 4.3 further
illustrates CAVIS component failure isolation using a hierarchal knowledge base.
In addition to the hierarchal rule base, the expert system can isolate faults based
on what features are alarmed for a particular sensor. In many instances, certain faults
may be characteristic of certain failures that a sensor may experience. For example, a
signal variance. Thus, the root cause of an increase in variance fault could be a loose
electrical connection for the culprit sensor.
CAVIS testing has identified a number of abnormal behaviors that can occur in
the reported radiation signals. These abnormalities are zero count rate (ZCR), stuck
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Figure 4.3. Hierarchal Fault Isolation

count rate (SCR), count rate mean shift up and down (MSU/MSD), count rate variance
shift up and down (VSUNSD), and spike in count rate (SpS). Faults in certain features
are characteristic of all of these abnormalities in the radiation signal. In addition, all of
these abnormalities can be mapped to a root cause. Thus, it is possible to associate a set
of faulted features with a root cause. Table 4.2 contains a mapping of the known root
causes to a set of alarming features. The table contains the logic necessary to identify the
root cause. The character ,..., (not) in the table indicates that the following features must be
in a non-alarmed state.
The logic contained in table 4.2 is used as the rule base knowledge of the expert
system to isolate root causes in CAVIS. The knowledge base enables the detection of
characteristic faults such as dead or stuck sensors, which affect individual sensors, and
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Table 4.2. Map of Feature Space to Root Cause
Root Cause Symptom
Dead Sensor
Stuck Sensor
Temp. Inc. Sensor Drift
External Radiation Source
Removal of SNM
Loose Elec. Connection
Dead Sensor PCDU
Stuck Sensor PCDU
Loose Elec. Conn. PCDU
Dead Sensor. Concentrator.
Stuck Sensor Concentrator.
Loose Elec. Conn. Sen. Cone.
Dead Sen. Cone. Processor Board
Stuck Sen. Cone. Processor Board
Elec. Conn. Sen. Processor Cone. Board
PCDU Power Failure
Sen. Cone. Unplugged
Sen. Cone. Board Removal (Processor)
Sen. Cone. Board Removal (Interface)
Equipment Vault Stack Collision

FOi Detection Logic (Feature)
1 1&16
1 1 &- 1 6
1 &3& 1 2& 1 4
1 &3& 1 2& 1 4 or (RAMM)
-1 &2&-4&- 1 1 &-1 2& 1 3&- 1 4
-1 &-2&3&-1 2&- 1 3& 1 4&- 1 6
1 1 & 1 6 (All Sen. PCDU)
1 1 &-1 6 (All Sen. PCDU)
-1 &-2&3&-1 2&- 1 3& 1 4&- 1 6 (All Sen. PCDU)
1 1 & 1 6 (All Sen. Cone.)
1 1 &-1 6 (All Sen. Cone.)
-1 &-2&3 &- 1 2&- 1 3& 1 4&- 1 6 (All Sen. Cone.)
1 1 & 1 6 (All Sen. Cone. Board)
1 1 &- 1 6 (All Sen. Cone. Board)
- 1 &-2&3&-1 2&- 1 3& 1 4&- 1 6 (All Sen. Cone. Board)
1 7 (All Sen. PCDU)
1 7 (All Sen. Cone.)
1 7 (All Sen. Cone. Board)
1 1 & 1 6& 1 7 (All Sen. Cone. Board)
Regional Anomaly Monitoring Module

hierarchical faults that affect CA VIS component such as the PCDU or the sensor
concentrators.

4.6

Regional Anomaly Monitoring Module (RAMM)

The Regional Anomaly Monitoring Module (RAMM) is an additional module used to
detect anomalies that affect regions of the CAVIS system. Several abnormalities or
operating conditions exist that can induce "change-in-state" behavior in a region of the
CA VIS system, rather than changes-in-state for individual sensors or the system as a
whole. These anomalies include the presence of external radiation sources in the CA VIS
78

I

storage area or a sensor vault pile impacted by a piece of heavy equipment. The module
is capable of detecting root causes that affect regions of the CAVIS system, rather than
individual radiation sensors by mapping the behavior of neighboring sensors to form a
neighborhood score. The neighborhood scores are analyzed to detect and isolate regional
anomalies. The ability to detect regional faults may help to avoid unnecessary inventory
checks, thus saving cost and eliminating unnecessary radiation exposure.
Kernel smoothing is a non-parametric technique used to estimate the probability
density function of a data set [Wand 1 995]. In this application the data are the radiation
detector count rates observed at different locations in the storage facility. Kernels are
used to smooth the discrete measurements resulting in an approximation of the
underlying radiation field. Kernel smoothing is implemented to detect and identify
regional radiation disturbances.
Each radiation sensor is expected to produce a specific count rate that is
calculated as an average of a series of count rates collected under normal operating
conditions. The difference between a sensor's actual count rate and its expected count
rate is called a residual. The residual values of the CA VIS radiation sensors are placed in
a three dimensional array according to their physical location. Under normal conditions,
these residuals will have a Gaussian distribution around a mean value of zero and have a
variance equal to the square root of the mean count rate.
Kernel smoothing is used to map the behavior of the sensors in close proximity to
form a neighborhood score. A change in the neighborhood scores for a region of CAVIS
indicates that the sensors in the region experienced the effect of the same root cause. The
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maximum of the neighborhood scores will occur near the root cause, enabling the
location of the anomaly.

4.6. 1

RAMM Methodology

The development of the RAMM module involves the implementation of a neighborhood
system that monitors regions of the CAVIS system for changes in state. It is difficult for
CAVIS to isolate an anomaly affecting several sensors in a region because CA VIS
focuses on sensors not their interactions. A neighborhood system features a kernel based
density estimation technique that reduces the noise or variability of the sensor readings,
to form neighborhood scores. The neighborhood score for a sensor is calculated based on
the Euclidean distance between the sensors, the behavior or count rate of the other
sensors in the warehouse, and a kernel width. Kernel smoothing of the detectors
residuals results in neighborhood scores near zero unless some abnormality exists in the
CAVIS system. Recall that the residuals are the difference between the sensor count rate
and the expected count rate (mean). Therefore, residuals have a mean of zero and a
variance equal to the square root of the radiation signal mean. Thus, the implementation
of a neighborhood system allows for the detection of abnormalities that affect regions of
CAVIS. Figure 4.4 illustrates the process of the RAMM.
CAVIS collects a count rate for every radiation sensor and the RAMM places the
residual (difference from the normal mean) of the count rate in a three-dimensional array
based on the sensors physical location. The sensors are contained in concrete vaults in
4x5 sensor arrangements that are then stacked on top of each other. The neighborhood
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Figure 4.4. Flow Chart of Regional Anomaly Monitoring Module

score for each sensor is then determined by performing kernel smoothing of the residual
values in the three dimensional array such that
NeighborhoodScore( x) =

I, Re s( X; ) * K (x, X; )
X;

h

Eq. 4. 1 2

where x is the sensor location in question, x; is the sensor location around which the
kernel is placed, Kh is a kernel function, and Res is the residual of the sensor x;. A
Gaussian kernel, with magnitude equal to the residual value, is placed at each sensor
location and the neighborhood score for each individual sensor location is determined by
summing the contributions from every sensor in the warehouse. Kernel smoothing is
used to reduce the variance due to the random nature of radioactive decay. Although the
mean of the residuals is zero, the value of any particular residual at any particular data
observation can vary between O ± 2<J with 95% confidence. Thus, it is necessary to
smooth the residuals to force the neighborhood score towards the mean.
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The kernel width acts as a regularization parameter and must be chosen to
optimally reduce the variance of the neighborhood function. As the kernel width
becomes larger, the solution will be smoother and the neighborhood score for every
sensor will be pushed towards the mean of zero. If the kernel width is small, less
smoothing (averaging) occurs and the model may overfit the data. As the width goes to
zero the neighborhood score for each sensor will simply be its residual. Thus, it is
necessary to determine the optimal kernel width to optimize the variance reduction. In
this application the optimal kernel width was found to be dependent on the Euclidean
distance between the sensors in the CAVIS vault pile.
In the event of some regional anomaly, the residuals of the sensors will smooth to
a set of neighborhood scores with values larger than zero, which will enable the detection
and isolation of the origin of the anomaly. Monitoring the maximum value of the
neighborhood scores will enable regional anomaly detection. The maximum
neighborhood score should vary around zero in the absence of a regional anomaly and
increase to some value greater than zero in the presence of a regional anomaly. Thus,
placing monitoring bands, which are determined experimentally, around the maximum
neighborhood score enables regional anomaly detection.
When a regional anomaly is detected, its origin will be in the vicinity of the
maximum neighborhood score, thus enabling the isolation of the location of the anomaly.
Three-dimensional plots of the neighborhood scores, with the color in the plot
representing the neighborhood score, will allow the visualization of the regional
anomaly's location and the visual image of the anomaly will change with time allowing a
82

moving anomaly to be tracked. The plots generated by the RAMM feature a color
scaling such that white or no color indicates no regional anomaly and a dark color in a
region indicates that some regional anomaly is present.
The three plots generated by the RAMM are: 1 ) the current neighborhood scores,
2) the neighborhood scores when the maximum neighborhood over a time interval
occurred, and 3) a time history plot of the five most recent neighborhood scores weighted
by an exponential function to give more weight to the most recent scores. The plot of the
current neighborhood scores describes what is currently occurring regionally in the
CAVIS system.
The plot of the neighborhood scores when the maximum score occurred is useful
for locating and keeping record of impacted CAVIS vault stacks. The radiation signal
spikes induced by collisions are short lived and usually last only one data observation.
The maximum score plot will preserve the neighborhood scores when the collision
occurred allowing the impacted vault pile to be identified even after the spiked sensor
behavior has pasted.
The time history plot illustrates the past behavior of the neighborhood scores and
is useful in tracking external radiation sources that may be moving in the CAVIS storage
area. If the external source is moving the time history plot will contain a "tail" that
reveals where the source has been and the direction it is traveling. Weighting the five
most recent sets of neighborhood scores by Eq. 4.13 creates the data plotted in the time
history plot.
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In this research

o is set to three and NSt are the neighborhood scores at the specified time

interval t, where NS I is the current neighborhood scores, NS2 is the previous
neighborhood scores, etc. The results and plots generated by the RAMM allow Y- I 2
personal the ability to visualize changes-in-state of regions of the CAVIS system and
detect anomalies that affect regions of CAVIS.
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5

Results

The CA VIS monitoring system is capable of detecting and isolating CA VIS faults
including numerous types of sensor failures, component failure, and environmental
effects. It was tested on several data sets including data sets collected over several
months of operation at Y- 1 2 and data sets containing induced failures collected at the
University of Tennessee. An Regional Anomaly Monitoring Module has also been
developed to investigate the presence of root causes of false alarms for regions of the
CAVIS system. This module is capable of detecting anomalies that affect regions of the
CAVIS system such as external radiation sources in the CAVIS storage area and spiked
sensor vault stacks induced by heavy equipment collisions with the CAVIS storage
vaults.

5.1

Data Abnormality Monitoring - Sensor Malfunction

The following sections contain several examples of the CAVIS monitoring system
anal yzing CAVIS data sets containing some data abnormality for a particular sensor. The
examples illustrate the ability of the CAVIS monitoring system to detect various RADSiP
sensor failures that have been found to occur in the CAVIS system. The data sets feature
twenty independent radiation signals that correspond to a particular sensor concentrator.
Each data set contains a single sensor failure that may result in a CA VIS alarm or an
unmonitored state of the SNM. An unmonitored state of the SNM means the CAVIS
system will not alarm provided the failure does not result in reported count rates outside
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of a 99% confidence interval. The sensor failures that are shown are I ) Dead RADSiP
sensor, 2) Stuck RADSiP sensor, and 3) Drifting RADSiP sensor induced by temperature
extremes. The CAVIS monitoring system is able to detect and isolate each sensor
malfunction and is able to produce an alternate response to any CAVIS alarm, which will
alleviate any unnecessary inventory check.

5.1.1

Sensor Malfunction - Dead Sensor

The following example illustrates the CAVIS monitoring systems ability to detect and
isolate a "dead" RADSiP radiation sensor. A dead sensor is a sensor that has experienced
some failure that results in a repeatedly reported count rate of zero. The root cause of this
abnormality can be failure of the RADSiP electronics, an unplugged or damage wire
connection between the RADSiP and sensor concentrator, or a failure of one of the
components the sensor is connected to in the sensor hierarchy. The data set analyzed
here was collected at the University of Tennessee and RADSiP sensor I I 3 was
unplugged from its sensor concentrator at data observation 1 87 and plugged back into the
concentrator at data observation 935 to induced the failure. The data was collected at
five-second intervals for 2 hours and 45 minutes to generate 2000 data observations. The
described dead sensor data set is presented in figure 5. I .
The data set shown in figure 5 .1 was analyzed by the CAVIS monitoring system
for abnormal behavior. In this instance, the data anomaly is obvious from a plot of the
data. Nonetheless it is necessary for the CAVIS monitoring system to detect and isolate
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Figure 5.1. Dead Sensor Anomaly Data Set

the failure, as it is impractical to continually visually inspect data collected by CAVIS.
The data was analyzed by the CAVIS monitoring system to detect any abnormalities in
the count rates. The warnings and alarms generated by the CAVIS monitoring system are
presented in table 5. 1 .
The CAVIS monitoring system was able to detect the dead CAVIS sensors in the
data set. As discussed the sensor failed at data observation 1 87 and the CAVIS
monitoring system was able to instantly generate a dead sensor warning. The warning is
generated because the current count rate feature is in a faulted state. At data observation
1 9 1 the CAVIS monitoring system generated a dead sensor alarm. The alarm is
generated because both the variance of the last five-observation feature and current count
rate feature are in a faulted state. The dead sensor failure ends at observation 93 5 when
the sensor was plugged into the sensor concentrator. The CAVIS monitoring system
recognized that the sensor malfunction had been corrected and generated a "sensor is no
longer dead" message. It is necessary for the CAVIS monitoring system to recognize this
87

Table 5.1. CAVIS monitoring system analysis of Dead Sensor Anomaly Data Set
Ind.
1 87
191
935

Problem
Warning: The RADSiP sensor may be dead: 1 1 1 3
The RADSiP sensor i"s dead: 1 1 1 3
The RADSiP sensor is no longer dead: 1 1 1 3

Lo2ic
Zero count rate for the sensor
Zero count rate for the sensor for 5 cons. obs.
The sensors no longer has a zero count rate

failure as it may result in an unnecessary inventory check of the SNM. The CAVIS
monitoring system is able to detect and isolate dead sensors and will provide an
alternative response, which should alleviate the possibility of unnecessary inventory
checks. It should be noted that dead sensor warnings and alarms will only be generated if
a radiation signal change-in-state is not correlated with a weight signal change-in-state
for the corresponding weight sensor in the SNM canister. In the event of a correlated .
change updates to the CA VIS monitoring system will alarm with a Removal of SNM
alarms.

5.1.2

Sensor Malfunction - Stuck Sensor

The following example illustrates the CA VIS monitoring systems ability to detect and
isolate a "stuck" RADSiP radiation sensor. A stuck sensor is a sensor that has
experienced some failure that results in a repeatedly reported non-zero count rate. The
data set analyzed here is a 2,000 data observations portion of a data set collected at Y- 1 2
from May 3 , 1 999 at 14:00:56 to January 6, 2001 at 1 2:2 1 :20 with a one-hour update rate.
The CAVIS data sets collected at Y-12 feature a one-hour update rate to limit the size of
the data set. It should be noted that the techniques used by the CAVIS monitoring would
require a quicker update rate to ensure the safe storage of the SNM. With this long of an
update rate the SNM could be removed for a few hours before the system would detect
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the induced change-in-state of the SNM. If an individual knew the time CA VIS logged
the data they could completely remove the SNM shortly after the attribute data was
logged and have a full hour to flee before CAVIS or the CAVIS monitoring system
would alarm. An update rate of around one minute is more appropriate to securely
monitor the SNM. Nonetheless, the CAVIS monitoring system is capable of detecting
and isolating sensor malfunction in the data set.
It is not possible to know what root cause induced the abnormal behavior in the
radiation signal because the data set were collected at Y- 1 2; however testing at UT has
found that stuck sensor behavior can be caused by failure of one of the components the
sensor is connected to in the sensor hierarchy or electronic failure of the RADSiP. This
particular data set contains only one stuck sensor thus the root cause cannot be a
component failure. In the data set, sensor 1 1 7 becomes stuck at about data observation
400 and is repaired or the failure ceases near data observation 1 350. The described stuck
sensor data set is presented in figure 5.2.
The data set shown in figure 5.2 was analyzed by the CAVIS monitoring system
for abnormal behavior. The warnings and alarms generated by the CA VIS monitoring
system are presented in table 5.2.
The CAVIS monitoring system was able to detect the stuck CAVIS sensor in the
data set that became stuck at data observation 3 7 1 . The sensor stuck alarm was generated
because the variance of the last five data observations feature was in a faulted state while
Table 5.2. CAVIS monitoring system analysis of Stuck Sensor Anomaly Data Set
Loeic
Problem
Ind.
37 1
1 365

The RADSiP sensor is stuck: 1 1 7
The RADSiP sensor is no longer stuck: 1 1 7

The sensor had the same count rate for 5 cons. obs.
The sensor no longer has the same count rate

89

'6r------------------,

Sh.ck
Senscr: 1 1 7

,:5-....___....____�----------�____,
6

Data O bservation

"6

•116

U.

til6

,..

''"

1•116

,,,,.

,,,.

-

D ata O bservation

Figure 5.2. Stuck Sensor Anomaly Data Set

the current count rate feature was not faulted. The CAVIS monitoring system recognized
the failure had been corrected at data observation 1 365 when the sensor was repaired or
ceased to fail, and generated a "no longer stuck" message for the sensor. Due to a lack of
variance testing in the original CAVIS system, a stuck sensor failure would result in an
unmonitored state for the SNM. However, the CAVIS monitoring system is able to
detect and isolate the stuck sensors, suggest a response of component repair of
replacement, and should alleviate the possibility of an unmonitored state of the SNM.

5.1.3

Sensor Malfunction - Drift in Signal Induced by Temperature Extremes

The following example illustrates the CAVIS monitoring system's ability to detect and
isolate a "drift" in the RADSiP radiation signal. Drifts in the RADSiP radiation signals
can be induced by extreme environmental conditions, or RADSiP electronic failure. The
drift presented in this example is an increase in the mean of the signal induced by
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extreme environmental conditions. The data set analyzed here is a portion of a data set
collected with the UT environmental chamber. The RADSiP sensor 1 1 4 was exposed to
a varying temperature of 90- 1 40 degrees Fahrenheit that induced a mean shift up
behavior in the sensors radiation signal . The analyzed data set represents four hours and
I O minutes of testing with an update rate of 5 seconds to generate a total of 3000 data
observations. Several RADSiP sensors were exposed to the same conditions as sensor I
1 4, however due to the peculiar response of the sensors to temperature variation it is the
only sensor in the set that demonstrated a temperature dependence. The described
drifting sensor data set is presented in figure 5 .3.
A visual inspection of the data set reveals that sensor 1 1 4 begins to experience a
shift up in mean near data observation 900 that remains throughout the set. The count
increases from a mean of about 70 at the beginning of the set to a mean of near 90 at the
end of the set. The data set shown in figure 5 .3 was analyzed by the CAVIS monitoring
system for abnormal behavior. The warnings and alarms generated by the CAVIS
monitoring system are presented in table 5.3.
The CAVIS monitoring system was able to detect the drifting CAVIS sensor in
the data set. However, it was not possible for the system to diagnose the root cause of
temperature-induced failure because only one RADSiP sensor exhibited the abnormal
behavior and temperature data was not presented to the system. Updates to the CAVIS
monitoring system may incorporate environmental data in the working memory

Table 5.3. CAVIS monitoring system analysis of Drifting Sensor Anomaly Data Set
Ind.

1 354
1 369

Problem

Warning: The RADSiP sensor may be drifting: 1 ] 4
The RADSiP sensor is drifting: 1 ] 4

Lo!!ic

The sensor is experiencing SPRT alarms
The sensor is experiencing SPRT alarms
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of the system. In the example, a drifting sensor warning was generated at data
observation 1 354 and the warning was upgraded to an alarm at data observation 1 3 69. A
drifting sensor warning is generated when the SPRT mean shift features are faulted for
either the last 100 or 1 000 data observations. The warning is raised to alarm status when
the SPRT mean shift features are faulted for both the last 1 00 and 1000 data observations.
The visual inspection of the radiation signal revealed that the drift began near data
observation 900, however it was not detected by the CAVIS monitoring system for
approximately 400 data observations or about 30 minutes. The time of detection can be
attributed to the magnitude of the drift in the data, the mean and standard deviation of the
non-drifting radiation signal, and the set value of the SPRT shifted mean hypothesis.
Before the drift began, sensor 1 1 4 radiation signal had a mean of approximately 70, and
because the signal is a Poisson a standard deviation of

..fio .

The SPRT mean shift

hypothesis is set to the mean plus or minus three standard deviations; thus when the mean
of a drifting data sequence is equal to the original mean plus or minus 1 .5 standard
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deviations the SPRT will alann [Harrison 04]. In this example, the SPRT should alarm at
a count rate 70 + 1 .5 * .J=io = 82.55 . Visual inspection of the data reveals that the
magnitude of the drift resulted in a drifting count rate mean of approximately 83 at about
data observation 1400. As expected, this is near the data observation the CA VIS
monitoring system detects the drifting sensor. Thus, the time of drift detection depends
magnitude of the drift, the statistical properties of the data stream before the drift occurs,
and the set value of the mean shift hypothesis.
The count rate for drifting sensors may fall outside of a 99% confidence interval
resulting in CA VIS alarms and unnecessary inventory checks of the SNM. The ability of
the CA VIS monitoring system to detect drifting CA VIS sensors should alleviate the
possibility of unnecessary inventory checks by providing Y-12 personal with an alternate
response to CAVIS alarms.

5.2

Data Abnormality Monitoring - Component Failure

The following sections contain several examples of the CA VIS monitoring system
analyzing CA VIS data sets containing some component failure. The examples illustrate
the ability of the CA VIS monitoring system to detect component failures that are known
to occur in the CAVIS system. The data sets feature twenty independent radiation signals
that correspond to a particular sensor concentrator. Each data set contains a single
component failure that results in a data abnormality for each RADSiP sensor that is
common to the component. The component failures that are shown are 1 ) stuck sensor
concentrator, and 2) a failed sensor concentrator communication board. The CAVIS
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monitoring system is able to detect and isolate each component failure and is able to
produce an alternate response to any CAVIS alarm generated due to the failure, which
will alleviate any unnecessary inventory check.

5.2.1

Component Failure - Stuck Sensor Concentrator

The following example illustrates the CAVIS monitoring system's ability to detect and
isolate a stuck sensor concentrator component failure. A stuck sensor concentrator
failure consists of the RADSiP sensors common to a sensor concentrator repeatedly
reported some non-zero count rate. The data set analyzed here is a 10,000 data
observations portion of a data set collected at Y-12 from May 3, 1999 at 14:00:56 to
January 6, 2001 at 12:21 :20 with a one-hour update rate. As previously discussed, a one
hour update rate is too long and an update rate of around one minute is more appropriate
to securely monitor the SNM. Nonetheless, the CAVIS monitoring system is still capable
of detecting and isolating the component failures that occur in the data set.
It is not possible to know what root cause induced the abnormal behavior in the
radiation sensors common to this particular sensor concentrator because the data set was
collected at Y-12. However, because each sensor common to the sensor concentrator and
only these sensors failed it can be assumed that the malfunction existed in the sensor
concentrator. The stuck sensor concentrator data set is presented in figure 5.4.
A visual inspection of the data reveals an obvious fault where all the sensors count rates
stick near data observations 8700. The data set shown in figure 5.4 was analyzed by the
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Figure 5.4. Component Failure Stuck Sensor Concentrator Data Set

CAVIS monitoring system for abnormal behavior. The warnings and alarms generated
by the CAVIS monitoring system are presented in table 5.4.
The CAVIS monitoring system experienced several stuck detector alarms for
various sensors prior to the common sensor concentrator communication failure at data
observation 8725 . However, in each of these instances the detector returned to normal
behavior after a short period of time. These stuck detectors are not visible in figure 5 .4
due to the amount of data and also due to the short length of time the stick occurs. As
previously discussed, this faulty behavior for several of the sensors has been determined
to be a precursor to the sensor concentrator failure that occurred later. At data
observation 8725 the sensor concentrator experienced a stick that is detected by the
monitoring system. The CA VIS monitoring system was able to detect the stick because
the variance of the last five-observation feature was in a faulted state and the current
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Table 5.4. CA VIS monitoring system analysis of Sensor Concentrator Failure Da1ta
Index

Problem

Logic

5649

The RADSiP sensor is stuck: 1 I 6

The sensor had the same count rate for 5 cons. obs.

5 650

The RADSiP sensor is no longer stuck: I I 6

5853

The RADSiP sensor is stuck: I

5 854

The RADSiP sensor is no longer stuck: I

66 1 3

The RADSiP sensor is stuck: I

66 1 4

The RADSiP sensor is n o longer stuck: I

7744

The RADSiP sensor is stuck: I

7745

The RADSiP sensor is no longer stuck: I

The sensor no longer has the same count rate

I 12

The sensor had the same count rate fo r 5 cons. obs.
I 12

I 12

The sensor n o longer has the same count rate
The sensor had the same count rate fo r 5 cons. obs.

I 12

I 17

The sensor n o longer has the same count rate
The sensor had the same count rate for

I 17

5 cons. obs.

The sensor n o longer has the same count rate
The sensor had the same count rate for 5 cons. obs.

8262

The RADSiP sensor is stuck: I I 2

8264

The RADSi P sensor is no longer stuck: I I 2

The sensor no longer has the same count rate

8714

The RADSiP sensor i s stuck: I I 3

The sensor had the same count rate for 5 cons. obs.

87 1 6

The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 1 i s stuck: 1 I

The Sen. Cone. board sensors have the same counts for 5 cons. obs.

8720

The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 4 is stuck : 1 1

The Sen. Cone. board sensors have the same counts for 5 cons. obs.

8724

The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 3 is stuck: 1 1

The Sen. Cone. board sensors have the same counts for 5 cons. obs. .

8725

The Sensor Cone. is stuck: I I

The Sen. Cone. sensors have had the same counts for 5 cons. obs.

9 1 43

The Sensor Cone. is no longer stuck: 1 1

The Sen. Cone., sensors no longer have the same count rate

9 1 47

The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 4 is no longer stuck: I 1

The Sen. Cone. board sensors no longer have the same counts

9 1 47
9 15 1

Warning: The RADSiP sensor may be drifting: I

I 18

The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 3 is no longer stuck: I I

9151

Warning: The RADSiP sensor may be drifting: I

9 1 52

I 12

The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 2 is no longer stuck: I I

The sensor i s experiencing SPRT alarms
The Sen. Cone. Board sensors no longer have the same counts
The sensor i s experiencing SPRT alarms
The Sen. Cone. Board sensors no longer have the same counts

count rate feature was in an unfaulted state for every sensor common to the sensor
concentrator. As previously discussed, this type of abnormality would go undetected by
previous monitoring technique, due to a lack of variance testing. Thus in all likelihood,
this CAVIS component failure would go unnoticed, and the SNM unmonitored, while the
failure existed. The stuck sensor concentrator returns to normal operation at data
observation 9152.

5.2.2

Component Failure - Failed Sensor Concentrator Communication Board

The following example illustrates the CAVIS monitoring systems ability to detect and
isolate a failed sensor concentrator communication board. A failed communication board
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will result in a zero count rate for every sensor common to the board. The failure
presented in this example was simulated at the University of Tennessee by removing
communication board 1 from the sensor concentrator at data observation 2 1 5 and
replacing the board at data observation 1 067. Removing board 1 resulted in the count
rates for sensors 1 -1 0, which are common to the board, going to and remaining at zero.
The data were collected at five-second intervals for 2 hours and 45 minutes to generate
2000 data observations. The described failed communication board data set is presented
in figure 5.5.
A visual inspection of the data reveals ten of the sensors count rates go to zero
near data observations 200 and return to normal operation near data observation 1 000.
The data set shown in figure 5 .5 was analyzed by the CAVIS monitoring system for

140

120

100

1200
Data Observation

1400

1600

1 800

2000

Figure S.S. Component Failure Dead Communication Module Data Set
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abnormal behavior. The warnings and alarms generated by the CAVIS monitoring
system are presented in table 5.5.
The CAVIS monitoring system was able to detect the failed communication board
and identified it as dead because the count rates for every sensor common to the board
were zero during the failure. The communication board failed at data observation 215
and the CAVIS monitoring system was able to instantly generate a dead communication
board sensor warning. The warning was generated because the current count rate feature
was faulted for every sensor common to the board. At data observation 219 the CAVIS
monitoring system generated a dead communication board alarm. The alann is generated
because both the variance of the last five-observation feature and current count rate
feature were in a faulted state for every sensor common to the board. The dead
communication board failure ends at observation 1068 when the communication board is
plugged back into the sensor concentrator. The CAVIS monitoring system recognized
that the board malfunction has been corrected and generated a "communication board is
no longer dead message." It is necessary for the CA VIS monitoring system to recognize
this type of failure as board malfunctions can occur and were frequently observed in the
Y- 12 data sets. These board failures would generate numerous CA VIS alarms and may
result in unnecessary inventory checks of the SNM. The CA VIS monitoring system is

Table 5.5. CA VIS monitoring system analysis of Failed Communication Module
I nd.

Problem

Logic

215

Warning: The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 1 may be dead: 1 1

Zero count rate for all sensors common to the board

219

The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 1 is dead: 1 I

Sensors common to board zero count rate for 5 cons. obs.

1 068

The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 1 is no longer dead: I I

Sensors common to the board no longer have a zero count
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able to detect and isolate board failures and will provide an alternative response, which
should alleviate the possibility of unnecessary inventory checks.

5.3

Regional Anomaly Monitoring Module

The Regional Anomaly Monitoring Module (RAMM) is a module that detects region
anomalies in the CA VIS system using a kernel smoothing technique. The following
sections contain results from the RAMM including I ) a demonstration of the maximum
neighborhood score as a fault symptom, 2) examples of kernel smoothing in two and
three dimensions with and without an anomaly present, 3) the RAMM detection and
isolation of a impacted CAVIS sensor vault pile, and 4) the RAMM detecting and
tracking an external radiation source in the CA VIS storage area.
The kernel function featured in the RAMM is a Gaussian kernel whose shape is
defined by the kernel width parameter. Optimization of the kernel width is performed
though experimentation, and depends on the physical distance between the sensors and
the various vault stacks. In this research, the kernel that produced the desired result had a
kernel width of 2.5. However, the desired result is subjective, thus the optimal kernel
width must be optimized for the application or at implementation.

5.3.1

Kernel Smoothing Neighborhood Score as Fault Symptom

The result of the RAMM is a collection of neighborhood scores at various locations in a
three-dimensional array representing the CAVIS system. The values of these
99

neighborhood scores should center near zero given no abnormality in the system. In the
event of some abnormality, the RAMM will smooth the residual values to neighborhood
scores greater than zero. Thus, the values of the neighborhood scores can be used as a
fault symptom. Figure 5.6 illustrates the value of the maximum neighborhood score at
each time interval during a simulation of the RAMM. The simulation featured an
external source entering the CAVIS storage area for the time interval 1 0 to 25 . The array
representing the CA VIS storage area had dimensions of [ 1 2 x 1 5 x 5] which would
correspond to 900 storage containers.
The value of the maximum neighborhood score increases to some larger value
when the external source is in the CA VIS storage area. The magnitude of this increase
depends on the strength of the external source. This result demonstrates that the
neighborhood scores
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Figure 5.6. Maximum Neighborhood Score as Fault Symptom
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can be used as a fault symptom to detect the presence of an abnormality affecting a
region of the CAVIS system. In addition, plots of the neighborhood scores, which are
described in the following sections, enable the visualization of the local anomalies.

5.3.2

Kernel Smoothing in Two Dimensions

The RAMM result is introduced by the following plots that illustrate kernel smoothing in
a two-dimensional plane such as what would be seen with an unassembled sensor vault
stack. The residual of the radiation sensor will be in the range of 0 ± 3.Jcr with 99%
confidence. Kernel smoothing the residual should result in neighborhood scores close to
zero given no anomaly because the sensor residuals mean is zero. Figure 5 . 7 illustrates
the smoothing of actual sensor residuals in two-dimensions without an abnormality
present. The array representing the CA VIS storage area has dimensions of [20 x 1 6 x 1 ]
which would correspond to 320 storage containers. To assist in visualization, the figure
is shown in three-dimensions with the third dimension representing the neighborhood
score.
The RAMM is able to transform the rigid plot of the residual data shown at the
top of figure 5.7, into the smooth surface plot of the neighborhood scores located on the
bottom of the figure. It is not possible to determine if an anomaly is present or not from
the residual plot because the residual values range from -20 to 20. This variation is
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Figure 3 - UnSmoothed Space - No External Fault
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natural as the residual values can vary by 3..Jcr with 99% confidence. However, it can
easily be seen that no anomaly is present from the plot of the neighborhood scores that is
smooth. As discussed, the surface is smooth because the mean residual of the CAVIS
regions center about zero because no data anomaly is present.
CAVIS collected data sets that contained regional anomalies were not available
because the sensor locations were not known in the Y- 1 2 collected data sets, and
insufficient equipment was available at UT to produce these sets. Therefore, data sets
featuring abnormalities had to be fabricated in order to test the RAMM system. The data
set fabricated for this example had dimensions of [20 x 1 6 x 1 ] which would correspond
to 320 storage containers. To simulate the abnormality in the set, a fabricated external
radiation source was placed near the sensor at coordinate [5, 5, 1 ]. The fabricated source
strength was such that it increased the residual value of this sensor by a factor of 20. The
external source affected the other sensors in the data set by increasing their values by
20 * (;, ) where R is the Euclidean distance from the sensor to the external source. The
described fabricated data set is shown at the top of figure 5.8 and the result of the RAMM
kernel smoothing of the data is shown at the bottom of the figure.
RAMM transforms the rough residual plot on the top of figure 5.8 into the smooth
plot of the neighborhood scores located on the bottom; resulting in a clearly visible
external source. Again, it is difficult to detect the data anomaly from the plot of the
residuals, but the external radiation source is easily seen in the plot of the neighborhood
scores. In addition, the RAMM is able to precisely determine the location of the external
radiation source by determining the location of the maximum neighborhood score.
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Figure 5.8. Kernel Smoothing in Two-Dimensions, Abnormality Present
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5.3.3

Kernel Smoothing in Three Dimensions

The following plots illustrate kernel smoothing in three-dimensions, which represents the
sensor vault stacks assembled on top of each other. As previously discussed, the residual
values will range between 0 ± 3-Jci with 99% confidence, and kernel smoothing the
residual data with no anomaly should result in neighborhood scores close to zero. Figure
5.9 illustrates the smoothing of actual sensor residuals in three-dimensions without an
abnormality present. The array representing the CAVIS storage area has dimensions of
[15 x 15 x 5] which would correspond to 900 storage containers. The X, Y, and Z
dimensions represent the location of the neighborhood score and the value of the
neighborhood score is represent by the color in the figure.
The RAMM transforms the residual sensor data, shown at the top of figure 5.9, to
produce the smoothed data plotted in the bottom of the figure. The congested plot on the
residual values ranges from -27 to 30. It is impossible to determine if an anomaly is
present from the residual plot because of the wide range of residual values. However,
these large residual values do not occur repeatedly in a region and are thus smoothed to
neighborhood scores of near zero represented by the lack of color shown in the smoothed
plot. This lack of color signifies the neighborhood scores center about zero, which
indicates that no external source is present in the system.
Again, because CAVIS collected data sets containing anomalies were not
available so it was necessary to fabricate data sets in order to test the RAMM system.
The data set fabricated for this example had dimensions of [12 x 15 x 5] which would
correspond to 900 storage containers. To simulate the abnormality in the set, a fabricated
1 05
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external radiation source was placed near the sensor at coordinate [2, 2, 5]. As before,
the fabricated source increased the residual value of the sensor by twenty and increased
the residual values of the other sensors in the set according to a ( ;, ) relation. The
described fabricated data set is shown at the top of figure 5 . 1 0 and the result of the
RAMM kernel smoothing of the data is shown at the bottom of the figure.
The RAMM transforms the rough residual plot on the top of the figure 5 . 1 0 to the
smooth plot of the neighborhood scores located on the bottom, resulting in a clearly
visible external source. Again, it is difficult to detect the data anomaly from the plot of
the residuals, but the external radiation source is easily seen in the plot of the
neighborhood scores. Also, the RAMM is able to precisely determine the location of the
external source by determining the location of the maximum neighborhood score.

5.3.4

RAMM Monitoring - Collision Induced Spike Vault Pile

The following example illustrates the ability of the RAMM to detect and isolate the
location of vault stacks that have experienced spikes in their sensors count rates due to a
collision with a heavy piece of machinery. The CAVIS storage area is a functioning
warehouse that may have moving heavy equipment. It is possible that forklifts or other
types of machinery moving in the CAVIS storage area may collide with one of the
CAVIS sensor vault stacks resulting in a physical shock to each sensor in the stack. As
previously discussed, the RADSiP sensors featured in the CA VIS system are sensitive to
physical shock. When impacted the count rate of the sensor spikes for one and only one
1 07
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data observation. The magnitude of these spikes varies and can be anywhere between
30% to 1 00% increase in the reported count rate. These collision induced spikes
represent a change-in-state of the radiation signals in the vault stack, and may generate
CA VIS alarms for the sensors that may result in inventory checks.
The RAMM can alleviate the possibility of unnecessary inventory checks due to
collision induced CA VIS alarms, by detecting the collision. Because the spikes will be
generated in the sensors common to the vault stack, the neighborhood scores for the
region near the vault stack will dramatically increase for the one data observation in
which the spike is recorded. These neighborhood scores will be recorded in the
maximum score plot generated by the RAMM creating a record of the collision and an
alternative hypothesis that can be inspected before an inventory check is performed.
CA VIS collected data sets of collision induced spike behavior were not available
so the sets were fabricated. The data set fabricated for this example had dimensions of
[ 1 6 x 20 x 8] which would correspond to sixteen-vault stacks in a 4 x 4 arrangement and
2560 storage containers as each vault stack contains 20 sensors in a 4 x 5 arrangement.
To simulate the collision in the set, the count rate of each sensor common to the impacted
vault stack was increase by 1 00%, which increased the value of the residual by the count
rate. In this example, the collision was simulated for vault stack [2 x 2], which is one of
the vault stacks in the middle of the arrangement. The described fabricated data set is
shown at the top of figure 5 . 1 1 and the result of the RAMM kernel smoothing of the data
is presented in the maximum neighborhood score plot shown at the bottom of the figure.
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The RAMM transforms the residual plot on the top of figure 5 . 1 1 into the smooth plot
of the neighborhood scores located on the bottom; resulting in a clearly visible data
anomaly that is the impacted vault stack. The large neighborhood scores for the sensors
common to the middle vault stack suggest that the anomaly originated from the stack.
The RAMM records the impact in the maximum neighborhood score plot and is able to
precisely determine the location of the impacted vault stack with zero error. Figure 5 . 1 1
is a portion of an impacted sensor vault simulation in which the collision was simulated
at time interval three. The entire simulation including the maximum neighborhood score
plot, the current residual plot, and the time history plot can be seen in appendix A.

5.3.5

RAMM Monitoring - Tracking of External Radiation Source

The following example illustrates the ability of the RAMM to track an external radiation
source as it travels in the CA VIS storage area. The CAVIS storage area is a functioning
warehouse in which radioactive material is frequently being moved. These external
radiation sources may be detected by the CA VIS system causing an alarm in the region of
the warehouse where the external radiation source is located. The RAMM can detect and
track the location of external radiation sources and may alleviate the number of
unnecessary inventory checks performed.
CAVIS collected data sets containing moving external radiation sources were not
available, thus it was necessary to fabricate data sets in order to test the RAMM system.
The data array fabricated for this example had dimensions of [ 1 6 x 20 x 8] which would
correspond to 2560 storage containers. To simulate the abnormality moving in the set, a
111

fabricated external radiation source was placed in the array at time index 3 at coordinate
[ 1, 1, 5] and moved randomly in the z direction along a set path towards the opposite x-y
planar comer of the array until the simulation ended at time index 10. The fabricated
source increased the residual value of the sensor by seventy-five and increased the
residual values of the other sensors in the set occurring to a ( ;, ) relation. The
described fabricated data at time index 9 is shown at the top of figure 5.12, the time
history plot result of the RAMM kernel smoothing of the data is shown in the middle of
the figure, and a rotation that shows a top view of the time history plot is shown at the
bottom of the figure.
The RAMM transforms the residual plot on the top of figure 5.12 to the smooth
time history plot of the neighborhood scores located in the middle plot; resulting in a
clearly visible external source. Recall that the time history plot is a combination of the
five most recent neighborhood scores weighted by an exponential function to give more
weight to the most recent scores. The time history plot illustrates the past behavior of the
neighborhood scores and contains a "tail" that reveals where the source has been and the
direction it is traveling. The bottom plot in figure 5.12 is a top view of the time history
plot that further demonstrates the tail in the time history plot. Figure Appendix A
contains the residual plots and the time history plot produced by the RAMM for the entire
simulation.
The RAMM determines the location of the external radiation source by locating
the maximum neighborhood score. Figure 5.13 is a plot of the magnitude of the error in
the RAMM predicted location of the external radiation source for the simulation.
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The RAMM was very successful at locating the external radiation source moving in
the CAVIS storage area during the simulation. The average error of the prediction was
0.97 in sensor units and the maximum error of 1 . 75 occurred at the beginning of the
simulation when the location of the external source was at the edge of the array. The
higher error at the edges is expected, as kernel-smoothing techniques are susceptible to
edge effects due to reduced amounts of data at the boundaries.
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6

Conclusions, Contributions, and Recommendations for Future
Work

6.1

Conclusions

The CAVIS monitoring system was developed as a fault detection and isolation system to
monitor the CAVIS system at the Y-12 National Security Complex. CAVIS is an
integrated package of sensors that continually monitors the physical attributes of special
nuclear material at Y-12. The CA VIS system is subject to several types of failures such
as environmental effects and component failure. The CAVIS monitoring system was
able to improve the reliability of CA VIS by monitoring the system for failures. The
monitoring was performed using the sequential probability ratio test, other key feature
extraction algorithms, and the fault detection and isolation expert system.
The SPRT and feature extraction system mined the necessary information from
the radiation signal to determine the current state of the CA VIS system. That data acted
as the working memory for the expert system. The feature extraction module was the
work of T Jay Harrison presented in his thesis "The Sequential Probability Ratio Test
(SPRT) in Feature Extraction and Expert Systems in Nuclear Material Management
[Harrison 04]."
The expert system detected and isolated all pre-enumerated faults that may occur
in the CAVIS system by analyzing the data from the feature extraction module. Failures
were detected by comparing the numerical values of extracted features to a set of
tolerances. The expert system rule base knowledge was applied to detected failures and
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the system isolated the root cause of the failure. Thus, the expert system was able to
reduce the alarm response cost by categorizing the alarms generated by the CAVIS
system based on its knowledge base and suggesting alternate explanations for the alarm.
If implemented, the FDI system can reduce operational costs by reducing the number of
unnecessary inventory checks and minimizing other responses.
The Regional Anomaly Monitoring Module was developed as an additional fault
detection module to monitor regions of the storage area for changes in state. The module
enabled the detection of external radiation sources and collisions between equipment and
CAVIS vault stacks. The module used a kernel smoothing technique to smooth the
sensor residuals based on their proximity to one another. The smoothing resulted in a
parameter referred to as the neighborhood score that can be monitored as a fault
symptom. An abnormal increase in the neighborhood scores for a region of CAVIS
indicates a common root cause such as the presence of an external radioactive source.
Also, the modules results were plotted in a three-dimensional mapping that represented
the regional behavior of the storage area.
The diagnostic system was capable of monitoring the condition of the CAVIS system
and could perform system prognosis that resulted in early warning of component failures.
If employed, its operation could allow the implementation of economical condition-based
maintenance practices rather than more expensive reactive maintenance. The
combination of CAVIS and its monitoring system allows for the safe, reliable, and
economical monitoring of SNM.
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6.2

Contributions

The primary contribution of this work to the field of nuclear material management is the
demonstration of an artificial intelligence expert system to monitor a SNM security
system. The research exhibits how an expert system, paired with a SPRT base feature
extraction module, is capable of diagnosing root causes of abnormality in a large nuclear
material management system.
The kernel smoothing method presented in this work has wide contributions as it
can be applied to any detection system featuring multiple sensors in a well-defined
lattice. In these systems, kernel smoothing can be used to determine the underlying
behavior of the sampled variable in the system. One such application may be the
proposed Homeland Security systems that feature multiple radiation sensors monitoring
activities in large cities. In these systems, sensors are placed throughout metropolitan
areas to monitor for radioactive materials that may be contained in bombs. Due to the
random nature of radioactive decay, the radiation signal of the sensors will center about
some mean value with a certain deviation, which makes it difficult to locate the origin of
the radioactive material. The kernel smoothing methods presented here could be applied
to smooth the sensor data to determine the underlying radiation behavior in the sensor
lattice and thus locate the origin of the radiation signal.
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6.3

Future Work

The future work of this project involves the integration of the CAVIS weight sensors into
the developed system. This will require an analysis of failure effects, the identification of
features and integration into the CAVIS monitoring system rule base knowledge.
Once the CA VIS weight sensors are integrated and optimized, the developed
system may be implemented at Y- 1 2. Implementation of the system will require adapting
the rule base knowledge to any variation between the CA VIS systems at Y- 1 2 and UT.
Also, the kernel width in the RAMM will require optimization according to the physical
distance between the sensors and the various vault stacks.
Future work may also include expansion of the expert system rule base
knowledge to incorporate currently unknown fault scenarios. If additional knowledge of
the CA VIS system is gained, or if additional components are incorporated into the
system, the rule base knowledge should be updated to account for these changes.
Additionally, modification of the detection threshold tolerances will make the FDI system
more or less sensitive to changes-in-state as needed. The optimal value for the thresholds
may be different depending on need as the values presented in this thesis are
experimentally and empirically derived and set.

1 18

List of References

119

1 . Bell, 2, T.W. Hickerson, J.E. Gaby, J.A. Williams, "Analysis of a radiation
attribute from uranium in storage", Computer Physics Communications.
2. Bhatnagar, R., Miller, D. W., Hajek, B. K. and Stasenko, J. E., "An integrated
operator advisor system for plant, monitoring, procedure management, and
diagnosis," Nucl. Technol. (Mar.) (1990) 281-317.
3. Cherkassky, V.S., and F. Mulier, Learning From Data, John Wiley & Sons, New
York, 1998.
4. Defense Programs at Y-12., Y-12 National Security Complex, [ online] 2
September 2003, http://www.y l 2 .doe.gov/bwxt/yl 2/y l 2-missions.html
(Accessed: 29 Dec. 2003).
5. Duba, R. 0., P. E. Hart, K. Konolige, and R. Reboh, "A Computer-based
Consultant for Mineral Exploration," Technical Report, SRI International. (Sept.)
(1979).
6. Feigenbaum, E. and Engelmore, R.S., "1993 Knowledge Based Systems in
Japan," (Japanese Technology Evaluation Center), [ online] May 1 993 ,
http://www.wtec.org/loyola/kb/ ( 18 November 2003 ).
7. Feigenbaum, E., "Knowledge Engineering in the l 980's", Dept. of Computer
Science, Stanford University, Stanford CA, 1982.
8. Fenu, G. and T. Parisini, "A note on nonparametric kernel smoothing for model
free fault symptom generation," A utomatica, 35 (1999) 1175-1179.

120

9. Giarratano, J., and G. Riley, Expert Systems - Principles and Programming, PWS
Publishing Company, 1 994.
1 0. Harrison, T Jay, "The Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) in Feature
Extraction and Expert Systems in Nuclear Material Management," Masters Thesis
in Nuclear Engineering, May 2004.
1 1 . Hastie, T. and R. Tibshirani, Generalized Additive Models, CRC Press, 1 990.
1 2. Hamamatsu, "Si PIN Phtotdiode S3590 series" (Hamamatsu) [online],
http://usa.hamamatsu.com/assets/pdf/parts_S/S3590-0 l .pdf (Accessed 23 March
2004).
1 3 . Khartabil, L., Hajek, B. K. and Miller, D. W., "An expert system for monitoring
functionally diagnosing, and managing operations of a multiple mode nuclear
plant system," In Proc. A 1 91 Frontiers in Innovative Computing for the Nuclear
Industry, Jackson, WY, 1 5- 1 8 Sept. 1 99 1 .

14. Knoll, G.F., Radiation Detection and Measurement, John Wiley & Sons, New
York, 1 999.
1 5. Linsay, R. K., B. G. Buchanan, E. A. Feigenbaum, and J. Lederberg, Applications
ofArtificial Intelligencefor Organic Chemistry: The Dendral Project, McGraw

Hill, New York, 1 980.
1 6. Luger, George F ., Artificial Intelligence: Structures and Strategies for Complex
Problem Solving, 4th Edition, Pearson Addison Wesley, 2002.

121

17. Miller, D. J. W. Hines, B. K. Hajek, L. Khartabill, Charles R. Hardy, Martin A.
Haas and Lane Robbins, "Experience with the hierarchical method for diagnosis
of faults in nuclear power plant systems," Reliability Engineering & System
Safety, 44(3) (1994) 297-311.

18. Nelson, Lloyd S. "The Shewhart Control Chart - Tests for Special Causes."
Journal of Quality Technology, 16.4 (October, 1984), pp. 237-239.
19. Newell Allen and Herbert A. Simon, Human Problem Solving, Prentice-Hall,
1972.
20. Parson, Paul, "Storage facility 'anchor tenant' for Y-12 effort," (The Oak Ridger)
[ online] 28 March 2002,
http://www.oakridger.com/stories/032802/bus_0328020012.html (Accessed 27
December 2003).
21. Parson, Paul, " Updated facilities are in DOE's future," (The Oak Ridger) [ online]
3 July 2001, http://www.oakridger.com/stories/070401/new_0703010071.html
(Accessed 1 6 March 2004).

22. Pickett C.A., K.M. Baldwin, Z.W. Bell, et al., "Automated Systems for
Safeguarding and Accountancy of Stored Nuclear Materials," presented at the
European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) 21st
Annual Meeting on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management in Sevilla,
Spain, 1999.

122

23. Pickett, Chris, "Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS™ )
for Accountability for Special Nuclear Materials," (Oak Ridge Systems for
Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards), [ online] 23 September 2003 A,
http://www.y l 2.doe.gov/orsens/cavis.htm (26 December 2003 ).
24. Pickett, Chris, "ORSENS™ Sensor Concentrator," (Oak Ridge Systems for
Enhanced Nuclear Safegu ards), [ online] 23 September 2003 B,
http://www.y l 2.doe.gov/orsens/cavis.htm (26 December 2003).
25. Pickett, Chris, "RADSiP™ II Photodiode Gamma Ray Sensor Unit," (Oak Ridge
Systems for Enhanced Nuclear Safegu ards), [ online] 23 September 2003 C,
http://www.y l 2.doe.gov/orsens/cavis.htm (26 December 2003).
26. Schmorak, M., "235U A Decay," (Table of Nuclides), [online] 1993,
http://atom.kaeri.re.kr/cgi-bin/decay?U-235+A (23 March 2004).
27. Shortliffe, E. H., Computer-based Medical Consultations: MYCIN, Elsevier, New
York, 1976.
28. Society for the Historical Preservation of the Manhattan Project, "Photo: P-047
(Y-12 Plant)," (Children of the Manhattan Project), [online] 10 March 2004,
http://www.childrenofthemanhattanproject.org/OR/Photo-Pages/ORP-047.htm
(16 March 2004).
29. Tsoukalas, Lefteri H. and Robert E. Uhrig, Fuzzy and Neural Approaches in
Engineering, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1997.

123

30. Wald, A., "Sequential Tests of Statistical Hypothesis", Ann. Math. Statist., 1 6,
1945, 117-186.
31. Wald, Abraham Selected Papers in Statistics and Probability, Stanford
University Press, California 1957.
32. Wald, Abraham Sequential Analysis. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York,
1947.
33. Wald, Abraham Statistical Decision Functions, Chelsea Publishing Company,
1971.
34. Wand, M.P., and M.C. Jones, Kernel Smoothing, Chapman & Hall/CRC, Boca
Raton, Fl, 1995.
3 5. Waterman, D. A., A guide to expert systems, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass,
1986.
36. Western Electric Company, Inc. Statistical Quality Control Handbook. 2nd ed.
New York: Western Electric Company, Inc., 1958.
3 7. Yesterday at the Y-12 National Security Complex., Y-12 National Security
Complex, [online] 2 September 2003, http://www.yl 2.doe.gov/bwxt/yl2/y12yesterday.html (Accessed: 27 Dec. 2003).
3 8. Younkin, J. R., D. W. Carver, R. L. Lawson, et al., "A Secure Sensor System for
Protected Asset Remote Verification," presented at the INMM 40th Annual
Meeting, Pointe Hilton Resort at Squaw Peak, Phoenix, Arizona, July 25-29 ,
1999.
124

39. Zadeh, L. A., "Fuzzy Sets", Information and Control, Vol 8 ( 1965) 338-353.

125

Appendices

1 26

Appendix A: Selected Figures

127

. .- · ·-r r·

UnSmoothed Data - Residuals

.... ··
·
10

. !:
GI

4

20

Sensor Space in Y

0 O

Sensor Space in X

Maximum of Neighborhood

10
8
>.!:

6

C:

4

GI

2

0

20

10
Sensor Space in Y

0

0

Sensor Space in X

· · r· - .

Tail Plot of Neighborhood Score
· ··· ···· ·!·· � .
· ··· · ·
: :·_
10
8
>C

C:

6
4 ...

0

20

128

•:

1

2

Sensor Space in Y

r-·

0 O

Sensor Space in X

Figure A-1. RAMM Analysis of Impacted Vault Stack, Time Index = 1

- ,· · · · · · - r r ·

UnSmoothed Data - Residuals

10

8
N

en

6

4 ..
2 ..
20

Sensor Space in Y

0

0

Sensor Space in X

Maximum of Neighborhood

r-

10 .. . ···

8 .. .
� 6 . ..

"'0
4 ...
en:ii
2 .. .

0
20

Sensor Space in Y

0

.· r · · r

0

Sensor Space in X

r

Tail Plot of Neighborhood Score

10 . . ···

···· ···;--·T· · · · .
:. =

8

::; 6

"'0

� 4 ...

2 .. .
··
0 .. .20

··

Sensor Space in Y

0 0

Sensor Space in X

Figure A-2. RAMM Analysis of Impacted Vault Stack, Time Index = 2
129

· ·-rr

UnSmoothed Data - Residuals

10

N

.s

enGI

6

4
2
0

0 O

Sensor Space in Y

Sensor Space in X

.. .·.·r,. · · :r:. · ·1·1•· · 1·• :· ·1 · . 1•· .
Maximum of Neighborhood

10

8
>-

C:

en

6
4

·····

.

· · ··]· ..

:... . . · · ·

.. . ·· · ·· ·
/ ··

2
0
20

0 O

Sensor Space in Y

Sensor Space in X

· • •: • · • · • • 1 1 • • t • · • . • 1 • · · . : •

Tail Plot of Neighborhood Score

10

8
>-

C

C:

GI

en

6
4

. . . ·-:-·

: _ ... ·

-� .

·

2
0
20

1 30

Sensor Space in Y

0 O

Sensor Space in X

Figure A-3. RAMM Analysis of Impacted Vault Stack, Time Index = 3

UnSmoothed Data - Residuals

10
8
N

.5

6

en
2
20

0

Sensor Space in Y

0

Sensor Space in X

: :ri:• :. .1:: ·

Maximum of Neighborhood

10
8
>.5

...

6
4 ..
2

. : 1·1· · ·

: r::

0
20

0

Sensor Space in Y

O

.. · r ..

Sensor Space in X

· re·· .>· . .

Tail Plot of Neighborhood Score

10
8
>-

...
C:

en

... :
..

-�---

. .
•.

_j... -····

·- . . )

r·-.

. _ r--·· ·-j. . <>··..· i
i.

6

·.. .

4 .. .

. .. ·�

2
20

Sensor Space in Y

0

0

Sensor Space in X

Figure A-4. RAMM Analysis of Impacted Vault Stack, Time Index = 4

1 31

UnSmoothed Data - Residuals

10
8
.!:

�

2
20

0 O

Sensor Space in Y

· · :1 :.

Sensor Space in X

Maximum of Neighborhood

10

..... .

. . ·=-·
,:-··

8
>.!:

.

� . .. .. ... .

6
-4

.
. .. .. � . . . . .

2

0

20

Sensor Space in Y

0

0

-· · · ·: · · · ·
·:'_ ] . . .
.:

Sensor Space in X

Tail Plot of Neighborhood Score

....,·

10

..···

. -· l.. . ·: ·

8
>-

�

4

...

0 -··
20

··· - i,'.,···.. .. "[···· .. .
· ... .t :

I

6

2

"[ "··- -.

···L.

...
15

Sensor Space in Y

0

0

Sensor Space in X

Figure A-5. RAMM Analysis of Impacted Vault Stack, Time Index = 5

1 32

· : · · · · · · · ·i . f . .

UnSmoothed Data - Residuals

10

N

.E

6
-4

2

0 O

Sensor Space in Y

Sensor Space in X

Neighborhood Score

.··-r

10
8
N

6

C:

4

C:

C/l

...........·..:=.··

2
0

Sensor Space in Y

0 O

Sensor Space in X

Time History Plot

... :··:· · . .
·

· ·. .
· "· · ·

10 . . · · ·
.

�:.

8

>.E
C/l

I

6
-4

2
0
20

.. . · ·

·

Sensor Space in Y

· · r·

0 O

Sensor Space in X

Figure A-6. RAMM Analysis of Moving External Source, Time Index = 1

1 33

.. · ·r · · .

UnSmoothed Data - Residuals

·r·

r� · ·
10

.

B
N

.5:

6

0

20

.. .

,•'

0

Sensor Space in Y

0

Sensor Space in X

· ·-rr

Neighborhood Score

1 0 .. .

,,•

.- ·:·

8 ...
N

.5:
0

6
4
2 ...
0

20

10

Sensor Space in Y

5

0

0

- ·r

Sensor Space in X

-· r=·-.

Time History Plot

··-r .. .

10
B

>.s
0

6
4
2
0

20

•"
,•'

,•'

..
15

Sensor Space in Y

0

0

Sensor Space in X

Figure A-7. RAMM Analysis of Moving External Source, Time Index = 2
1 34

UnSmoothed Data - Residuals

10

N
C

8

.. .

6

..

4

0
20

0 0

Sensor Space in Y

Sensor Space in X

Neighborhood Score

10
8
N

r· · · r

6

4

l : 1· >

: :i

2

0 O

Sensor Space in Y

Sensor Space in X

lime History Plot
.. .. .
. .•. .......... .]· .
..

10
8 . ..
>C

�-·· ,.

--� .. . . .

6 ...

4
2

20

Sensor Space in Y

0 O

Sensor Space in X

Figure A-8. RAMM Analysis of Moving External Source, Time Index = 3
135

, • " , . ,.: • f

UnSmoothed Data · Residuals
I

..

10
8
N
C

6

2

20

Sensor Space in Y

0

O

Sensor Space in X

Neighborhood Score

- r:: : rr:::1 -__ • . _

10

�

. .

8
N

.5
0

-� . . -.
.

·

6

· 1

4 .. .
2

Sensor Space in Y

0 0

Sensor Space in X

Time History Plot

10
8
>.5
0

6

· .
· ·:::r.. . · ·::r:: ..

. . · ···;·T·· . .

: ··..

. 1 :· - r

. .

4

2
0 ..

20

Sensor Space in Y

1 36

0 0

Sensor Space in X

Figure A-9. RAMM Analysis of Moving External Source, Time Index = 4
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Appendix
This appendix contains the coding for the FDI system. This includes the scripts and
functions necessary to operate the expert system, and several scripts and function that run
a demonstration of the RAMM.

Expert System Code, CAVIS monitoring system script
This script initiates and runs the CAVIS monitoring system.
fprintf('\n\nWelcome to Eskimo: The CA VIS monitoring system\n\n');
warning off MATLAB:divideByZero
warning off MATLAB:m_warning_or_and_precedence
Data_Choice = input('Do you wish to load Fabricated Data or Y- 1 2 Data ( I :Fab, 2 :Y- 1 2) \n');
Location = input('ls the program running on the UTK Network( 1 ), Josephs House(2), or elsewhere(3): \n');
if Location = 1
if Data_Choice = 1
fprintt'{'Available Data Files to be loaded\n');
dir('\\nepc 1 26\Y- 1 2\Fab_Data\')
data_set = input('lnput the data set you wish to run: ','s');
eval(['load \\nepc 1 26\Y- 1 2\Fab_Data\',data_set]);
end
if Data_Choice == 2
fprintt'{'Available Data Files to be loaded\n');
dir('\\nepc 1 26\Y- 1 2\Y- 1 2_Data\')
data_set = input('lnput the data set you wish to run: ','s');
eval(['load \\nepc 1 26\Y - 1 2\Y- 1 2_Data\',data_set]);
end
elseif Location == 2
if Data_Choice = 1
fprintt'{'Available Data Files to be loaded\n');
dir('C:\Y- 1 2\Fab_Data\')
data_set = input('Input the data set you wish to run: ','s');
eval(['load C:\Y- 1 2\Fab_Data\',data_set]);
end
if Data Choice = 2
fprintt'{'Available Data Files to be loaded\n');
dir('C:\Y- 1 2\Y- l 2_Data\')
data_set = input('Input the data set you wish to run: ','s');
eval(['load C:\Y- 1 2\Y- l 2_Data\',data_set]);
end
else
fprintf('The only available data files are in the current directory\n');
dir • . mat
data_set = input('lnput the data set you wish to run: ','s');
eval(['load ',data_set]);
end
figure( ) )
plot(dets)
title('Data set to be analyzed by Eskimo');
xlabel('Data Observation');ylabel('Activity');
ch l = ddeinit('excel','featextexcel/Counts');
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ch2 = ddeinit('excel','featextexcel/FeatureExt');
ch3 = ddeinit('excel','featextexcel/ExpSys');
ch4 = ddeinit('excel','featextexcel/Faults');
ch5 = ddeinit('excel','featextexcel/lnd50');
ch6 = ddeinit('excel','featextexcel/ldentification');
ch7 = ddeinit('excel','featextexcel/ldentificationNew');
%Define variables for the state of the state of the system
PCDUQuan = I ; %input('Enter the number of PCDU in the system : ');
SenConQuan = I ; %input('Enter the number of Sensor Concentrators in the system : ');
index=0;
clear RADSiPNum state previousstate;
for i = I : PC DU Quan
for j = I :SenConQuan
for k = 1 :20
index=index+ I ;
RADSiPNum(index,:) = [ i j k];
state(index,:) = [i j k];
previousstate(index,:) = [i j k];
end
end
end
RADSiPNum= RADSiPNum';
state = state';
state(4:20,:) = 0;
previousstate = previousstate';
previousstate(4:20,:) = 0;
ConSignFault = zeros( 1 ,20);
faultindex = I ;
ProbExclnd = 1 ;
Problem = {'0' '0'} ;
PreProblem = {'0' '0'} ;
Logic = f0' } ;
Prob Mat = zeros(30,9);ProbMat(3, I ) = l ;ProbMat(4: 1 0, 1 : 2 ) = I ;
I = [ones(20, I ) ones(20, I ) ( I :20)'];ProbMat( I I :30, I : 3 ) = I ;
PreProbMat = ProbMat;
ProbMatOrg = ProbMat;
PExlnd = I ;
offset = 0;
for indexa = I :length(dets);
indexb = indexa + offset;
H = datestr(now);
data = round(dets(indexa,:));
k = indexa + 2 + offset;
j = nurn2str(k);
posit I = ['r' j 'c I '];
posit2 = ('r' j 'c2'];
posit3 = ['r' j 'c3:r' j 'c22'];
% Write fabricated data
re = ddepoke(ch 1 ,posit l ,H( l : 1 2));
re = ddepoke(ch I ,posit2,H( 1 3:20));
re = ddepoke(ch l ,posit3,data);
% Perfonn reading/writing
for sens = I :20
mu = mus(sens);
featexpdat2(k,mu,sens,ch 1 ,ch2,ch3,ch5);
end
%Call features from Excel Database "ExpSys"
Data = ddereq(ch3,'r2c2 :r2 l c 1 7')';
Data( l 7,:) = I ;
%Fault Detection
[Faults,prefault,NumSensor,state,ConSignFault] = Tolerance(Data,RADSiPNum,indexb,faultindex,state,ConSignFault,ch5);
%Fault Identification New
if any(any(state))
[ProbMat]=RulesNew(Faults,ProbMat,RADSiPNum,NumSensor,state,ConSignFault);
end
%ProbMatStutT(:,:,indexb) = ProbMat;
%Save Faults, Problem, Logic in Excel Database New;
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ProbStatus = [ProbMat(:, I :3) ProbMat(:,4:9)-PreProbMat(:,4:9)];
if any(any(ProbStatus(:,4:9)))
[ProblemNew,LogicNew,Colorldent] = lnference(ProbMat,PreProbMat,ProbStatus);
[PExlnd] = ExcelESNew(ProblemNew,LogicNew,Colorldent,H,PEx lnd,ch7,indexb);
end
%Define Variables for following loop
previousstate = state;
LastFaults = Faults;
PreProblem = Problem;
Problem = {'0' '0' } ;
Logic = {'0' } ;
PreProbMat = ProbMat;
ProbMat = ProbMatOrg;
end

Tolerance Function
This function acts as the diagnostic module for detection faults in the CAVIS system.
function [ Faults,prefault,NumSensor,state,ConSignFault] = Tolerance( Data,RADSi PNum.index, faulti ndex,state, Con Sign Fa ult,ch5)
% Inference - Inference engine for an expert system to monitor CAVIS system
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% 3/ 1 0/03
%
% Data = State of System
% RADSiPNum = Sensor identification [PCDU#; SensorConcentrator#; Sensor#]
% index = current index of data point
% faultindex = current fault index (Used in database entry)
% state = current state of system (Faulted or Unfaulted) used in print
%
statement

%

% Faults = Faults of System
% NumSensor = Total number of sensors in system
% state = current state of system (Faulted or Un faulted) used in print
statement
%

%
%

% data! = Mean UP alann in last 1 000 data points
% data2 = Mean DOWN alann in last I 000 data points
% data3 = Variance UP alann in last 1 000 data points
% data4 = Variance DOWN alann in last I 000 data points
% data5 = Time between successive Mean UP alarm
% data6 = Time between successive Mean DOWN alann
% data7 = Time between successive Variance UP alarm
% data8 = Time between successive Variance DOWN alarm
% data9 = The number of same signs (+) of the residual
% data l 0 = Variance of last 50 or 1 00 data points
% data I l = Variance of last 5 data points
% data l 2 = Mean UP alann in last 1 00 data points
% data 13 = Mean DOWN alann in last I 00 data points
% data l 4 = Variance UP alann in last 1 00 data points
% data l 5 = Variance DOWN alann in last 1 00 data points
% data 16 = Current count rate
% data 1 7 = Communication status of CAVIS ( l =Good, 2 = Bad)
%Test for fault to locate problematic sensors
[NumData NumSensor]=size(Data);
FaultSen = zeros(3,80);
%Get previous faults
%ch5 = ddeinit('excel','featextexcel/lnd50');
Counter = I ;
Counter2 = 0;
prefault = zeros(5,80);
for i = 1 :20
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a = Counter:
b = Counter + 3;
A = num2str(a);
B = num2str(b);
a = a-Counter2;
b = b-Counter2;
positcheck = ['r4c' A ];
check = ddereq(ch5,positcheck);
if check = O
Filler = [0];
positfiller = ['r4c' A ];
re = ddepoke(ch5,positfiller,Fil ler);
end
positprefault = ['r4c' A ':r8c' BJ;
prefaultnum = ddereq(ch5,positprefault);
[prex prey) = size(prefaultnum);
prefault( I :prex,a:b-(4-prey)) = prefaultnum;
Counter = Counter + 5;
Counter2 = Counter2 + I ;
end
Counter5 = I ;
Counter6 = 2 ;
Counter7 = 3;
Counters = 4;
for j = I :NumSensor
if Data( l j ) >= 5; %6e-5;
F ( l ,j ) = I ;
state( I j ) = I ;
else F( l j ) = O;
state( l j ) = O;
end
if Data(2j) >= 5; %8e-5;
F(2j) = I ;
state(2j) = I ;
else F(2,j) = O;
state(2j) = 0;
end
if Data(3j) >= 5; %4e-6;
F(3 ,j ) = I ;
state(3 j) = I ;
else F(3,j) = O;
state(3j) = 0;
end
if Data(4j) >= 5; %2e-5;
F(4j) = I ;
state(4j) = I ;
else F(4j) = O;
state(4j) = O;
end
if (prefault( l ,Counter5)
prefault{2,Counter5) + I ) & (index > 2);
F(5j) = I ;
state(5j) = I ;
else F(5j) = O;
state(5,j) = 0;
end
Counters = Counters + 4;
i f (prefault( l ,Counter6)
prefault{2,Counter6) + I ) & (index > 2);
F(6j ) = I ;
state( 6j ) = I ;
else F(6j) = O;
state(6j) = O;
end
Counter6 = Counter6 + 4;
if (prefault( I ,Counter?) == prefault(2,Counter7) + I ) & (index > 2);
F(7j) = I ;
state(7,j ) = I ;
else F(7 j ) = 0;

=

=
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state(7,j ) = 0;
end
Counter7 = Counter7 + 4;
if (prefault( I ,CounterS) == prefault(2,CounterS) + I ) & (index > 2);
F(S,j ) = I :
state(S,j) = I ;
else F(Sj) = 0;
state(S,j) = 0;
end
Counters = Counters + 4;
if abs(Data(9j)) >= 1 5;
F(9j) = l ;
state(9j) = 1 ;
ConSignFault( ) ,j) = ConSignFault( l ,j) + l ;
else F(9j) = O:
state(9j) = O;
end
if (Data( 1 OJ) = 0) & (index > 50);
F( ) Oj) = l ;
state( I O,j) = I ;
else F( I Oj) = O;
state( ) Oj) = O;
end
if(Data( l l ,j) == 0) & (index > 3);
F( l l j) = I ;
state( l l j) = I ;
else F( ) I j ) = O;
state( ! I j) = O;
end
if Data( 1 2j) >= 3; %6e-5;
F( l 2j) = I ;
state( l 2j) = I ;
else F( I 2j) = O;
state( l 2j) = O;
end
if Data( 1 3 j) >= 3; ¾Se-5;
F( ) 3j) = l ;
state( 1 3,j) = I ;
else F( 1 3,j ) = 0;
state( l 3j) = O;
end
if Data( l 4j) >= 3; %4e-6;
F( l 4j) = l ;
state( 1 4,j) = I ;
else F( l 4j) = 0;
state( 1 4j) = O;
end
i f Data( 1 5j) >= 3; %2e-5 ;
F( ) 5j) = I ;
state( I 5j) = I ;
else F( 1 5j) = O;
state( I 5j) = O;
end
if Data( l 6,j) = 0;
F( l 6j) = l ;
state( l 6,j) = I ;
else F( l 6j) = O;
state( I 6j) = O;
end
%Communication Status
i f Data( l 7j) -= I ;
F( l 7j) = I ;
state( ) 7,j) = I ;
else F( I 7j ) = O;
state( l 7 j) = O;
end
for i= l :NumData
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if F(i,j) == I
FaultSen(:,j) = RADSiPNum(:,j);
end
end
end
C=FaultSen( I ,:);
C=find(C);
FaultSen = FaultSen( :,C);
F= F(:,C);
Faults = [FaultSen;F];
%Define state of system for print statement - Only print for change in
%state of system
[NumData NumSenJ=size(Faults);
state(4: l 5,:) = 0;
for j = I :NumData
for i= l : NumSen
Z = (80*Faults( 1 ,i))-80 + (20*Faults(2,i))-20 + Faults(3,i);
state(i,Z) = Faults(j,i);
end
end

RulesNew Function
This function acts as the fault isolation module. It contains the characteristic fault portion
of the knowledge base. The function also calls other function to establish facts additional
facts.
function [ProbMatJ=RulesNew(Faults,ProbMat,RADSiPNum,NumSensor,state,ConSignFault);
% Rule base for Expert System to Monitor CAVIS System
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% 3/ 1 1 /03
% Last Modified June 5,2003
%
% Rules based on Hierarchical System
%
% Faults = Faults detected by Inference
% RADSiPNum = Radiation Sensor Identification
% NumSensor = Total number of sensor in CA VIS system
% state = current state of system (Faulted or Un faulted) used in print
%
statement
% previousstate = Previous state of system (Faulted or Un faulted) used in
%
print state to only print during change of state
%

% ProbMat = Matrix containing root causes of CA VIS fault
% previousstate = Previous state of system ( Faulted or Un faulted) used in
%
print state to only print during change of state
%Define necessary variables for rules
[NumData NumSenJ = size(Faults);
%Hierarchal Rule Base
if NumSen > 3 %Set the tolerance for the minimum number of sensor to perform hierarchal rule base
[PCDUSen,SCSen,PCDUSenFail,SCSenFail] = SenCount(Faults,RADSiPNum);
[ProbMat) = HeirarchalNew(ProbMat,Faults,state,PCDUSen,SCSen,PCDUSenFail,SCSenFail);
end
%Sensor Failures
%Dead Detector Alarm & Warning
for i= I :20
if (state( 14,i)=- I )&(state( 1 9,i)= l );
ProbMat(i+ I 0,4) = 2; %Dead Detector Alann
elseif (state( 14,i)-= I )&(state( l 9,i)== I );
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ProbMat(i+ I 0,4) = I ; %Dead Detector Warning
end
end
%Stuck Detector Alann
for i= I :20
if (state( 14,i) == I )&(state( l 9,i)-= 1 );
ProbMat(i+ I 0,5) = 2; %Stuck Detector Alann
end
end
%Loose Electrical Connection Alarm & Warning (Variance Shift Up)
for i= I :20
if
(state(4,i)== I )&(state(5,i)= I )&(state(6,i)== I )&(state( 1 3,i}-= I )&(state( 14,i}-= I )&(state( l 5 ,i)= I )&(state( I 6,i)== I )&(state( 1 7,i)=
I )&(state( 1 8,i)-= I );
ProbMat(i+ l 0,6) = 2; %Loose Detector Alann
elseif (state( 1 3,i}-= I )&(state( 14,i)-= I )&(state( 1 5,i)=- I )&(state( 1 6,i)= l )&(state( 1 7,i)= l )&(state( 1 8,i)-= I );
ProbMat(i+ I 0,6) = I ; %Loose Detector Warning
elseif (state(4,i)= I )&(state(5,i)=I )&(state(6,i)= I )&(state( 1 3,i}-= I )&(state( 14,i}-= I )&(state( 1 8,i}-= l );
ProbMat(i+ 1 0,6) = 1 ; %Loose Detector Warning
end
end
%Removal of Stored Nuclear Material Alarm (Mean Shift Down)
for i= I :20
if
(state(4,i}-= I )&(state(5,i)= l )&(state(6,i)=l )&(state( 1 3,i)-= I )&(state( 1 4,i)-= I )&(state( 1 5,i)-= l )&(state( 1 6,i)= 1 )&(state( 1 7,i)=
1 )&(state( l 9,i}-= I );
ProbMat(i+ 1 0,7) = 2; %Removal of material alarm
elseif (state(4,i}-= I )&(state(5,i)= I )&(state(6,i)== I )&(state( 1 3,i}-= I )&(state( 1 4,i}-= I )&(state( 1 9,i}-= l );
ProbMat(i+ 1 0, 7) = 1 ; %Removal of material warning
elseif (state( 1 3,i}-= l )&(state( 1 4,i}-=l )&(state( 1 5,i}-= l )&(state( 1 6,i )=- l )&(state( 1 7,i)= 1 )&(state( 1 9,i}-= I );
ProbMat(i+ I 0, 7) = 1 ; %Removal of material warning
end
end
%Run Test Warning
%for i= l :20
% if ConSignFault( l ,i) > 3;
%
ProbMat(i+ I 0,8) = 1; %Drifting Sensor Warning
% end
%end
%Drifting Sensor Warning (Mean Shift Down or Mean Shift Up)
for i= l :20
if ((state(4,i)==l I state(5,i)= l )&(state( l 5 ,i)== I I state( 1 6,i)= I ))&(state( 1 3,i}-= I )&(state( 1 4,i)-= 1 )&(state( I 9,i)-= l );
ProbMat(i+ I 0,9) = 2; %Drifting Sensor Alarm
elseif ((state(4,i)= I )j(state(5,i)==I )j(state( l 5,i)= I )!(state( 1 6,i)= l ))&(state( I 3,i)-= I )&(state( l 4,i)-= l )&(state( 1 9,i}-= 1 );
ProbMat(i+ 1 0,9) = I ; %Drifting Sensor Warning
end
end
%Power or CA VIS System Failure
if (NumSensor = NumSen) & (NumSensor > 20);
ProbMat( l ,4) = l ; %Total CAVlS System Failure
end
%External Source in Warehouse Alarm (Mean Shift Up)
if
(NumSen> 1 O)&(((sum(Faults(4,:) )>=0 . 5*NumSen)&(sum(Faults(5,: ))=O)l((sum(Faults( 1 5,: ))>=0.5 *NumSen)&(sum(Faults( 1 6,:))==
O))));
ProbMat( 1 ,5) = 1 ; %Mean shift up in several sensors
end
%Temperature Increase in warehouse inducing fault in sensor (Extreme Mean Shift Up)
if
(NumSen> I O)&(((sum(Faults( 4,:))>=0.5*NumSen)&(sum(Faults(5,:))==0)l((sum(Faults( I 5,:))>=0.5*NumSen)&(sum(Faults( 1 6,:))=0))));
ProbMat( 1 ,6) = I ; %Mean shift up in several sensors
end
%Note External Source and Temperature alarms are the same
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SenCount Function

This function is a portion of the isolation module that determines the number of RADSiP
sensor present in the CAVIS system.
function [PCDUSen,SCSen,PCDUSenFail,SCSenFail] = SenCount(Faults,RADSiPNum)
% SenCount - Determines the number of RA DSiP sensors for every
%
PCDU & Sensor Concentrator

%

% Written by T Jay Harrison & Joseph Bowling
%
April 1 4, 2003
Last Modified June 5, 2003
%

%

% Faults - Faults in system detected by Inference
% RADSiPNum - Sensor Identification

%

% PCDUSen - Number of sensors for each PCDU
% SCSen - Number of sensors for each Sensor Concentrator
% PCDUSenFail - Number of faulted sensors for each PCDU
% SCSen Fail - Number of faulted sensors for each Sensor Concentrator
[NumData NumSensor]=size(RADSiPNum);
PCDUSen=0;
SCSen=0;
PCDUSenFail=0;
SCSenFail=O;
%Identify the number of sensor for each PCDU
counter I = I ;
counter2 = 0;
counter3 = I ;
for i = I : NumSensor;
if RADSiPNum( l ,i) == counter l ;
counter2 = counter2 + I ;
elseif RADSiPNum( 1 ,i) -= counterl ;
PCDUSen( 1 ,counter3) = counter I ;
PCDUSen(2,counter3 ) = counter2;
counter) = counter l + I ;
counter2 = I ;
counter3 = counter3 + I ;
end
PCDUSen( l ,counter3) = counterl ;
PC DUSen(2,coun ter3 ) = counter2;
end
%Identify the number of sensor for each Sensor Concentrator
counterl = I ;
counter2 = l ;
counter3 = 0;
counter4 = I ;
for i = l :NumSensor;
if (RADSiPNum( 1 ,i)
counter) )&( RADSiPNum(2,i)
counter2);
counter3 = counter3 + I ;
elseif (RADSiPNum( 1 ,i) == counter! )&(RADSiPNum(2,i) -= counter2);
SC Sen( 1 ,counter4) = counter I ;
SCSen(2,counter4) = counter2;
SCSen(3,counter4) = counter3;
counter2 = counter2 + I ;
counter3 = I ;
counter4 = counter4 + I ;
elsei f (RADSi PN um( 1 ,i) -= counter I )&(RADSi PNum(2,i) -= counter2 );
SCSen( l ,counter4) = counter l ;
SCSen(2,counter4) = counter2;
SCSen(3,counter4) = counter3;
counter ) = counterl + I ;
counter2 = I ;

=

=
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counter3 = I ;
counter4 = counter4 + I ;
end
%Needed if only one PCDU & one Sensor Concentrator
if (counter l = l )&(counter2 == l );
SCSen( l ,counter4) = counter ! ;
SCSen(2,counter4) = counter2;
SCSen(3,counter4) = counter3;
end
%Need to enter last data entry
SC Sen( l ,counter4) = counter I ;
SCSen(2,counter4) = counter2;
SCSen(3,counter4) = counter3;
end
[x i y l J = size(Faults);
counter = zeros( 1 ,4);
counter ! = zeros(4);
for index2 = I :yl
steve = Faults( 1 ,index2);
sammy = Faults(2,index2);
if steve == I
counter( I ) = counter( I ) + I ;
if sammy == I
counter ! ( I , I ) = counter I ( I , I ) + I ;
elseif sammy == 2
counter l ( l ,2) = counter l ( l ,2) + I ;
elseif sammy == 3
counter ! ( 1 ,3) = counter l ( l ,3) + I ;
elseifsammy == 4
counterl ( l ,4) = counterl ( l ,4) + I ;
end
elseif steve == 2
counter(2) = counter(2) + I ;
if sammy = I
counter I (2, I ) = counter I (2, I ) + I ;
elseifsammy == 2
counter l (2,2) = counterl (2,2) + I ;
elseif sammy == 3
counter I (2,3) = counter I (2,3) + I ;
elseif sammy = 4
counter l (2,4) = counter l (2,4) + I ;
end
elseif steve = 3
counter(3) = counter(3) + I ;
if sammy = I
counter I (3, I ) = counter I (3, I ) + I ;
elseif sammy == 2
counter ! (3,2) = counter! (3,2) + I ;
elseif sammy = 3
counter ! (3,3) = counter I (3,3) + I ;
elseif sammy = 4
counter l (3,4) = counterl (3,4) + I ;
end
elseif steve = 4
counter(4) = counter(4) + I ;
if sammy = I
counter l (4, l ) = counter l (4, l ) + I ;
elseifsammy == 2
counter I (4,2) = counter! (4,2) + I ;
elseif sammy == 3
counter l (4,3) = counterl (4,3) + I ;
elseifsammy == 4
counter I (4,4) = counter l (4,4) + I ;
end
end
end
%PCDUSenFail( l ,:) = 1 : 1 ;
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for k = I :4
PCDUSenFail( l ,k) = k;
PCDUSenFai1(2,k) = counter(k);
end
SCSenFail( I , I :4) = I ;
SCSenFai l( l ,5:8) = 2;
SCSenFail( l ,9: 1 2) = 3;
SCSenFai l( I , 1 3 : 1 6) = 4;
SCSenFai1(2, I :4) = I :4;
SCSenFai1(2,5:8) = I :4;
SCSenFail(2, 9: I 2) = I :4;
SCSenFai1(2, 1 3 : 1 6) = 1 :4;
r= I;
for j = 1 :4
for m = 1 :4
SCSenFail(3,r) = counter l G,m);
r= r+ I;
end
end

HierarchalNew Function
This function is a portion of the isolation module. It contains the hierarchal portion of the
knowledge base.
function [ProbMat] = HeirarchalNew(ProbMat,Faults,state,PCDUSen,SCSen,PCDUSen Fail,SCSenFail);
%Hierarchal - Fault identification function based on hierarchal rule base
% Iden ti fies faulty component in CAVIS system if all sensors that
% correspond to component fail
% Written by Joseph Bowling, May 5, 2003
% Last modified June 4, 2003
%
% Faults - Matrix. containing faulty sensor identification and nature of
%
faults
% RADSiPNumFail - Number of failed sensors
% PCDUSen - Number of sensors that correspond to each PCDU
% SCSen - Number of sensors that correspond to each Sensor Concentrator
% PCDUSenFail - Number of failed sensors that correspond to each PCDU
% SCSenFail - Number of failed sensors that correspond to each Sensor Concentrator
%
% Problem - Isolated fault in CA VIS system
%Define necessary variables are function
[NumData NumSen] = size(Faults);
[PC DUx. NumPCDU] = size(PCDUSen);

[SCx NumSC] = size(SCSen);

%PCDU Problem Identification
%IF every sensor from a particular PCDU experiences a fault
%Then the problem is in the PC DU
for i = I :NumPCDU
if (PCDUSen(2,i)
PCDUSenFail(2,i)) & (PCDUSen(2,i)>20);
if (sum(Faults( l 4,:)) >= 80) & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) >= 80) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < 2);
ProbMat(3,4) = 2; %PCDU Dead Alann
elseif (sum(Faults( 1 4,:)) < 2) & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) >= 80) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < 2);
ProbMat(3,4) = I; %PCDU Dead Warning
end
if (sum(Faults( 1 4,:)) >= 80) & (sum(Faults( I 9,:)) < 2) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < 2);
ProbMat(3,5) = 2; %PCDU Stuck Alann
end
if
(sum(Faults(4,:))>=60)&(sum(Faults(5,:))>=60)&(sum(Faults(6,:))>= 60)&(sum(Faults( l 3,:))<2)&(sum(Faults( l4,:))<2)&(sum(Faults
( I 5,:))>=60)&(sum(Faults( I 6,:))>=60)&(sum(Faults( I 7,:))>=60)&(sum(Faults( 1 9,:))<2);

=
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ProbMat(3,6) = 2; ¾PCDU loose wire or connection Alann
end
if (sum(Faults(20,:)) >= 80)
ProbMat(3,7) = 2; ¾PCDU Unplugged, lost communication Alarm
end
ProbMat(3,8) = I ; ¾PCDU has failed, all corresponding sensors have faults
end
end
%Sensor Concentrator Fault
%IF every sensor from a particular sensor concentration experiences a fault
%Then the problem is in the Sensor Concentrator
for i = I :NumSC
if (SCSen(3,i) == SCSen Fai1(3,i)) & (SCSen(3,i) > 1 0);
if (sum(Faults( l4,:)) == 20) & (sum(Faults( l 9,:)) == 20) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < 2)
ProbMat(4,4) = 2; %Sen Cone Dead Alarm
elseif(sum(Faults( 1 4,:)) < 2) & (sum(Faults( l 9,:)) == 20) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < 2)
ProbMat(4,4) = I ; %Sen Cone Dead Warning
end
if (sum(Faults( 1 4,:))
20) & (sum(Faults( 1 9, :)) < 2) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < 2);
ProbMat(4,5) = 2; %Sen Cone Stuck Alann
end
if
(sum(Faults(4,:))>= 1 5)&(sum(Faults(5,:))>= 1 5)&(sum(Faults(6,:))>= I 5)&(sum(Faults( 1 3,:))<2)&(sum(Faults( 1 4,:))<2)&(sum(Faults
( 1 5,:))>= 1 5)&(sum(Faults( 1 6,:))>= 1 5)&(sum(Faults( 1 7,:))>= 1 5)&(sum(Faults( 1 9,:))<2);
ProbMat(4,6) = 2; %Sen Cone loose wire or connection Alann
end
if (sum(Faults(20,:)) >= 20)
ProbMat(4,7) = 2; %Sen Cone Unplugged, lost communication Alarm
end
ProbMat(4,8) = I ; %Sen Cone has failed, all corresponding sensors have faults
end
end
%Sensor Concentrator Board Fault
%IF 1 /2 of the sensors from a particular sensor concentration corresponding to a SC board experiences a fault
%Then the problem is in the Sensor Concentrator Board May need floor or
¾ceil in front of ( 1 /2)*SCSen(3,i)
%Communication Board I
for i = I :NumSC
55);
if (( 1 /2)*SCSen(3,i) == (SCSenFai1(3,i))) & (SCSen(3,i) > 5) & (sum(Faults(3,:))
if (sum(Faults( 1 4, :)) >= I 0) & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) >= I 0) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat(5,4) = 2; %Sen Cone Dead Alarm
elseif (sum(Faults(l 4,:)) < I ) & (sum(Faults( l 9,:)) >= 1 0) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat(5,4) = I ; %Sen Cone Dead Warning
end
if (sum(Faults( 1 4,:)) >= 1 0) & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) < I) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat(5,5) = 2; %Sen Cone Stuck Alarm
end
if
(sum(Faults(4,:))>=7)&(sum(Faults(5,:))>=7)&(sum(Faults(6,:))>=7)&(sum(Faults( 1 3,:))< I )&(sum(Faults( 1 4,:))< I )&(sum(Faults( 1 5,
:))>=7)&(sum(Faults( l 6,:))>=7)&(sum(Faults( l 7,:))>=7)&(sum(Faults( 1 9,:))< 1 );
ProbMat(5,6) = 2; %Sen Cone loose wire or connection Alarm
end
if (sum(Faults(20,:)) >= 20)
ProbMat(5,7) = 2; %Sen Cone Unplugged, lost communication Alarm
end
ProbMat(5,8) = I ; %Sen Cone has failed, all corresponding sensors have faults
end
end
%Communication Board 2
for i = I :NumSC
1 55);
if(( l /2)*SCSen(3,i) == (SCSenFail(3,i))) & (SCSen(3,i) > 5) & (sum(Faults(3,:))
if (sum(Faults( 1 4,:)) >= I O) & (sum(Faults( l 9,:)) >= 1 0) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat(6,4) = 2; %Sen Cone Comm Board Dead Alarm
elseif (sum(Faults( 1 4,:)) < I ) & (sum(Faults( l 9,:)) >= I 0) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat(6,4) = I ; %Sen Cone Comm Board Dead Warning
end
if (sum(Faults( 1 4,:)) >= I 0) & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) < I ) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );

=

=

=

156

ProbMat(6,5) = 2; %Sen Cone Comm Board Stuck Alarm
end
if
(sum(Faults(4,:))>=7)&(sum(Faults(5,:))>=7)&(sum(Faults(6,:))>=7)&(sum(Faults( 1 3,:))< I )&(sum(Faults( 1 4,:))< I )&(sum(Faults( I 5,
:))>=7)&(sum(Faults( I 6,:))>=7)&(sum(Faults( 1 7,:))>=7)&(sum(Faults( 1 9,:))< l );
ProbMat(6,6) = 2; %Sen Cone Comm Board loose wire or connection Alarm
end
if (sum(Faults(20,:)) >= 1 0)
ProbMat(6,7) = 2; %Sen Cone Comm Board Unplugged, lost communication Alarm
end
ProbMat(6,8) = l ; %Sen Cone Comm Board has failed, all corresponding sensors have faults
end
end
%Sensor Concentrator Board Fault
%IF 1 /4 of the sensors from a particular sensor concentration corresponding to a SC board experiences a fault
%Then the problem is in the Sensor Concentrator Board, May need floor or
%ceil in front of ( l /4)*SCSen(3,i)
%Process Board I
for i = l :NumSC
if(( l/4)*SCSen(3,i) == (SCSenFail(3,i))) & (sum(Faults(3,:)) == 1 5);
if(sum(Faults( l 4,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults( l 9,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < l );
ProbMat(7,4) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board Dead Alarm
elseif (sum(Faults( 1 4,:)) < I ) & (sum(Faults( l 9,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat(7,4) = I ; %Sen Cone Process Board Dead Warning
end
if(sum(Faults( l 4,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults( l 9,:)) < l ) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < l );
ProbMat(7 ,5) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board Stuck Alarm
end
if
(sum(Faults(4,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults(5,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults(6,:))>=3 )&(sum(Faults( 1 3,:))< 1 )&(sum(Faults( 1 4,:))< I )&(sum(Faults( 1 5,
:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( I 6,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( l 7,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( 1 9,:))< I );
ProbMat(7,6) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board loose wire or connection Alarm
end
if (sum(Faults(20,:)) >= 5)
ProbMat(7,7) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board Unplugged, lost communication Alarm
end
ProbMat(7,8) = I ; %Sen Cone Process Board has failed, all corresponding sensors have faults
end
end
%Process Board 2
for i = I :NumSC
40);
if (( l/4)*SCSen(3,i) == (SCSenFail(3,i))) & (sum(Faults(3,:))
if (sum(Faults( 1 4,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat(8,4) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board Dead Alarm
elseif (sum(Faults( 1 4,:)) < l ) & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat(8,4) = I ; %Sen Cone Process Board Dead Warning
end
if (sum(Faults( l4,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) < l) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat(8,5) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board Stuck Alarm
end
if
(sum(Faults(4,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults(5,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults(6,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( 1 3,:))< I )&(sum(Faults( 1 4,:))< I )&(sum(Faults( 1 5,
:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( 1 6,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( l 7,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( 1 9,:))< I );
ProbMat(8,6) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board loose wire or connection Alarm
end
if (sum(Faults(20,:)) >= 5)
ProbMat(8,7) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board Unplugged, lost communication Alarm
end
ProbMat(8,8) = I ; %Sen Cone Process Board has failed, all corresponding sensors have faults
end
end
%Process Board 3
for i = l :NumSC
65);
if (( l /4)*SCSen(3,i) == (SCSenFai1(3,i))) & (sum(Faults(3,:))
if (sum(Faults( l 4,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults( I 9,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat(9,4) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board Dead Alarm
elseif (sum(Faults( l 4,:)) < l )· & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < l );

=

=
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ProbMat(9,4) = I ; %Sen Cone Process Board Dead Warning
end
if (sum(Faults( 1 4, :)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) < I ) & (sum( Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat(9,5) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board Stuck Alann
end
if
(sum(Faults(4,:))>=3 )&(sum(Faults(5,:})>=3 )&(sum(Faults(6,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( 1 3,:))< I }&(sum(Faults( 1 4,:))< I )&(sum(Faults( 1 5,
:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( I 6,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( l 7,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( l 9,:))< I );
ProbMat(9,6) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board loose wire or connection Alann
end
if (sum(Faults(20,:)) >= 5 )
ProbMat(9, 7 ) = 2 ; %Sen Cone Process Board Unplugged, lost communication Alann
end
ProbMat(9,8) = l; %Sen Cone Process Board has failed, all corresponding sensors have faults
end
end
%Process Board 4
for i = t :NumSC
if (( t /4)*SCSen(3,i) == (SCSenFail(3,i))) & (sum(Faults(3,:)}
90);
if (sum(Faults( 1 4, :)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat( I 0,4) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board Dead Alann
elseif (sum(Faults( I 4,:)) < I ) & (sum(Faults( 1 9, :)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat( I 0,4) = I ; %Sen Cone Process Board Dead Warning
end
if (sum(Faults( l 4,:)) >= 5) & (sum(Faults( 1 9,:)) < I ) & (sum(Faults(20,:)) < I );
ProbMat( I 0,5) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board Stuck Alarm
end
if
(sum(Faults(4,: ))>=3 )&(sum(Faults(5,:))>=3 )&(sum(Faults( 6,:))>=3 )&(sum(Faults( 1 3,:) )< I )&(sum(Faults( 1 4,:))< I )&(sum(Faults( 1 5,
:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( 1 6,:))>=3)&(sum(Faults( I 7,:)}>=3)&(sum(Faults( 1 9,:))< I );
ProbMat( I 0,6) = 2; %Sen Cone Process Board loose wire or connection Alann
end
if (sum(Faults(20,:)) >= 5 )
ProbMat( l 0,7) = 2 ; %Sen Cone Process Board Unplugged, lost communication Alann
end
ProbMat( l 0,8) = I ; %Sen Cone Process Board has failed, all corresponding sensors have faults
end
end

=

Inference Function
This function acts as the inference engine for the expert system. It determines which
rules should fire by calling an additional sub inference engine specific to the CAVIS
system state.
function [Problem,Logic,Colorldent] = lnference(ProbMat,PreProbMat,ProbStatus);
¾Inference - Determines which rules fire for the expert system
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% 1 1 - 1 3-03
Plnd = I ;
Problem = {'0' '0'} ;
Logic = {'0' } ;
Colorldent = 0;
%Dead Sensor Inference Engine
i f any(ProbStatus( :,4));
[Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd] = Deadlnference(ProbMat,ProbStatus,Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
end
%Stuck Sensor Inference Engine
if any(ProbStatus(:,5));
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[ Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd] = Stucklnference(ProbMat,ProbStatus,Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
end
%Loose Wire Inference Engine
if any(ProbStatus(:,6));
[ Problem,Logic,Colorfdent,Plnd] = LooseWirelnference(ProbMat,ProbStatus,Problem, Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
end
%Unplugged Component Inference Engine
if any(ProbStatus(3 : I 0, 7));
[ Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd] = Unplugged lnference(ProbMat, ProbStatus,Problem, Logic,Colorldent, Plnd);
end
%Removal of SNM
if any(ProbStatus( 1 1 :30, 7));
[ Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd] = SNM Removelnference(ProbMat,ProbStatus,Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
end
%Component Failure Inference Engine
%if any( ProbStatus(3: I 0,8)) & (max(max(ProbStatus(3: I 0,3 : 7)))>0);
% [ Problem,Logic,Colorfdent,Plnd] = CompFaillnference(ProbMat,ProbStatus,Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
%end
%Sensor Drift Run Test
%if any(ProbStatus( 1 1 :30,8));
% [ Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd] = DriftRunlnference(ProbMat,ProbStatus,Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
%end
%Sensor Drift SPRT
if any(ProbStatus( I I :30,9));
[ Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd] = DriftSPRTinference(ProbMat,ProbStatus, Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
end
%CA VIS warehouse or system faults
if any(ProbStatus( 1 ,:))
i f (ProbMat( l ,4)= 1 ) & (ProbStatus( l ,4)-=0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'CA VIS has failed' } ;
Logic(Pind,:) = {'CA VIS has failed because all sensors have failed' } ;
Colorldent(Pind,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
if (Prob Mat( 1 ,4)==0) & (ProbStatus( 1 ,4}=- 1 );
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'CAVIS is no longer failing' } ;
Logic(Pind,:) = {'All o r some o f the C AV I S sensors are functional' } ;
Colorldent(Pind,:) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
if (ProbMat( l ,5)=-1 ) & (ProbStatus( l ,5 )-=0);
Problem(Plnd, :) = {'Warning: An external radiation source may be in warehouse' } ;
Logic(Pind,:) = {' l /2 o f the CA VIS sensors have experienced a mean shift up' } ;
Colorldent(Pind,:) = I ;
Plnd = P lnd + I ;
end
if (ProbMat{ l ,5)=0) & (ProbStatus( l ,5)= 1 );
Problem{Plnd, :) = {'An external radiation source is no longer detected' } ;
Logic(Pind,:) = {'A mean shift up i s n o longer detected i n 1 /2 o f the CAVIS sensors' } ;
Colorldent(Pind, :) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
%if (Prob Mat( 1 ,6 )= I ) & (ProbStatus( 1 ,6)-=0);
% Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The environ. cond. may have induced CA VIS drifts' } ;
% Logic(Pind,:) = { ' l /2 o f the CAVIS sensors have experienced a mean shift up' } ;
% Colorldent(Pind,:) = I ;
% Plnd = Plnd + I ;
%end
%if (ProbMat( l ,6)=0) & (ProbStatus( l ,6)=- 1 );
% Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The environ. cond. drifts are no longer detected' } ;
% Logic(Pind,:) = {'A mean shift u p is n o longer detected i n 1 /2 o f the CAVIS sensors' } ;
% Colorldent(Pind,:) = 3 ;
% Plnd = Plnd + I ;
%end
end
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Deadlnference Function
This function acts as a sub inference engine for the detection of dead or failed CAVIS
components.
function [Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd] = Deadlnference(ProbMat,ProbStatus,Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
%Deadlnference - Inference Engine for the dead sensors
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% 1 1 / 1 3/03

if (ProbMat(3,4) == 2) & (ProbStatus(3,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The PCUD is dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(3, I ))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate for all sensors corresponding to the PCDU for 5 cons. obs.'};
Colorldent(Plnd, :) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(3,4)
I ) & (ProbStatus(3,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The PCU D may be dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(3, I )) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = { 'Zero count rate fo r all sensors corresponding to the Sen. Cone.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd, :) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(3,4) = 0) & ((ProbStatus(3,4) == - I ) I (ProbStatus(3,4) == -2));
Problern(Plnd,:) = {'The PCUD is no longer dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(3, I )) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) ::: { 'The sensors corresponding to the PCDU no longer have a zero count rate'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd, :) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(4,4) 2 ) & (ProbStatus(4,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. is dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(4, I :2))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate for all sensors corresponding to the Sen. Cone. for 5 cons. obs.' };
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I;
elseif (ProbMat(4,4) = I) & (ProbStatus(4,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Cone. may be dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(4, I :2))};
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate for all sensors corresponding to the Sen. Cone.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(4,4) = 0) & ((ProbStatus(4,4) == - I ) I (ProbStatus(4,4) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. is no longer dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(4, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the Sen. Cone. no longer have a zero count rate' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(5,4) 2 ) & (ProbStatus(5,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board I is dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(5, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r all sensors corresponding to the board fo r 5 cons. obs.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd, :) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(5,4) = I ) & (ProbStatus(5,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board I may be dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(5, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(5,4) = 0) & ((ProbStatus(5,4) = - I ) I (ProbStatus(5,4) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board I is no longer dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(5, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding t o the board no longer have a zero count rate'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd, :) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(6,4) 2 ) & (ProbStatus(6,4) -= 0);
Problern(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 2 is dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(6, I :2))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r all sensors corresponding to the board fo r 5 cons. obs.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(6,4)
I ) & (ProbStatus(6,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 2 may be dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(6, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r all sensors corresponding to the board' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;

=

=

=

=

=

160

Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(6,4) = 0) & ((ProbStatus{6,4) == - I ) I (ProbStatus{6,4) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 2 is no longer dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(6, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board no longer have a zero count rate'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3 ;
Pind = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(7,4) = 2 ) & (ProbStatus(7,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board I is dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(7, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r all sensors corresponding to the board fo r 5 cons. obs.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elsei f (ProbMat(7,4) = I ) & (ProbStatus(7,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Process Board I may be dead: ' num2str(ProbMat{7, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(7,4) = 0) & ((ProbStatus(7,4) = - 1 ) I (ProbStatus(7,4) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Process Board I is no longer dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(7, I :2))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board no longer have a zero count rate'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(8,4) = 2 ) & (ProbStatus(8,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 2 is dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(8, I :2))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r all sensors corresponding t o the board fo r 5 cons. obs.'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(8,4) = I ) & (ProbStatus(8,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Process Board 2 may be dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(8, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r all sensors corresponding to the board' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(8,4) = 0 ) & ((ProbStatus(8,4) = - 1 ) I (ProbStatus(8,4) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Process Board 2 is no longer dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(8, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board n o longer have a zero count rate'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + l ;
elseif (ProbMat(9,4) = 2 ) & (ProbStatus(9,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 3 is dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(9, I :2))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate for all sensors corresponding to the board for 5 cons. obs.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(9,4) = I ) & (ProbStatus(9,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Process Board 3 may be dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(9, I :2)} } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r a l l sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plrid + l ;
elseif (ProbMat(9,4) = 0 ) & ((ProbStatus(9,4) == - 1 ) I (ProbStatus(9,4) = = -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Process Board 3 is no longer dead: ' num2str(ProbMat(9, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board n o longer have a zero count rate'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat( I 0,4) == 2) & (ProbStatus( I 0,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 4 is dead: ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r all sensors corresponding t o the board fo r 5 cons. obs.'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Pind = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat( I 0,4) == I ) & (ProbStatus( I 0,4) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Process Board 4 may be dead: ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r all sensors corresponding to the board' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat( I 0,4) == 0) & ((ProbStatus( 1 0,4) = - I ) I (ProbStatus( I 0,4) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Process Board 4 is no longer dead: ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0, I :2))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board no longer have a zero count rate' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif any(ProbMat( 1 1 :30,4)) I any(ProbStatus( 1 1 :30,4))
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for k = 1 :20
if (ProbMat(k+ 1 0,4)
2) & (ProbStatus(k+ 1 0,4) -= 0)
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The RA DSiP sensor is dead: ' num2str(ProbMat( l o+k, I :3))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate for the sensor for 5 cons. obs.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
if (ProbMat(k+ I 0,4)
I ) & (ProbStatus(k+ I 0,4) -= 0)
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The RADSiP sensor may be dead: ' num2str(ProbMat( I o+k, l :3)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Zero count rate fo r the sensor' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
if (ProbMat(k+ I 0,4)
0) & ((ProbStatus(k+ I 0,4) == - 1 ) I (ProbStatus(k+ l 0,4) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The RADSiP sensor is no longer dead: ' num2str(ProbMat( I o+k, I :3 )) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors n o longer has a zero count rate' } ;
Colorident(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
end
end

=

=

=

Stuck.Inference Function
This function acts as a sub inference engine for the detection of stuck CAVIS
components.
function [Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd] = Stucklnference(ProbMat,ProbStatus,Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
¾Stucklnference - Inference Engine for the stuck sensors
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% 1 1 / 1 3/03
if (ProbMat(3,5) == 2) & (ProbStatus(3,5) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The PCUD is stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(3, I )) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'All sensor corresponding to the PCDU have same count rate fo r 5 cons. obs.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(3,5) 0 ) & (ProbStatus(3,5) = = -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The PCUD is no longer stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(3, l)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the PCDU n o longer have the same count rate'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(4,5) = 2 ) & (ProbStatus(4,5) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. is stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(4, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'All sensor corresponding to the Sen. Cone. have same count rate fo r 5 cons. obs.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + l ;
elseif (ProbMat(4,5)
0) & (ProbStatus(4,5) == -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. is no longer stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(4, l :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the Sen. Cone. n o longer have the same count rate' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(5,5) 2 ) & (ProbStatus(5,5) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board I is stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(5, I :2))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'All sensor corresponding to the board have same count rate for 5 cons. obs.'};
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I;
elseif (ProbMat(5,5) 0) & (ProbStatus(5,5)
-2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board l is no longer stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(5, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board n o longer have the same count rate' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
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elseif (ProbMat(6,5)
2) & (ProbStatus(6,5) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 2 is stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(6, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'All sensor corresponding to the board have same count rate fo r 5 cons. obs. ' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(6,5)
0) & (ProbStatus(6,5) == -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 2 is no longer stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(6, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board n o longer have the same count rate' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(7,5)
2 ) & (ProbStatus(7,5) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board I is stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(7, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'All sensor corresponding to the board have same count rate fo r 5 cons. obs.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(7,5) = 0) & (ProbStatus(7,5) = -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board I is no longer stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(7, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding t o the board n o longer have the same count rate' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(8,5)
2) & (ProbStatus(8,5) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 2 is stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(8, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'All sensor corresponding t o the board have same count rate fo r 5 cons. obs.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd.:) = 2 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(8,5)
0 ) & (ProbStatus(8,5) == -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = { 'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 2 is no longer stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(8, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board n o longer have the same count rate'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + 1 ;
elseif (ProbMat(9,5) == 2) & (ProbStatus(9,5) -= O);
Problem(Plnd,:) = { 'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 3 is stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(9, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'All sensor corresponding t o the board have same count rate fo r 5 cons. obs.'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(9,5)
0) & (ProbStatus(9,5) == -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 3 is no longer stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat(9, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding t o the board n o longer have the same count rate'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat( I 0,5) == 2 ) & (ProbStatus( I 0,5) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 4 is stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'All sensor corresponding to the board have same count rate fo r 5 cons. obs. ' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat( I 0,5)
0) & (ProbStatus( I 0,5)
-2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = { 'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 4 is no longer stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding t o the board n o longer have the same count rate' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elsei f any(ProbMat( I 1 :30,5)) I any(ProbStatus( l 1 :30,5))
for k = I :20
if (ProbMat(k+ l 0,5)
2) & (ProbStatus(k+ l 0,5) -= 0)
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The RADSiP sensor is stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat( I O+k, I :3)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensor had the same count rate for 5 cons. obs.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
if (ProbMat(k+ l 0,5)
0) & (ProbStatus(k+ 1 0,5)
-2)
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The RADSiP sensor is no longer stuck: ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0+k, I :3)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensor n o longer had the same count rate'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
end
end

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

163

LooseWirelnference Function
This function acts as a sub inference engine for the detection of loose and damage wire
connections of CAVIS components.
function [Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd] = LooseWirelnference(ProbMat,ProbStatus,Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
¾LooseWirelnference - Inference Engine for the loose wire sensors
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% 1 1 / 1 3/03
if (ProbMat(3,6)
2) & (ProbStatus(3,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The PCUD has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(3, I )) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. fo r a l l sensors corresponding to the PCDU' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(3,6)
I ) & (ProbStatus(3,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The PCUD may have a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(3, l )) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. fo r all sensors corresponding to the PCDU' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(3,6)
0) & ((ProbStatus(3,6) == - 1 )l(ProbStatus(3,6) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The PCUD no longer has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(3, I )) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the PCDU no longer have a count rate variance inc.'};
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat{4,6) 2 ) & (ProbStatus(4,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = fThe Sensor Cone. has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(4, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. fo r all sensors corresponding to the Sen. Cone.'};
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(4,6)
I ) & (ProbStatus(4,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Cone. may have a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(4, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. fo r all sensors corresponding to the Sen. Cone.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif(ProbMat(4,6)
0) & ((ProbStatus(4,6) == - l )l(ProbStatus(4,6) = -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. no longer has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(4, I :2)) };
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the Sen. Cone. no longer have a count rate variance inc.' };
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat{5,6) 2 ) & (ProbStatus(5,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board I has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(5, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. fo r all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif(ProbMat{5,6)
I ) & (ProbStatus(5,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board I may have a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(5, l :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. fo r all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(5,6)
0) & ((ProbStatus(5,6) == - 1 )l(ProbStatus(5,6) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board I no longer has a loose wire conn. : ' num2str(ProbMat(5, I :2))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board no longer have a count rate variance inc.'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(6,6) 2 ) & (ProbStatus(6,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 2 has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(6, l :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. fo r a l l sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(6,6)
I ) & (ProbStatus(6,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 2 may have a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(6, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. fo r all sensors corresponding to the board' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
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Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(6,6)
0) & ((ProbStatus(6,6) == - 1 )l(ProbStatus(6,6) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = ('The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 2 no longer has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(6, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board n o longer have a count rate variance inc.'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(7,6) = 2 ) & (ProbStatus(7,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board I has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(7, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. fo r all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(7,6)
I ) & (ProbStatus(7,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Process Board I may have a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(7, I :2)) };
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. for all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(7,6) 0 ) & ((ProbStatus(7,6)
- 1 )l(ProbStatus(7,6) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Process Board I no longer has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(7, I :2)) };
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board no longer have a count rate variance inc.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(8,6) 2 ) & (ProbStatus(8,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 2 has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(8, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. fo r all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(8,6)
I ) & (ProbStatus(8,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Process Board 2 may have a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(8, I :2))};
Logic(Plnd,:) = ( 'Count rate variance inc. for all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(8,6)
0) & ((ProbStatus(8,6)
- I )l(ProbStatus(8,6) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Process Board 2 no longer has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(8, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board no longer have a count rate variance inc.'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(9,6) = 2 ) & (ProbStatus(9,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 3 has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(9, I :2))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = { 'Count rate variance inc. for all sensors corresponding to the board'};
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(9,6)
I ) & (ProbStatus(9,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The Sensor Process Board 3 may have a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(9, I :2)) };
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. for all sensors corresponding to the board'};
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I;
Plnd = Plnd + I;
elsei f (ProbMat(9 ,6) 0) & ((ProbStatus(9 ,6)
- 1 )l(ProbStatus(9 ,6) == -2) );
Problem(Plnd,:) = ('The Sensor Process Board 3 no longer has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat(9, I :2)) };
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board no longer have a count rate variance inc.' };
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
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Plnd = Plnd + I ;

elseif (ProbMat( l0,6) == 2 ) & (ProbStatus( I 0,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 4 has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat( 1 0, l :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. fo r all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat( I 0,6) == I ) & (ProbStatus( I 0,6) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = ('Warning: The Sensor Process Board 4 may have a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0, I :2)) };
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'Count rate variance inc. for all sensors corresponding to the board' };
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I;
Plnd = Plnd + I;
elseif (ProbMat( I 0,6) == 0) & ((ProbStatus( I 0,6)
- l )l(ProbStatus( I 0,6)
-2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Process Board 4 no longer has a loose wire conn.: ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0, I :2))};
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors corresponding to the board no longer have a count rate variance inc.'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif any(ProbMat( I I :30,6)) I any(ProbStatus( l l :30,6))

=

=
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for k = 1 :20
if (ProbMat(k+ l 0,6) = 2) & (ProbStatus(k+ I 0,6) -= 0)
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The RADSiP sensor has a loose wire conn. : ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0+k, I :3)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = { 'Count rate variance inc. for the sensor'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
i f ( ProbMat(k+ I 0,6) = 1 ) & (ProbStatus(k+ l 0,6) -= 0)
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The RADSiP sensor may have a loose wi re conn . : ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0+k, l :3)) } ;
Logic(Plnd, :) = {'Count rate variance inc. for the sensors' } :
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = l ;
Plnd = Plnd + l ;
end
if(ProbMat(k+ l 0,6) = 0) & ((ProbStatus(k+ l 0,6) = - l )l(ProbStatus(k+ l 0,6) == -2));
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The RADSiP sensor no longer has a loose wire conn.: ' nurn2str(ProbMat( I 0+k, I :3)) } ;
Logic(P lnd,:) = {'The sensor n o longer has a count rate variance inc.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
end
end

Unpluggedlnference Function
This function acts as a sub inference engine for the detection of unplugged CA VIS
components.
function [Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd] = Unpluggedlnference(ProbMat, ProbStatus, Prob lem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
%Unplugged Inference - Inference Engine for unplugged component failure
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% 1 1 / 1 3/03
if (ProbMat(3,7) == 2) & (ProbStatus(3,7) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The PCUD has been unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(3 , I )) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication i s lost for all sensors corresponding to the PCDU' } ;
Colorldent( Plnd, :) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(3,7)
0 ) & (ProbStatus(3,7) == -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The PCUD is no longer unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(3, I )) } ;
Logic(Plnd, : ) = {'The communication has been restored for all sensors corresponding to the PCDU'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + l ;
elseif (ProbMat(4,7)
2 ) & (ProbStatus(4,7) -= 0):
Problem(Plnd, :) = {'The Sensor Cone. has been unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(4, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication is lost for all sensors corresponding to the Sen. Cone.' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,: ) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(4,7) = 0) & (ProbStatus(4,7) = -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. is no longer unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(4, 1 :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd, : ) = {'The communication has been restored fo r all sensors corresponding t o the Sen. Cone .' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd, : ) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(S,7) = 2) & (ProbStatus(S,7) -= 0);
Problem( Plnd, :) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 1 has been unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(5, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd, :) = {'The communication i s lost for all sensors corresponding to the board' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + l ;
elsei f (ProbMat(S,7 )
0) & (ProbStatus(S,7 ) == -2);
Problem(Plnd, :) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board I is no longer unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(5, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication has been restored for all sensors corresponding to the board' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd, :) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
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elseif (ProbMat(6,7)
2) & (ProbStatus(6,7) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 2 has been unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(6, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication i s lost for all sensors corresponding to the board' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(6,7)
0) & (ProbStatus(6,7) == -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Comm. Board 2 is no longer unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(6, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication has been restored fo r all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(7,7) = 2 ) & (ProbStatus(7,7) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 1 has been unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(7, 1 :2)) };
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication is lost for all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorfdent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(7,7)
0) & (ProbStatus(7,7) == -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board I is no longer unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(7, 1 :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication has been restored for all sensors corresponding to the board' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + l ;
elseif (ProbMat(8,7) 2 ) & (ProbStatus(8,7) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 2 has been unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(8, I :2)) };
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication is lost for all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(8,7)
0) & (ProbStatus(8,7) == -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 2 is no longer unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(8, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication has been restored for all sensors corresponding to the board' };
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(9,7) 2 ) & (ProbStatus(9,7) -= 0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 3 has been unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(9, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication i s lost fo r a l l sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat(9,7)
0) & (ProbStatus(9,7)
-2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 3 is no longer unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat(9, I :2)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication has been restored fo r all sensors corresponding to the board' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3 ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif (ProbMat( I 0,7) == 2) & (ProbStatus( I 0,7) -= O);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 4 has been unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0, 1 :2)) };
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication is lost for all sensors corresponding to the board'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
elseif(ProbMat( I 0,7)
0) & (ProbStatus( l 0,7) == -2);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The Sensor Cone. Process. Board 4 is no longer unplugged: ' num2str(ProbMat( I 0, 1 :2))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The communication has been restored for all sensors corresponding to the board' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
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end

SNMRemovelnference Function

This function acts as a sub inference engine for the detection of the removal of SNM
from the CAVIS system.
function [Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd) = SNMRemovelnference(ProbMat,ProbStatus,Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
%SNMRemovelnference - Inference Engine for the removal of SNM

167

% Written by Joseph Bowling
% 1 1 / 1 3/03
for k = I :20
if(ProbMat(k+ I 0,7) == 2) & (ProbStatus(k+ I 0,7) -= 0)
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Possible removal of SNM at : ' num2str(ProbMat( I O+k, I :3)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensor has experienced a mean shift down i n count rate' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
if (ProbMat(k+ 1 0,7) == I ) & (ProbStatus(k+ 1 0,7) -= 0)
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The SNM may have been removed: ' num2str(ProbMat( l o+k, I :3)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensor has experienced a mean shift down i n count rate' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
if (ProbMat(k+ I 0,7) == 0) & ((ProbStatus(k+ 1 0,7)
- 1 ) I (ProbStatus(k+ I 0,7) == -2))
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The SNM removal state no longer exists: ' num2str(ProbMat( l o+k, I :3))} ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensor i s no longer experiencing a mean shift down i n count rate'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
end

=

DriftSPRTinference Function
This function acts as a sub inference engine for the detection of drifting RADSiP
radiation sensors.
function [Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd] = DriftSPRTlnference(ProbMat,ProbStatus,Problem,Logic,Colorldent,Plnd);
%DriftSPRTinference - Inference Engine for drifting sensors by SPRT
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% I 1 / 1 3/03
for k = I :20
i f (ProbMat(k+ I 0,9) == 2) & (ProbStatus(k+ 1 0,9) -= 0) & (max(ProbMat(k+ 1 0,4:7))=-0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The RADSiP sensor is drifting: ' num2str(ProbMat( I o+k, I :3)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors i s experiencing SPRT alarms' } ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 2;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
if(ProbMat(k+ I 0,9) == I) & (ProbStatus(k+ I 0,9) ---= 0) & (max(ProbMat(k+ I 0,4:7))==0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'Warning: The RADSiP sensor may be drifting: ' num2str(ProbMat( I O+k, I :3)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors i s experiencing SPRT alarms'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = I ;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
if (ProbMat(k+ J 0,9) == 0) & ((ProbStatus(k+ I 0,9)==-1 )l(ProbStatus(k+ I 0,9) == -2)) & (max(ProbMat(k+ I 0,4:7))==0);
Problem(Plnd,:) = {'The RADSiP sensor is no longer drifting: ' num2str(ProbMat( I o+k, I :3)) } ;
Logic(Plnd,:) = {'The sensors i s no longer experiencing SPR T alarms'} ;
Colorldent(Plnd,:) = 3;
Plnd = Plnd + I ;
end
end
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ExcelNew Function

This function acts as a communication module between the CA VIS monitoring system
and the EXCEL database.
function [ PExInd] = Excel ESNew( Problem, Logic,Colorldent, H, PEx lnd,ch 7 ,index);
%ExcelESNew - script that writes the problem to the excel database.
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% 1 1 - 1 3-03
for m = I :length(Problem(:, I ));
PExlnd = PExlnd + I ;
R = num2str(PEx ind);
TimePos = ('r' R 'c 1 1;
IndPos = ['r' R 'c2');
ProPos = ['r' R 'c31;
LogPos = ['r' R 'c41;
¾ResPos = ('r' R 'c5'];
ColPos = ['r' R 'c6');
ProbChar = char(Problem(m,:));
LogChar = char(Logic(m,:));
%ResChar = char(Response(m,:));
re = ddepoke(ch7,TimePos,H);
re = ddepoke(ch7, IndPos,index);
re = ddepoke(ch7,ProPos,ProbChar');
re = ddepoke(ch7,LogPos, LogChar');
%re = ddepoke(ch7,ResPos,LogChar');
re = ddepoke(ch7,ColPos,Colorident(m,:));
end

RAMM Code

This script initiates and runs a demonstration of the RAMM.
%NeighborRes - Script file that runs the neighborhood system using the
%residual of the sensor.
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% 7/2 1 /03
clear all;
%Define the Warehouse
VaultRow = 4;
VaultCol = 5;
VauitHeight = input('Enter the height the concentrators are stacked to: ');
WareX = input('Enter the number of vaults (x coordinate) in the warehouse: ');
WareY = input('Enter the number of vaults (y coordinate) in the warehouse: ');
%Create the Sensor Space
[Space] = FabricateSen(VaultRow, VaultCoI, VaultHeight, WareX, WareY);
%Create the radiation signal
time = input('Enter the time length of the demo: ');
[t,mu l ] = FabricateSignal(VaultRow, VaultCol,VaultHeight,WareX,WareY ,time);
%Define the fault to induce in the warehouse
choice = input('Simulate a source of mean shift up in the warehouse: I :Source, 2:Crash Spike: ');
if choice = I
faultindex = input('Enter the index the external source appears in the warehouse: ');
source = input('Enter the x and y coordinate of the source in sensor units [x y z]: ');
[tex] = extsource(time);
%Define the parameters for the moving source
XS = [ I ;VaultRow*WareX];XY = [ I ;VaultCol *WareY];
[centerspace] = centroid([XS XY]);
Arrive = 0;
end
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if choice = 2
faultindex = input('Enter the index the crash occurs in the warehouse: ');
Crash = input('Enter the SC vault stack the crash occurred in [WareX WareY]: ');
if(Crash( I , I )>WareX) I (Crash( l ,2)>WareY)
error('Spike is outside dimension of Warehouse');
end
A = (Crash(:, I ) - I ) • VaultRow + I ;
B = Crash( :, ) ) • VaultRow;
C = (Crash(:,2) - 1 ) * VaultCol + I ;
D = Crash(:,2) • VaultCol;
Ind = I ;
end
%Kernel Smoothing Parameters
width = input('Enter the Kernel Smoothing Width: ');
Vresolution = input('Enter the vertical resolution of the Kernel Smoothing ');
Hresolution = 1 ; %input('Enter the resolution of the Kernel Smoothing');
[gauss.Interest] = LoadGauss(VaultRow, VaultCol,WareX,WareY,VaultHeight, Vresolution,Hresolution,width);
%Define plotting parameters and loop
[ts ty] = size(t);
x = [ 1 : 1 :VaultRow*WareX];
y = [ 1 : 1 :VaultCol*WareY];
preMike = O;
PreNeigh I = zeros(VaultRow*WareX*VaultCol*WareY*(VaultHeight*Vresolution-(Vresolution-1 )), I );
PreNeigh2 = zeros(VaultRow•WareX*VaultCol*WareY*(VaultHeight*Vresolution-(Vresolution- 1 )), I );
PreNeigh3 = zeros(VaultRow* WareX*VaultCol*WareY*(VaultHeight*Vresolution-(Vresolution- 1 )), I );
PreNeigh4 = zeros(VaultRow*WareX*VaultCol*WareY*(VaultHeight*Vresolution-(Vresolution- 1 )), I );
PreNeigh5 = zeros(VaultRow*WareX*VaultCol*WareY*(VaultHeight*Vresolution-(Vresolution- 1 )), 1 );
Sara = O;
for i = I :ty
Sara = Sara + I ;
%Insert count rate i n Space 4
Space(:,4) = t(:,i);
%Insert Faults into Space
if (Sara >= faultindex) & (choice = I );
%Add external noise source to the signal
source( :,4) = tex(:,i);
[Space] = addext(Space,source);
end
if (Sara == faultindex) & (choice == 2);
%Add spike to faulted vaults
for k = I :VaultHeight;
CC = C- 1 ;
for j = C: D
CC = CC + I ;
AA = A;
for j = A:B
F = ((k-1 )*VaultRow*WareX*VaultCol*WareY) + ((CC- I )*VaultRow•WareX) + AA;
G(lnd,:) = F;
Ind = Ind + I ;
AA = AA + I ;
end
end
end
[Gx Gy]=size(G);
for k = 1 :Gx
Gcount = G(k,:);
Space(Gcount,4) = 3 *Space(Gcount,4);
end
end
%Calculate the residual
Space(:,4) = Space(:,4) - mu l ;
%Kernel Smoothing
[SmoothSpace] = KernalSmooth(Space,gauss, VaultRow,VaultCol,WareX, WareY, VaultHeight, Vresolution,Interest);
%Plot the Neighborhood
figure( ! )
AlphaPlot(SmoothSpace,VaultRow, VaultCol, WareX, WareY, Vault Height, Vresolution,[O 20]);
zlabel('Sensor in Z');
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xlabel('Sensor Space in X');ylabel('Sensor Space in Y');
title('Neighborhood Score');
drawnow;
%Plot the UnSmoothed Data
figure(4)
AlphaPlot(Space, VaultRow, VaultCol, WareX, WareY,VaultHeight, 1 ,[0 20});
zlabel('Sensor in Z');
xlabel('Sensor Space in X');ylabel('Sensor Space in Y');
title('UnSmoothed Data - Residuals');
drawnow;
%Record largest residuals.
Mike = max(Space(:,4));
if Mike > preMike
figure(2);
AlphaPlot(SmoothSpace, VaultRow, VaultCol, WareX, WareY,VaultHeight, Vresolution,[0 20]);
%axis([- 1 VaultRow*WareX+ I - 1 VaultCol*WareY+ l - 1 00 400]);
title('Maximum of Neighborhood');
zlabel('Sensor in Y');
xlabel('Sensor Space in X');ylabel('Sensor Space in Y');
preMike = Mike;
drawnow;
end
%Plot Tails
Tails = SmoothSpace;
Tails(:,4) = (SmoothSpace(:,4)+(exp(- I /3))*PreNeigh I +(exp(-2/3 ))*PreNeigh2+(exp(-3/3))*PreNeigh3+(exp(4/3 ))*PreNeigh4+(exp(-5/3 ))*PreNeighS)./2.0503;
figure(3);
AlphaPlot(Tails, Vault Row, VaultCol, WareX, WareY, VaultHeight, Vresolution,[0 20]);
title('Tail Plot of Neighborhood Score');
zlabel('Sensor in Y');
xlabel('Sensor Space in X');ylabel('Sensor Space in Y');
drawnow;
PreNeigh5 = PreNeigh4;
PreNeigh4 = PreNeigh3;
PreNeigh3 = PreNeigh2;
PreNeigh2 = PreNeigh I ;
PreNeigh l = SmoothSpace(:,4);
%Find the maximum of the neighborhood space
if ( (Sara<faultindex )&(choice== I )) I ((Sara-= faultindex )&(choice==2))
SourcelocPre(Sara,:) = [0 0 0];
elsei f ( ((Sara>= faultindex)&(choice= I )) I ((Sara==faultindex )&(choice==2 )));
ind = find(max(SmoothSpace(:,4)) == SmoothSpace(:,4));
A = SmoothSpace(ind, I :3);
%Chart position of source prediction location
SourcelocPre(Sara,:) = [A];
if choice == l ;
Error(Sara,:) = source(:, I :3)-A;
end
if choice = 2;
Crash Pre = [ceil(center( l , 1 )/VaultRow) ceil(center( l ,2)/VaultCol)];
Error = Crash - Crash Pre;

end
end
%Chart position of source location
if choice = I ;
Sourceloc(Sara,:) = [source( I , I :3)];
end
%Alter the coordinates of the source
if (choice = I ) & (Sara >= faultindex);
[source.Arrive] = Alter(source,centerspace,Arrive,WareX,WareY,VaultRow,VaultCol,VaultHeight);
end
if Sara = I
pause
end
end
%Plot position of source and prediction of source location
if choice = I
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for i = faultindex :Sara
figure(5);
Brian = plot3(SourceLoc(i, I ),SourceLoc(i,2),SourceLoc(i,3),'r +');hold
on;plot3(SourceLocPre(i, 1 ),SourceLocPre(i,2),SourceLocPre(i,3),'b 0')
title('Location of Source');
zlabel('Neighborhood Score');
xlabel('Sensor Space in X');ylabel('Sensor Space in Y');
legend('Source Location','Source Location Prediction',0);
grid on;
axis([- 1 VaultRow*WareX+ l -1 VaultCol*WareY+ l O VaultHeight+ I J);
set(Brian);
drawnow;
pause(.2)
cla
end
%plot the error in the prediction
figure(6)
ErrorTotal = sqrt(Error(:, 1 )."2+Error(:,2)."2+Error(:,3)."2);
plot(ErrorTotal(faultindex:Sara,:));xlabel('Time Step');ylabel('Error Value (Sensor Space Units)');
title('Error in Prediction of Neighborhood System');
end
%Error in Crash fault
if choice = 2
ErrorTotal = sqrt(Error(:, I )."2+Error(:,2)."2);
fprintt'('\nA crash spike occurred in Sensor Concentrator Vault %g %g \n',CrashPre( 1, I ),Crash Pre( 1 ,2));
fprintt'('The actual spike occurred in Sensor Concentrator Vault %g %g \n',Crash( I, I ),Crash( 1 ,2));
fprintt'('The error in the prediction is %g in Vault Units',ErrorTotal);
end

FabricateSen Function
This function creates the three dimensional array and the RADSiP sensor information for
the RAMM.
function [Space] = FabricateSen(VaultRow, VaultCol, VaultHeight,WareX, WareY)
%Fabricate - Fabricates the data for the neighborhood function.
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% VaultRow - The number of rows in the vault
% VaultCol - The number of columns in the vault
% VaultHeight - The height the vaults are stacked to
% VaultX - The number of vaults x coordinate
% VaultY - The number of vaults y coordinate
%
% [Space] = Fabricate(VaultRow,VaultCol,VaultHeight,VaultX,VaultY);
%Create the Sensor Space
index = l ;
for k = I :VaultHeight %Change the I to a zero to make ground 0
for j = l :VaultCol*WareY
for i = l :VaultRow*WareX
Count = [i j k OJ;
Space(index,:) = Count;
index = index + I ;
end
end
end
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FabricateSignal Function

This function creates the RADSiP radiation signal for use in the RAMM.
function [t,mu I ] = FabricateSignal(VaultRow,VaultCol,VaultHeight,WareX, WareY,time)
%Fabricate - Fabricates the data for the neighborhood function.
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% VaultRow - The number of rows in the vault
% VaultCol - The number of columns in the vault
% VaultHeight - The height the vaults are stacked to
% VaultX - The number of vaults x coordinate
% VaultY - The number of vaults y coordinate
%
% [Space] = Fabricate(VaultRow, VaultCol, VaultHeight, VaultX, VaultY);
%Fabricate the data
mu I ( I :VaultRow*VaultCol*VaultHeight*WareX*WareY) = round( I OO*rand( I , VaultRow*VaultCol*VaultHeight*WareX*WareY))

+ 20;

sig( l :VaultRow*VaultCol*VaultHeight*WareX*WareY) = sqrt(mu l );
for index = I :time
randy = randn( I , VaultRow*VaultCol* VaultHeight*WareX*WareY);
data = round(mu I ( I : VaultRow*VaultCol *VaultHeight*WareX • WareY) + sig. *randy);
t(index,:) = data;
end
t = t';
mu ! = mu l ';

Extsource Function

This function creates the external source abnormality that the RAMM demonstration will
track.
function [tex] = extsource(time);
o/oextsource - Function that creates the external source to add to the fabricated signal
%in the neighborhood system.
%Fabricate the external source
exmu 1 ( 1 : I ) = round{ I OO*rand( l , I )) + 40;
exsig( I : I ) = sqrt( exmu I );
for index = I :time
randy = randn( I , I );
data = round(exmu I ( I : I ) + exsig. *randy);
tex(index,:) = data;
end
tex = tex';

LoadGauss Function

This function creates and loads the kernel function information necessary for the kernel
smoothing of the RADSiP radiation signal.
function [gauss,lnterest] = LoadGauss(VaultRow, VaultCol, WareX, WareY, VaultHeight, Vresolution,Hresolution, width);
%LoadGauss - Loads of creates the gaussian data for the Neighborhood System
% distance - the distance from each point to each other.
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% gauss - gaussian value of distance with width
% VaultRow - The number of rows in the vault
% VaultCol - The number of columns in the vault
% VaultHeight - The height the vaults are stacked to
% WareX - The number of vaults x coordinate
% WareY - The number of vaults y coordinate
% h - smoothing parameter
% Vresolution - Vertical resolution of the smoothing (Number of Nodes)
% Hresolution - Horizontal resolution of the smoothing (Number of Nodes)
%
% Written by Joseph Bowling, August 6,2003
if (VaultRow==4)&(VaultCol=5)&(WareX-=4)&(WareY==4)&(VaultHeight==3)&(Vresolution== l )&(width=2.5)
load gauss-4-4-3-2_5
elsei f (VaultRow==4 )&(VaultCol==5)&(WareX==4 )&(WareY ==4)&(VaultHeight==3 )&(Vresolution== 1 )&(width=3)
load gauss-4-4-3-3
elseif(VaultRow-=4)&(VaultCol==5)&(WareX==5)&(WareY==5)&(VaultHeight=2)&(Vresolution== l )&(width= 3 )
load gauss-5-5-2-3
elseif (VaultRow==4)&(VaultCol==5)&(WareX== 3 )&(WareY=3 )&(VaultHeight=2)&(Vresolution= I )&(width=5)
load gauss-3-3-2-5
elsei f (VaultRow==4)&(VaultCol==5)&(WareX--4)&(WareY -=4)&(VaultHeight= 5)&(Vresolution== I )&(width= 3 .5)
load gauss-4-4-5-3_5
elseif (VaultRow==4)&(VaultCol==5)&(WareX= 3)&(WareY= 3)&(VaultHeight= l 5)&(Vresolution= l )&(width==4)
load gauss-3-3- 1 5-4
elseif (VaultRow==4)&(VaultCol==5)&(WareX==4)&(WareY==4)&(VaultHeight= I )&(Vresolution== I )&(width=4)
load gauss-4-4- l -4
elseif (VaultRow==4)&(VaultCo1==5)&(WareX==3)&(WareY==3)&(VaultHeight=2)&(Vresolution= l )&(width=4)
load gauss-3-3-2-4
elseif (VaultRow=4)&(VaultCol= 5)&(WareX==2 )&(WareY==2)&(VaultHeight=6)&(Vresolution== 1 )&( width==4)
load gauss-2-2-6-4
elsei f (VaultRow==4 )&(VaultCol=5)&(WareX=2 )&(WareY==2)&(VaultHeight=6)&(Vresolution== I )&( width=2.5)
load gauss-2-2-6-2_5
elseif (VaultRow==4)&(VaultCol==5)&(WareX==2)&(WareY==2)&(VaultHeight=3)&(Vresolution==2)&(width=2 . 5 )
load gauss-2-2-3-2_5-2
elseif (VaultRow==4)&(VaultCol==5)&(WareX= 3)&(WareY=3)&(VaultHeight=5)&(Vresolution==2)&(width=2 . 5)
load gauss-3-3-5-2_5-2
elseif (VaultRow==4)&(VaultCo1==5)&(WareX= 3)&(WareY==3)&(VaultHeight=6)&(Vresolution== l )&(width= 2.5)
load gauss-3-3-6-2_5
else
fprintfl'\n\nThe gauss matrix does not exist for the specified architecture.\n');
fprintfl'Please wait will it is being created and saved .\n');
filename = input('Enter the gauss data matrix filename (gauss-WareX-WareY-VaultHeight-Width-Vresolution): ','s');
fprintfl'Please make the appropriate changes to the function LoadGauss');
[distance,gauss,lnterest] = Distance(VaultRow, VaultCol,WareX,WareY, VaultHeight, Vresolution, H resolution, width);
eval(['save ' filename ' gauss Interest']);
end
%Experiment with this to avoid having to enter the gauss matrix name
%filename = char('gauss',WareXs,'-',WareYs,'-',VaultHeights);

Addext Function

This function adds the external radiation source to the radiation signals in the RAMM
demonstration.
function [Space] = addext(Space,source);
o/oaddext - Adds external source to the radiation signal based on the
%distance from the source to the sensor in question .
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% 7/23/03
%Determine the distance between the source and the sensor in question
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[spacex spacey] = size(Space);
index = I ;
for i = I :spacex
distance(index,:) = sqrt(sum((source( I , I :3)-Space(i, I :3))."2));
index = index + I ;
end
%Determine the effect the source would have on the sensor at the various
%distances.
A = 1 ./((distance(:, I )."2+ I ))*source(:,4);
%Add the effect of the external source to the existing count rate for the
%sensor
Space( :,4) = Space(:,4) + A;

AlphaPlot Function

This function creates a transparent three-dimensional plot of the RAMM result.
function AlphaPlot(SmoothSpace, Vault Row, VaultCol, WareX, WareY, VaultHeight, Vresolution,Caxis);
¾AlphaPlot - Slice plotting for the Neighborhood System
%
% Written By Joseph Bowling
% Aug 3, 2003
%
% SmoothSpace - Smooth Data
% VaultRow - The number of rows in the vault
% VaultCol - The number of columns in the vault
% VaultHeight - The height the vaults are stacked to
% VaultX - The number of vaults x coordinate
% VaultY - The number of vaults y coordinate
%
% AlphaPlot(SmoothSpace, VaultRow, VaultCol, WareX, WareY, VaultHeight);
x = SmoothSpace(:, 1 );%Space(:, I ); %SmoothSpace(:, I );
y = SmoothSpace(:,2);%Space( :,2); %SmoothSpace(:,2);
z = SmoothSpace( :,3);%Space(:,3); %SmoothSpace(:,3);
res = SmoothSpace(:,4);%Space( :,4); %SmoothSpace(:,4);
dimen = VaultRow•WareX *VaultCol*WareY;
for i = I :VaultHeight * Vresolution - (Vresolution - I );
Count2 = dimen*i-dimen;
for j = I :VaultRow•WareX
Count I = Count2;
Count2 = Count2 + I ;
Count ! = Count! + I ;
for k = I :VaultCot•WareY
Res(kj,i) = res(Count l , I );
Count I = Count! + VaultRow•WareX;
end
end
end
[x,y.z] = meshgrid( l : I :VaultRow•WareX, I : I :VaultCol*WareY, I : 1 /Vresolution:VaultHeight);
h = slice(x,y,z,Res, I : I :VaultRow•WareX, I : I :VaultCol*WareY, I : 1 /Vresolution:VaultHeight);
%axis([0 16 0 20 0 4])
set(h, 'EdgeColor','none', 'FaceColor', 'interp', . . .
'FaceAlpha','interp');
axis([0 VaultRow•WareX 0 VaultCol*WareY 0 max(VaultHeight,VaultCol*WareY/2)])
alpha('color');
%alpha('color');
colormap('NeighColorMap');
caxis(Caxis);
colorbar;
% VIEW(AZ,EL)
%alphamap('rampdown')
%alphamap('increase',. l )
%colorrnap(hsv)
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Alter Function
This function alters the position of the external radiation source in the CAVIS array
during the RAMM demonstration.
function [source,Arrive] = Alter(source,centerspace,Arrive, WareX, WareY, Vault Row, VaultCol, VaultHeight);
%Alter - Alters the coordinates of the source for the NeighMove demo
% Written by Joseph Bowling
% source - location of external source in sensor space
%
% [source] = Alter(source,centerspace);
CS = round(centerspace);
source(:, I :2) = round(source(:, I :2));
FFF = rand;
if (FFF > 0.5) & (source(:,3) -= VaultHeight)
source(:,3) = source(:,3) + I ;
end
if (FFF < 0.5) & (source(:,3) -= I )
source(:,3) = source(:,3) - I ;
end
if Arrive == 0
Diff = CS - source(:, I :2);
if Di flt:, I ) > 0
source(:, I ) = source(:, I ) + I ;
elseif Diff(:, I ) < 0
source(:, I ) = source(:, I ) - I ;
elseif Di ff(:, I ) == 0
source(:, I ) = source(:, I );
end
if Diff(:,2) > 0
source(:,2) = source(:,2) + I ;
elseif Di ff(:,2) < 0
source(:,2) = source(:,2) - 1 ;
elseif Diff(:,2) == 0
source(:,2) = source(:,2);
end
end
if Arrive == I
source(:, 1 ) = source(:, I ) + I ;
source(:,2) = source(:,2);
end
if Arrive == 2
source(:, I ) = source(:, I ) - I ;
source(:,2) = source(:,2) - I ;
end
if Arrive = 3
source(:, I ) = source(:, l ) - I ;
source(:,2) = source(:,2) + I ;
end
if Arrive == 4
source(:, I ) = source(:, I ) + I ;
source(:,2) = source(:,2) + l ;
end
if Arrive == 5
source(:, I ) = source(:, I ) + I ;
source(:,2) = source(:,2) - I ;
end
if CS == source(:, I :2)
Arrive = I ;
end
if WareX*VaultRow
source(:, I )
Arrive = 2;
end

=
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if O

=

source(:,2)
Arrive = 3;

end

if O

=

source(:, I )
Arrive = 4;

end

if WareY *VaultCol == source(:,2)
Arrive = 5;

end
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